

RIIO2 Outputs and Incentives

Next steps on framework



Clothilde Cantegreil/ James Veaney 26/09/18



- Update stakeholders and seek feedback on our current thinking relating to:
 - > Output categories
 - > Types of outputs
- Provide stakeholders with an early steer on:
 - Role of the companies/ enhanced engagement in setting outputs – with a focus on Output Delivery Incentives

- Policy development in these areas is **on-going**
- We will be consulting on proposals formally in **December 2018**



٠

The price control settlement seeks to achieve **the right balance** by ensuring network operators deliver the outputs consumers want at a fair price.





What we said in the Framework Decision

We will specify outputs as a set of consumerfacing outcomes that we expect network companies to deliver. We will set minimum standards and these will be imposed as a condition of the licence.

We will apply **output delivery incentives** where service quality improvements beyond the minimum standard may be in the interest of consumers.

We will establish **price control deliverables** where appropriate... the framework will set out a **clear methodology** of what happens if an input or output delivery is not delivered/ delivered late/ to a lower or different specification.



We will specify outputs as a **set of consumer-facing outcomes** that we expect network companies to deliver.

- We will specify outputs as a set of **consumer-facing outcomes** that we expect network companies to deliver.
- We are proposing to consolidate existing output categories into three new proposed categories as described below.
- We have incorporated early feedback on these from our various sector-specific working groups.

Improve the consumer and network user experience

 Network companies must deliver a high quality and reliable service, to all network users and consumers, including those who are vulnerable

Support the energy system transition

• Network companies must enable the transition to a low carbon, consumer-focused energy system

Improve the network and its operation

• Network companies must deliver a safe, sustainable, and resilient network that is more responsive to change



- For the purpose of illustration, we have mapped existing output categories to the three new output categories we are seeking feedback on.
- As with RIIO-1, there is likely to be some overlap between categories.





- For the purpose of illustration, we have mapped existing output measures to the three new proposed output categories we are seeking feedback on.
- As with RIIO-1, there is likely to be some overlap between categories.

	GD	GT	ET	ED
Improve the consumer and network user experience	Reliability and Availability• Interruptions• Guaranteed standards• Stkhldr engagementCustomer Satisfaction• Customer surveys• ComplaintsSocial Obligations• Carbon monoxide safety• Vulnerable customers• FPNESSafety• Emergency responseConnections	Customer Satisfaction • Stakeholder surveys • Stkhldr engagement <u>Reliability</u> <u>Connections</u>	Customer Satisfaction • Stakeholder satisfaction • Stkhldr engagement Connections	Reliability and AvailabilityInterruptionsGuaranteed standardsWorst-served customersCustomer SatisfactionCustomer surveysComplaintsStkhldr engagementVulnerable customersConnections
Support the energy system transition	 Environment BCF Green gas Green company ops 	 Environment Low carbon (compressor emissions) 	Environment BCF SF6 EDR Losses Visual impact	Environment BCF SF6 Oil leakage Energy efficiency Losses Visual impact
Improve the network	 <u>Reliability and Availability</u> Resilience (NOMs) Repex MOBs Shrinkage 	 <u>Reliability and Availability</u> Resilience (NOMs) 	 <u>Reliability and Availability</u> Resilience (NOMs) ENS 	Reliability and Availability Resilience (NOMs)





RIIO2 Outputs and Incentives – next steps on framework



9

- In our RIIO2 Framework Decision, we identified three types of outputs
- \rightarrow Licence obligations
- \rightarrow Price Control Deliverables
- → Service level improvements incentivised through Output Delivery Incentives (ODIs)
- In this slide, we describe the role we expect Ofgem and companies to play in terms of proposing/setting outputs. Ultimately Ofgem will retain final decision-making on all aspects of the price control settlement.



- All activities led by Ofgem (orange) will involve significant stakeholder engagement and consultation.
- We expect companies to engage proactively and make extensive use of their user/ customer groups in developing and putting forward proposals (green). The onus is on the companies to put forward evidence-based proposals.

RIIO2 Outputs and Incentives – next steps on framework



- **Output Delivery Incentives** (ODIs) will incentivise service level improvements by setting target service levels, rewards, and penalties.
- We propose to set a number of *common ODIs* within each sector, and potentially across sectors these will be determined by Ofgem. E.g.:
 - ✓ Reliability
 - ✓ Environment/ low-carbon
 - ✓ Stakeholder surveys
- ODIs may be financially incentivised, or reputational only in nature this will depend on a number of factors, for example how confident we are in our ability to set targets.
- In setting ODIs, we will consider whether some of these mechanisms may operate better on the basis of relative performance.

Opportunities for Network Operators:

- Opportunities to propose bespoke ODIs, in collaboration with their stakeholders and Customer/ User Groups:
 - ✓ Potential areas suited to bespoke outputs could include vulnerability.
 - ✓ We will set clear criteria against which we will assess proposals for bespoke outputs.



- In our December consultation, we will set out proposed criteria against which we will assess any proposals for bespoke ODIs.
- We are still in the process of working these out overall we will consider whether proposals deliver **value for money**.

In assessing proposals, we are likely to consider amongst other things:

- Whether the output reflects a service that consumers expect to receive from a network company that cannot be funded through the price control settlement
- Whether the existing level of service that consumers receive and the extent to which the target level is an improvement on this
- Where appropriate, the level of service provided by other companies/comparators
- The value that consumers will receive from the service level being targeted/increases in existing service levels
- The reward consumers believe is appropriate for achieving the target level/increments of improvement above the target level
- The penalty consumers believe is appropriate for not achieving the target level/increments below the target level
- The activities (and indicative cost) associated with achieving the targeted level of service
- Proposals for licence conditions is performance falls below existing service levels