



Making a positive difference
for energy consumers

To: Domestic electricity and gas suppliers, BEIS, Citizens Advice, Citizens Advice Scotland and other interested parties

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Date: 19 October 2016

Statutory Consultations on the introduction of SLC 32A: Power to direct suppliers to test consumer engagement measures

We are consulting on a proposed modification to the standard conditions of the electricity and gas supply licences¹ in order to introduce new standard condition 32A (proposed SLC 32A). The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) recommended that Ofgem² make this licence modification as part of its remedies for addressing adverse effects on competition (AECs) in the GB energy market.

This consultation letter outlines the background to and rationale for proposed SLC 32A, the main effects of proposed SLC 32A and how Ofgem envisages the powers afforded by this licence condition may be used in practice.³ The statutory consultation notices published alongside this letter set out the envisaged drafting of proposed SLC 32A.

We are seeking views on proposed SLC 32A on or before 18 November 2016.

We are consulting separately on the selection criteria⁴ which would apply to the power of direction contained in proposed SLC 32A.

These consultations form part of the wider programme of work Ofgem is undertaking in relation to the remedies and recommendations made by the CMA. We will be publishing our implementation plan for this wider programme shortly.

Background

CMA investigation, findings and recommendations

Following a two year in-depth review, the CMA has identified a number of AECs in respect of features of the GB energy market. In its final report the CMA has set out the remedies for addressing the AECs, including recommendations to Government and Ofgem. These remedies cover four areas:

¹ Ofgem, Licence conditions, <https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/licences-codes-and-standards/licences/licence-conditions>

² The terms "we", "Ofgem" and "Authority" are used interchangeably in this letter.

³ The commentary in this document about how Ofgem may use powers under proposed SLC 32A is only intended as a general guide and should not be treated as any form of binding commitment by Ofgem.

⁴ Ofgem, Open letter: Proposed selection criteria for mandatory supplier testing of measures to promote domestic consumer engagement, 19 October 2016, <https://ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/open-letter-proposed-selection-criteria-mandatory-supplier-testing-measures-promote-domestic-consumer-engagement>

- creating a framework for effective competition;
- helping customers to engage;
- protecting customers who are unable to exploit the benefits of competition; and
- future-proofing our remedies by building a robust regulatory framework.

The CMA specifically found that a combination of features in the domestic retail supply of gas and electricity gave rise to an AEC through an overarching feature of weak customer response. It found that features leading to weak domestic customer response were:

- customers' limited awareness of and interest in their ability to switch energy supplier, arising in particular from the role of traditional meters and bills and the homogeneous nature of gas and electricity;
- actual and perceived barriers to accessing and assessing information; and
- actual and perceived barriers to switching.

As part of the remedies to address this AEC, the CMA recommended that **Ofgem establish a programme of work to provide customers, directly or through their own suppliers, with measures to prompt them to engage**. It considered that customers' current suppliers have the ability to engage their customers through the regular communications they send to them, but they are likely to face limited incentives to do so.

As such, the CMA recommended that this **Ofgem-led programme should identify, test (through randomised controlled trials (RCTs), where appropriate)⁵ and implement measures to provide domestic consumers with different or additional information with the aim of promoting engagement in the domestic retail energy market**. The CMA further recommended that we **introduce a licence condition to require suppliers to participate in this programme**, to ensure the programme's effective implementation, for which it provided the draft licence condition wording.⁶

The CMA's recommendation suggested that we develop and test proposals concerning the following priority list of measures, to address this AEC:

- changes to the information in domestic bills and how it is presented;
- changes to the information provided to customers on the availability of cheaper tariffs in the markets;
- changes to the specific messaging that domestic customers receive in bills once they move, or are moved, on to a standard variable tariff (SVT) and / or other default tariffs; and
- changes to the name of the default tariff.

It further recommended that this programme should be used to test aspects of the marketing communications sent by rival suppliers to prompt disengaged consumers in the context of the Database remedy. Similarly, the CMA suggested an area for further testing was the form of information that could be presented to prepayment customers to address their lack of awareness and understanding of available options with respect to security deposits.

Our response

Ofgem has considered the CMA's report and fully supports the findings on AECs and remedies to address them, including the recommendation for Ofgem to establish a programme to identify effective information and approaches to prompt consumers to

⁵ And through quasi-experimental and other research methods where not.

⁶ See Appendix 13.1, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/576bcc89ed915d3cfd0000c1/appendix-13-1-standard-condition-32a-fr.pdf>

engage. This is in line with our commitment, set out in an Open Letter in March 2016, to ensure that consumers have the information they need to fully engage with the market and to make well-informed decisions about their energy supply.⁷ Moreover, we are not limiting ourselves to testing only the priority list of measures suggested by the CMA and will be exploring proposals more broadly that would lead to increased customer engagement.

We support the recommendation to test using RCTs, where appropriate, and note that we may also test through quasi-experimental and/or other methods where RCTs are not appropriate. We have recently established a Behavioural Insight unit who have the specialist skills and expertise to apply behavioural insight to the policy issue(s) and to lead the design and management of RCTs (or other methods as appropriate).

In light of the CMA's compelling AEC findings, Ofgem considers that the introduction of proposed SLC 32A would be both a necessary and proportionate regulatory intervention. We also consider that this intervention is consistent with Ofgem's principal objective and general duties. In particular, we note that the power of direction afforded by proposed SLC 32A will ultimately facilitate Ofgem decisions on the most appropriate ways of protecting the interests of existing and future consumers, including in terms of the balance between the promotion of effective competition and more direct methods of consumer protection.

The envisaged text for proposed SLC 32A is set out in the appendices to the statutory notices published alongside this letter.

The drafting of proposed SLC 32A is substantially the same as that provided by the CMA⁸, but we have made minor amendments, to address typographical errors or to better reflect or provide clarity on policy intent. Appendix 1 to this letter sets out in more detail the amendments we have made to the original version of SLC 32A included in the CMA's final report.

The following sections provide an overview and more detail on the key effects of proposed SLC 32A.

Key features of our proposals and their effects

Proposed SLC 32A has two key features: (i) the power to direct licence holders to undertake testing and trialling; and (ii) the information gathering powers. Both are with regards to us being able to use RCTs or other forms of testing to identify effective domestic consumer engagement measures. Below we set out these aspects in more detail, firstly what are consumer engagement measures, and secondly what do the powers of direction and information gathering look like in practice.

Consumer engagement measures

Consumer engagement measures will vary from test/trial to test/trial and will have to be clearly specified from the outset in each case. They are defined as "measures or behaviours which may impact on consumer engagement" in proposed SLC 32A.

The definition of consumer engagement measures is intended to be broad and as such covers **any supplier activity or behaviour that may affect consumer behaviour**. For example, this would include (but is not limited to) **any form of communication** between an energy supplier and a customer to facilitate engagement. This broad definition will ensure that the licence condition is future-proof in light of ongoing market developments or

⁷ Ofgem open letter, Improving consumer communications and the value of trials, 7 March 2016, <https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/99381>

⁸ See Appendix 13.1, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/576bcc89ed915d3cfd0000c1/appendix-13-1-standard-condition-32a-fr.pdf>

industry changes. For example, in the future, smart meters may affect consumer behaviour (eg consumers could change their consumption patterns). Whilst we would generally envisage that our immediate focus will be on information prompts to drive consumer engagement, future trials may be conducted on broader supplier activities or behaviour, which may directly or indirectly impact on consumer engagement.

Randomised controlled trials

Whilst the term "Randomised Controlled Trial" (RCT) is defined in paragraph 8 of proposed SLC 32A, we have used this section to explain the concept and how Ofgem might expect to use powers to direct the use of RCTs in practice.

In order to identify measures that are most effective at prompting consumer engagement we would normally intend to use RCTs. Where appropriate we will require that a pilot study is conducted to ensure all the main parts of the trial work together. Where an RCT is not practical, ethical or appropriate we will explore other experimental methods. In order to refine and develop the interventions for trialling we intend to undertake other forms of consumer research as appropriate. This may include qualitative research such as focus groups, in-depth interviews, deliberative research and lab tests and/or quantitative research such as surveys. Such methods will also be considered to supplement the quantitative data obtained from the trial. For example, we may conduct follow-up research with a sample of trial participants to better understand how and why the intervention was/wasn't effective in changing behaviour. A trial plan/protocol (specification for testing) will be developed for each trial which will outline in detail the objectives, design and methodology of the trial. The exact details of each specification for testing will be outlined in the direction we would envisage issuing if proposed SLC 32A is implemented, as we set out further below.

RCTs are a form of research conducted in a 'real world' setting. Typically, they are an experiment carried out on two or more groups where participants (in this case consumers) are randomly assigned to either a treatment group (who receive the intervention), or a control group (who receive no intervention or just standard practice). The aim is to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention against what would have happened if nothing else had changed, hence allowing us to determine whether a cause-and-effect relationship exists between an intervention and outcome (where the randomised groups are large enough). In this context, an intervention could be providing customers with different or additional information and seeing whether this has an effect on predefined consumer engagement outcomes, such as switching, for example.

These trials are characterised by several important features:

- participants are chosen at random to either the treatment group(s) or control group;
- participants should remain unaware that they are part of a trial or which group they have been assigned to until the end of the study (although there may be situations where this is neither feasible nor appropriate);
- treatment and control groups are treated identically except for the experimental treatment (intervention);
- sample size in each group is large enough to allow statistical tests to be used robustly;
- analysis will focus on difference in predefined measurable outcomes between the treatment and control groups. Outcome data should be collected from all groups at the same time and under the same conditions.

As such, if the control and treatment groups are otherwise identical (or similar), we are able to attribute the size of the difference in effect to the impact of the intervention itself. For example, if one trial related to investigating the effectiveness of changing the name of the default tariff, we could test the impact of changing the name by: (i) assigning the new

default tariff name to one group of consumers - the treatment group; (ii) keeping the current default tariff name for a comparable group of consumers - the control group.

In light of the CMA's final report, we consider that RCTs would be appropriate where:

- the treatment can be applied to a sample of customers independently of a control group;
- the desired outcome can be measured;
- the expected impact of an intervention is sufficiently large for there to be a reasonable expectation of being able to detect it;
- the costs of a trial are proportionate to the potential benefits; and
- the intervention is immediately reversible if found to be ineffective or to have unintended consequences.

Where RCTs are not appropriate we do not preclude the ability to direct suppliers to conduct other, more appropriate, forms of testing, such as laboratory experiments or the use of other quasi-experimental methods.

Power of direction

As set out above, one of the key features of the proposed new licence condition is the power of direction. In this section we set out its effects. Proposed SLC 32A provides Ofgem with the **power to direct one or more suppliers to test/trial the consumer engagement measures that we specify, subject to being given at least one month's prior notice**. The notice period is intended to allow for a reasonable⁹ period of time for a supplier to make all the preparations and other necessary steps to enable successful testing/trialling to be undertaken.

The scope of the power of direction is set out in the definition of "Relevant Matters for Standard Condition 32A" in paragraph 8 of proposed SLC 32A. The scope can be summarised as:

- the broad power to direct suppliers to test or evaluate (including via RCTs) any type of consumer engagement measure in a manner and timescale decided by Ofgem;
- in the context of trials of consumer engagement measures, the power to direct suppliers to provide information to domestic consumers in a manner and timescale decided by Ofgem;
- the power to direct suppliers to produce and submit a plan for conducting trials for engagement measures;
- the broad power to direct suppliers not to comply¹⁰ with any relevant licence conditions, with or without enforceable requirements to comply with any alternative/replacement obligations relevant to the same subject matter (derogation power); and
- the broad power to direct a supplier to provide Ofgem (or any other person) with information about the results of the trial (including underlying data).

We consider that power of direction is a necessary and proportionate regulatory intervention for three main reasons:

1. in light of the CMA's compelling AEC findings in relation to weak consumer response, trials will ultimately play an important role in informing Ofgem policy decisions on

⁹ We will consider what a reasonable period of time is depending on the circumstances and on a case-by-case basis.

¹⁰ Whilst it is envisaged that this power could be used in a similar way to existing powers of derogation that apply to supply licence conditions, in the context of RCTs, it may be necessary to actually prohibit the supplier from complying with an existing licence condition in order to ensure that a selected group of customers only experience the effect of the consumer engagement measure being tested.

- regulatory interventions designed to protect the interests of existing and future energy consumers;
2. such regulatory interventions are unlikely to be aligned with suppliers' commercial interests (eg because they may be facilitating consumer switching to rival suppliers) and therefore there is no guarantee that all relevant suppliers¹¹ would be willing to conduct appropriate trials on a voluntary basis¹² either at all or in the form and timescale envisaged by Ofgem. This also reflects Ofgem's previous experience attempting to run trials during the Retail Market Review; and
 3. the power of direction could be used in different ways, including for example to facilitate trials (or elements of them) being conducted on a voluntary basis, eg by formally giving suppliers a derogation from relevant licence conditions. This derogation would provide suppliers with assurance that no enforcement activity will be taken.

The power to direct suppliers to undertake trials will apply to **all domestic electricity and gas supply licence holders** and would only be used where we have considered information provided to us by suppliers to determine both the right measures to test/trial and the right supplier(s) to undertake the testing/trialing with.

How we might use the power of direction

In this section we set out how we might use the power of direction in practice, including what the specification for testing would entail. For the purpose of proposed SLC 32A, Ofgem is considering both Ofgem-led trials, as well as supplier-led trials. As such, the direction could take on various different forms.

Under an Ofgem-led trial, Ofgem would develop a specification for testing. We could gather information from suppliers (including under our information gathering powers, set out further below) to inform the test/trial design and to inform our selection of suitable suppliers to undertake the testing/trialing with. Following our selection, we would then issue the selected supplier(s) with a direction. This would set out the specification for testing and where necessary provide a derogation to exempt the supplier(s) from the need to comply with any relevant licence conditions (although this may be subject to the need to comply with enforceable alternative requirements). The precise specification for testing would vary from trial to trial, depending on which customer engagement measure was tested.

We envisage there to be two broad types of supplier-led trials. First, where Ofgem has identified an area or issue that we consider merits research, but where suppliers would be better placed to develop the trial idea and design, we may direct suppliers to submit a trial plan/protocol (specification for testing) to test consumer engagement measures and we would then assess this. Second, where a supplier has already developed a test/trial of certain consumer measures that may be of interest to our policy design we will be happy to consider this. Here, we would assess the supplier's specification for testing and whether it would provide us with usable results for our policy design.

In either of the above two circumstances, where we consider a supplier's proposals are fit for purpose and where they would assist us in our policy development we would support their trial implementation. Where necessary, we may use the derogation power to exempt them from the need to comply with any relevant licence conditions (although this may be subject to the need to comply with enforceable alternative requirements).

¹¹ We note that any voluntary commitments made by existing suppliers are unlikely to be sufficient to future-proofing the success of trials. This is because the existing suppliers could change their mind or the suppliers which would be most relevant and suitable for a particular trial would be future new entrants.

¹² We note that the CMA decided against the option of securing suppliers' participation in the Ofgem-led programme through undertakings as a result of indications from some suppliers that they would be unwilling to offer such undertakings.

As part of the testing and trialling, whether it is an Ofgem-led or supplier-led trial, supplier(s) will be required to share all the information relating to results and underlying data with Ofgem (and any other persons we have specified in the direction).

Specification for testing

Whether the specification for testing is drafted by Ofgem or by suppliers there are key components which must be considered and documented in detail. Where the specification is mandated by Ofgem, the scope of this concept is set out in the definition of "Authority's Specification for Testing" in paragraph 8 of proposed SLC 32A – see the accompanying statutory notices. Here, we briefly summarise the main components of a typical specification. We may include additional detail in the direction on our specification for testing if the trial requires it. We expect that the specification for any testing, including trialling, would include detail on (but would not be limited to) three stages: (i) design; (ii) implementation; and (iii) analysis and evaluation of the results.

The design stage should determine the objectives of the trial and one or more interventions to be evaluated (eg old versus new; different variations of the intervention). It should consider the key outcome that the trial is intended to influence and how it will be measured. The design should also set out the testing methodology, including the approach to randomisation, the sample size (number of customers in the control and treatment group(s)) and method of ensuring that the treatment and control groups are comparable in all other aspects other than receiving the prescribed intervention. We expect the proposed timetable, and any planned piloting activity to be part of the design phase. It will be at the design stage that consideration should be given to any supplementary research that may need to be conducted during or after the trial, for example follow-up research with trial customers (typically those in the treatment group) to gain a full understanding of the behavioural response to the intervention.

In preparing for the implementation phase of a trial, consideration should be given to any third parties who will be involved in delivering the proposed specification for testing and clarity of assigned roles and responsibilities. We would expect full and frank disclosure¹³ of any proposed supplier-initiated activity which might have an impact on the testing, ie distort the results. This could include for example a new marketing campaign or other activities that could distort the results/impact the test/trial. It should set out the proposed approach for monitoring (including possible arrangements for independent moderation where appropriate) and quality assurance. Clear consideration should be given to any ethical issues, with a clear approach to dealing with (including processes for monitoring and addressing) any ethical and consumer protection issues, for example any adjustments where measures may no longer be having the desired effect and how any potential consumer detriment arising will be identified. This stage should also consider the mechanics of implementing the trial, for example what processes will be put in place to ensure that the trial is implemented correctly, that the outcome data can be collected in a timely and efficient way etc.

The analysis and evaluation stages should set out the approach to analysing the data and determining the impact of the intervention. This will reflect the outcomes identified in the design stage. It should define the data to be shared, alongside any prescribed format, file type, and data security considerations that we find suitable to analyse these results. This stage may vary depending on the trial, but regardless of the approach taken, quality assurance will be central to the analysis. It is critical that there can be complete confidence in the data, results and associated analysis if it is to be used as the basis for policy recommendations.

¹³ Where necessary we may use our information gathering powers to check this against what we set out in our direction. Where we discover that non-disclosure has occurred we would take appropriate action.

Information gathering powers

Here we set out the effects of the information gathering powers Ofgem would have under proposed SLC 32A and how these affect the criteria to select one or more suppliers to undertake a test/trial with (the "selection criteria"). Proposed SLC 32A would require any domestic suppliers to provide Ofgem (and/or any other person we specify) with information that we reasonably consider relevant to our consideration of whether to issue a direction, or to assessing compliance with any direction already issued under proposed SLC 32A. The information gathering powers can be used either on a one-off basis or set an enduring requirement during the period of the testing/trialling.

We generally envisage using these powers to aid our identification of both the most appropriate proposals to be tested and the appropriate supplier to undertake the testing/trialling. Moreover, where the testing/trialling is already under way, these powers would allow us to monitor compliance with the direction and to collect the relevant data required for our policy analysis.

The information we could require under proposed SLC 32A includes any documents, accounts, estimates, returns, records or reports and data of any kind specified by us, whether or not prepared specifically for this request.

Selection criteria

Proposed SLC 32A includes a provision for Ofgem to publish selection criteria for the selection of suppliers which will be required to conduct testing. The effect of this provision is that the power of direction for trials (but not the separate powers to gather information in paragraphs 4 to 6 of proposed SLC 32A) will not be binding on suppliers until the Authority has published the selection criteria. As such, we are issuing an Open Letter seeking views on selection criteria¹⁴ alongside these Statutory Consultations today and will seek to publish our decision before any licence amendment comes into effect.

The selection criteria should enable Ofgem to conduct testing and trialling with suppliers who have been selected in a proportionate manner and will be in line with Ofgem's Better Regulation principles.

In order to select a supplier to undertake the testing/trialling, we may use the information gathering powers set out above to collect the necessary information to allow us to assess suppliers against these selection criteria. This will in turn enable us to issue a direction to a supplier(s) to undertake the testing/trialling as specified in the direction.

Compliance

Under proposed SLC 32A suppliers would be required to provide us with information to assist in both the design of proposals and the selection of supplier(s) to undertake the testing/trialling. Suppliers may ultimately be required to do a range of things specified by us in directions.

We expect suppliers to comply with these requirements and would take non-compliance with SLC 32A seriously.

¹⁴ Ofgem, Open letter: Proposed selection criteria for mandatory supplier testing of measures to promote domestic consumer engagement, 19 October 2016, <https://ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/open-letter-proposed-selection-criteria-mandatory-supplier-testing-measures-promote-domestic-consumer-engagement>

Proposed implementation date

We will consider the responses we receive to these Statutory Consultations. If we decide to proceed with the changes, we will then aim to publish our decision to modify the licence as soon as possible, ideally before the end of the year. We are proposing that the implementation date for proposed SLC 32A would be the statutory minimum of 56 days from publication of any final decision to make licence modifications.

Impact assessment

We have considered the impact assessment conducted by the CMA regarding the establishment of an Ofgem-led programme to promote customer engagement.¹⁵ Due to the extensive consultation process undertaken by the CMA and its substantial analysis of the energy market and the impact of its proposed remedies, we do not deem it necessary to conduct a separate impact assessment.

Responses to this consultation

We would like to hear the views of anyone interested in the issues in this document. Please respond with your views on this consultation and the effect of the draft licence modification on or before **18 November 2016** to: DomesticRetailPolicy@ofgem.gov.uk.

We prefer to receive responses by email, but you can also post them to:

Fiona Cochrane-Williams
Consumers & Competition
Ofgem
9 Millbank
London
SW1P 3GE

Unless you mark your response as confidential, we will publish all responses on our website and put them in our library. You can ask for us to keep your response confidential, and we will respect this, subject to any obligations to disclose information, for example, under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.

If you want your response to remain confidential, clearly mark the document(s) to that effect and include the reasons. Put any confidential material in the appendices.

Direct any questions about this letter to Fiona Cochrane-Williams at DomesticRetailPolicy@ofgem.gov.uk or 0207 901 1802.

Yours faithfully,



Neil Barnes
Associate Partner
Consumers & Competition

¹⁵ CMA, Energy Market Investigation, Final report, 24 June 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/576d3f15e5274a0da9000092/energy_market_final_report.pdf

Appendix 1

Table 1: Drafting changes

The table below indicates where we have made changes to the original version of SLC 32A which was set out in the CMA's final report. These changes are not intended to have any substantive effect and have been made to address typographical errors or to better reflect or clarify policy intent. An explanation for these changes is given in the final column.

Standard condition	Change from CMA's recommended drafting	Reason for change
32A.3	"any" after "test" has been replaced with "of"	Typographical error
Sub-paragraph (a) of standard condition 32A.8 "Relevant Matters for Standard Condition 32A" definition	"or evaluate" has been inserted after "a requirement to test"	To clarify that an RCT may also seek to evaluate the impact of an intervention
Sub-paragraph (b) of standard condition 32A.8 "Relevant Matters for Standard Condition 32A" definition	"Ofgem" has been replaced with "the Authority"	Consistency with drafting in the remainder of standard condition 32A
Sub-paragraph (d) of standard condition 32A.8 "Relevant Matters for Standard Condition 32A" definition	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> "(and the underlying data)" has been introduced before "the testing"; "potential regulatory measures concerning the information provided to Domestic Customers" after "testing of any" has been replaced with "consumer engagement measures in the manner and time frame specified by the Authority" 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> To clarify that the results would include the underlying data Consistency with drafting and scope of the power of direction in the remainder of standard condition 32A
32A.8 "Randomised Controlled Trial" definition	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> "selected" has been replaced with "assigned"; and "from the pool of eligible participants (which may be determined and specified by the Authority)" has been inserted after "customer groups" 	1.-2. To clarify that Ofgem may direct how the customer pool is selected and then randomly assign between the control and treatment groups
Sub-paragraph (b) of standard condition 32A.8 "Randomised Controlled Trial" definition	"section" has been replaced with "selection"	Typographical error
32A.8 "Authority's Specification for Testing" definition	"of" after "some" has been replaced with "or"	Typographical error
Bullet points under the sub-heading "Design" in the definition of "Authority's	";" has been inserted after "(and any variants) to be tested"	Editorial change to ensure consistency across bullet points

Specification for Testing” in 32A.8		
Bullet points under the sub-heading “Design” in the definition of “Authority’s Specification for Testing” in 32A.8	“eg” before “the approach to randomisation” has been replaced with “including, but not limited to,”	To clarify that those are non-exhaustive examples
Bullet points under the sub-heading “Design” in the definition of “Authority’s Specification for Testing” in 32A.8	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. “the testing of outcomes and how they will be measured;” has been inserted before “the proposed timetable;”; and 2. “; and/or any supplementary research or follow up analysis to gain a better understanding of the behavioural impact.” has been inserted after “any planned piloting activity” 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To be clear that the identification of measurable outcome metrics is something that is identified in the design stage and measured at the analysis and evaluation stage 2. To clarify that supplementary research or follow up analysis with participants may be required to better understand any behavioural impact and this should be planned for at the design stage
Bullet points under the sub-heading “Design” in the definition of “Authority’s Specification for Testing” in 32A.8	“and/or” after “the proposed timetable;” has been removed	Editorial change to reflect above changes
Bullet points under the sub-heading “Analysis and evaluation of results” in the definition of “Authority’s Specification for Testing” in 32A.8	“and/or” has been inserted after “the results of the testing;”	Editorial change to reflect below changes
Bullet points under the sub-heading “Analysis and evaluation of results” in the definition of “Authority’s Specification for Testing” in 32A.8	“the testing outcomes and how they will be measured;” has been removed from the bullet points under the sub-heading “Analysis and evaluation of results”	Text of similar effect has been inserted as a bullet point under the sub-heading “Design”. This better reflects our expectations that decisions on the testing and measurement of outcomes would be taken at the design stage of a trial.
Bullet points under the sub-heading “Analysis and evaluation of results” in the definition of “Authority’s Specification for Testing” in 32A.8	“precise content,” has been inserted after “consideration of format,”	To be clear that when suppliers hand over the data to Ofgem we will be specifying in detail exactly how that dataset should be constructed and formatted
Bullet points under the sub-heading “Analysis and evaluation of results” in the definition of “Authority’s Specification for Testing” in 32A.8	“proposals for any supplementary research” has been removed from the bullet points under the sub-heading “Analysis and evaluation of results”	Text to similar effect has been inserted as a bullet-point under the sub-heading “Design”. This better reflects our expectations that decisions on supplementary research would be taken at

		the design stage of a trial.
Bullet points under the sub-heading "Analysis and evaluation of results" in the definition of "Authority's Specification for Testing" in 32A.8	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "; and/or" has been removed after "data security"; and 2. "." has been inserted after "data security" 	1.-2. Editorial change to reflect above changes