

Competition in electricity transmission

Transmission Competition Policy team Electricity Transmission







1.	Introduction	9.30 – 9.40
2.	Proposed arrangements for introducing competition in onshore transmission	9.40 – 10.40
3.	Break	10.40 – 10.55
4.	Panel discussion	10.55 – 11.55
5.	Summary and next steps	11.55 – 12.10



Proposed arrangements for introducing competition in onshore transmission

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Why run competitive tenders for transmission?

Promoting effective competition

Statutory duties

Experience from offshore transmission (OFTOs)

- 15 tenders so far, c.£3bn transmission investment to date
- Significant cost savings vs counterfactuals (14% from TR1)
- Further savings expected TR2
- Innovation in financing and O&M in particular




Onshore transmission - Competitively Appointed Transmission Owners (CATOs)

- Renewables, new nuclear and system reinforcement pipeline of new large transmission infrastructure
- March 2015 Ofgem decision that competition can be important in driving value in transmission delivery
- Competition can bring value in capital & operational cost savings. Also helps benchmarking of monopolies



Setting up the competitive regime





What to compete?

New

• A brand new overhead line, cable or substation, or a complete replacement of these

Separable

• Able to clearly delineate ownership boundaries. Not necessarily electrically separable

High-value

• Expected capital expenditure of £100m or more

- During RIIO-T1 (up to April 2021) only Strategic Wider Works (SWW) projects considered for tendering. Incumbents continue to deliver everything else.
- Potential pipeline:
 - New nuclear, new large scale wind generation onshore, system reinforcement
 - SO to flag future projects annually
 - For RIIO-T1 SWW one or more projects might be tendered, but need to consider whether projects meet criteria, and timing / other delivery factors




When to run a tender?


	Onshore		Offshore	
	Early CATO Build	Late CATO Build	OFTO Build	Generator Build
Identify Need	SO			
Select Options (desktop)	(TO for RIIO-T1	SO		
Identify Preferred Solution	SWW projects)	(TO for RIIO-T1	Generator	
Initial solution design		SWW projects)		
Undertake surveys / studies				
Obtain consents				
Detailed design of assets				
Supplier engagement				Generator
Main contracts procurement				
Construction Construction delivery Legal responsibility for construction Funder of construction Regulatory reporting Consents management Contractor management	CATO	САТО	OFTO	
Operations Legal responsibility for operations Asset management and maintenance Network control and monitoring Funder of operations Regulatory reporting				OFTO 7



Pre-tender processes



'Enduring' project





Taking forward preliminary works

- Preliminary works are works that need to be done before a tender can commence,
 - eg surveys, environmental impact assessments, DCO and/or section 37 consents, easements, wayleaves, etc
- We set out our proposals to oblige and incentivise the SO (or incumbent TOs) to deliver these
 preliminary works on time, to a high-standard and efficiently.
 - We proposed licence obligations and a 'success fee' based on either a binary or balanced scorecard approach.
- Incumbent TOs have already received funding to do preliminary works for RIIO-T1 SWW projects that they are developing.
 - > They will receive further funding for any additional outputs required due to tendering.
- The SO will be funded to do preliminary works.



Tender processes and market offering

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How do we run tenders?

What do we do when running tenders?

We **validate the scope** of the project and the tender specification before the tender begins.

We ensure we run a **robust and fair tender process**.

We **shortlist bidders** by evaluating the bidders' technical and financial capability.


We evaluate bids at the ITT stage against criteria covering **capability/deliverability, costs** and **robustness**.

We oversee the **finalisation of arrangements** between the preferred bidder and asset owner to reach financial close.

We **protect consumers** by putting in place licence conditions that have the right balance of risks between transmission licensee and consumers.



Late CATO build - overview






Late CATO build – key points

- Tender to start once certainty over project need and outputs some overlap with other processes (eg consenting) but prefer for ITT stage to start once consent obtained
- Tender specification likely to be quite detailed expect CATO would have to work within tightly defined parameters (eg in planning consent)
- Prefer to fix CATO's revenue allowance before we appoint, with some limited re-openers.
 - competition would incentivise bidders to bid efficient costs so it may not be necessary or efficient to have sharing factors
 - > However, open to considering other mechanisms where its not efficient to fix costs
- Revenue to commence on completion of construction



Early CATO build - overview





Early CATO build – key points

- Tender to start after NOA process has identified a preferred option allows for innovation in design and routeing.
- More focus on design and innovation, less on supply procurement and costs during the tender process than late build
- Separate out CATO's revenue stream for preliminary works from the revenue stream for construction and operations
 - preliminary works paid during the project development period
 - > main revenue stream to only start on completion of construction
- Given uncertainty in project scope and output during tender, expect bidders to bid 'best indicative cost' to construct/operate/finance:
 - Considering including specific mechanism to manage projects changes due to need or planning consent
 - CATOs to secure debt finance once all costs are known, through debt funding competition



Regulated revenue

- Propose that a **CATO's revenue should be fixed** following the tender process for as long as is economic and efficient, without periodic reviews
- Initial view is that a fixed revenue stream for 25 years would facilitate efficient and competitive financing and allow other costs to be fixed
- Consumers should pay for all new onshore transmission assets over the same period. We would look
 to put in place incentives and obligations around asset condition at the end of the revenue term
- CATOs' revenue should be indexed to an inflation index (ie CPI or RPI)
 - > proportion to be indexed should be bid during the tender, not set by us
- Propose that there should be a **refinancing gain share mechanism** to return a proportion of any refinancing gain during the revenue term to consumers
- If new investment is required on a CATO's assets during the revenue term (ie extension, new connection), CATOs are best placed to do the work if the project doesn't meet the criteria for tendering.
 - we would develop a mechanism to enable this

Incentives



- We're considering at a high level what incentives ought to apply to CATOs
- Two of the most important areas to incentivise are:
 - **System reliability** an availability incentive might be appropriate, possibly combined with another type of incentive (eg around asset management)
 - We think this might involve a % availability target, with a capped upside and downside of annual revenue for over- or underperformance
 - **Asset delivery** we propose to commence a CATO's revenue on completion of construction. Not currently convinced that a specific delivery incentive would be necessary. We're keen however to understand the circumstances under which this might not be efficient
- We're considering the full range of incentives/obligations that currently apply to TOs to determine which we think are applicable to CATOs



Who can compete and next steps





Who can compete?

- We want to encourage as many bidders as possible
- It should be possible for the incumbent TOs to bid, so long as they put in place measures to mitigate any conflicts of interest
- NGET has conflicts of interest arising from both its TO role and its SO role there will be a need for additional mitigations
- We set out potential conflicts and mitigations in the consultation keen for views on these





Initial consultation on proposed arrangements

- October 2015
- Covers the commercial and regulatory construct and tender processes, also criteria and institutional arrangements
- Closes 11 January 2016

Stakeholder engagement

- Bilateral meetings with interested parties
- Events / presentations

Further consultation on our proposed arrangements

- Spring/Summer 2016
- Expect decisions in some areas where policy is more developed, further policy details in others

First tender

- From 2017
- Initial view on possible projects likely in H1 2016



Panel discussion

- Chris Veal (Transmission Investment)
- Malcolm Burns (Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission)
- Chris Bennett (National Grid Electricity Transmission)
 - Matt Cuchra (KPMG)
 - Will Lockhart (DECC)





Summary and next steps

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