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26<sup>th</sup> August 2011

Dear Rachel,

# <u>On the Losses Incentive and Gross Volume Correction</u>

We are writing collectively to you as members of the Losses and Gross Volume Correction (GVC) Working Group with an update on our discussions in relation to Settlement data and the Distribution Losses Incentive Mechanism (DLIM).

This Group was set up at the request of suppliers under the auspices of the Distribution Charging Methodologies Forum (DCMF) to provide a greater awareness of the operation of the DLIM (CRC 7 in the DNO Licence). The DNOs, the six major suppliers, one small supplier and ELEXON have all been represented in the Group. We have also kept your own team up to date with our discussions.

The Group has met on five occasions. Areas covered include:

- Overview of the losses incentive and the two 'top down' methodologies currently proposed for data correction
- The extent that DNOs can influence the data used for the losses calculation

- Review of why data can change during the Settlement process (e.g. new meter readings, change of metering standing data, data correction activities)
- Areas where losses reporting could be improved (e.g. potential changes to some areas of the Balancing & Settlement Code (BSC))

Although the Group spent considerable time looking at how the current losses reporting process could be improved, there is an underlying concern that the DLIM, due to the use of Settlement data, is unable to deliver on its objectives of encouraging DNOs to achieve an efficient level of losses on their distribution networks. The reasons behind these concerns are outlined below.

#### Use of Settlement Data to calculate Distribution Losses

Under the Distribution Losses Incentive Mechanism:

Calculated Distribution Losses = Units Entering – Units Distributed
Units Distributed are determined using Settlement data.

Calculated Distribution Losses are made up of:

- 1 Technical losses (mainly under direct influence of the DNOs)
- 2 Non Technical losses (mainly out of the DNOs' influence)

Examples of the factors affecting technical and non-technical losses are shown in Appendix 1.

Illustrative impacts of some of these factors on the percentage Units
Distributed for one DNO are shown in Appendix 2. This clearly shows that the largest movements in Settlement data being used in the losses calculation are **outside** of the influence of the DNO. This can result in windfall gains or losses for DNOs which may be unrelated to losses improvement work carried out on the network. This means that the DLIM is not meeting its objectives of encouraging DNOs to achieve an efficient level of losses on their distribution networks since the outcome is largely outside of their influence.

#### **Volatility of Settlement Data**

Historically, the DLIM has relied on data errors and data movements being at a consistent level across price controls. Therefore, any change in calculated losses could be assumed to be an improvement or degradation of losses that were under the DNOs' influence.

However, the effectiveness of the DLIM is reduced when Settlement data becomes more volatile due to major data correction activities by suppliers, as demonstrated for 2009/10 data. The reason for this has been shown to be partly due to the application of Gross Volume Correction (GVC). However, the Group has shown that an increase in many other areas of data cleansing carried out by suppliers (e.g. improvements at RF performance, data issues caused by long term no access sites, metering data error correction etc) were also a major contributory factor. Suppliers anticipate that this increased volume of data correction will continue. This is a result of meter change programmes, initially covering Profile Class 5 - 8 and later, more significantly, the rollout of SMART metering. It is therefore likely that future losses reporting will be subject to large fluctuations in excess of the caps/ collars for the duration of DPCR5 and that this will not be within the influence of the DNOs. This therefore significantly impacts on the effectiveness of the DLIM, and will likely result in ongoing issues similar to those we have seen for 2009/10.

#### The Potential for Improved Reporting of Losses

In looking at possible approaches for identifying and adjusting the losses data to address the issue of abnormal Settlement adjustments, it was confirmed that there is no additional data available to DNOs other than that currently used in the data adjustment approaches developed by CE and Engage Consulting on behalf of SP. To date no new methodologies have emerged.

The Group have looked at a number of potential BSC changes with the view to mitigating the weaknesses in the DLIM by seeking to improve losses reporting. However, there is concern in the Group about making major

changes to Settlement that do not address the root cause of the problem. The real issue is that the DLIM is using data that is not suited for the purpose of measuring Distribution Losses. The solution should not be to change the established principles of Settlement (annual Gross Cashflow approximately £1.5bn) in order to make a marginal improvement to the DLIM (annual value at cap £60m). The correct approach should be to address the source of the problem i.e. the DLIM itself should be reviewed.

#### Impact of the DLIM

Whilst the principle of a losses incentive is accepted as a valid means of encouraging DNOs to achieve an efficient level of losses on their distribution networks, the Group are concerned at the effectiveness of the DLIM against its stated objectives based on the points raised above.

Suppliers and consumers are exposed to total DNO revenue adjustments of +/- £60m per annum and an overall exposure of five times this level. These changes result in unpredictable and volatile DUoS tariffs.

#### In Summary

The Group are concerned that:

- The Distribution Losses Incentive Mechanism, by using Settlement data that is both volatile and outside the DNOs' control, no longer meets its objective of encouraging DNOs to achieve an efficient level of losses on their distribution networks.
- The DLIM results in windfall gains or losses for DNOs and exposes suppliers and customers to potentially large and unpredictable DUoS tariff movements.
- There is concern that any BSC changes, discussed as part of this Group to mitigate the weaknesses in the DLIM by seeking to improve losses reporting, make significant changes to Settlement and do not address the root cause of the problem. The correct approach is to address the source of the problem i.e. the DLIM itself should be reviewed.

This letter has been prepared to capture the sentiment of the Group and may also assist you in developing your forthcoming consultation on the way ahead.

We hope you find these comments helpful.

Yours sincerely

Andy Manning Harvey Jones

On behalf of British Gas

On behalf of CE-Electric

Julia Haughey Tony McEntee

On behalf of EDF Energy On behalf of Electricity North West

Glenn Sheern Allan Hendry

On behalf of EON On behalf of SP Energy Networks

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Distribution

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On behalf of SSE Supply

Binoy Dharsi

On behalf IPM Energy Retail Ltd

#### **APPENDIX 1**

## **LOSSES**

## **Technical losses (under DNO control)**

- Fixed (mainly transformers)
- Variable (cables and lines)
   Increase with square law as network utilisation increases
- Can be reduced over time by investment and operational practice

| Non-technical losses (partly DNO / partly supplier control) |                                      |  |  |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| Unregistered/ illegal connections                           | DNOs' responsibility                 |  |  |
| Theft   | Suppliers' / DNOs' responsibility    |  |  |
| Metering errors   | Suppliers' responsibility            |  |  |
| Meter Reading Data  | Suppliers' responsibility            |  |  |
| Standing data issues  | Suppliers' responsibility            |  |  |
| Data cleansing activity                                     | Suppliers' responsibility            |  |  |
| Profiling allocation errors                                 | Profile Administrator responsibility |  |  |

#### **APPENDIX 2**

### **Example DNO Data**

|                                     | Volume  | % units     | Responsibility |
|-------------------------------------|---------|-------------|----------------|
|                                     |         | distributed |                |
| Transformer Change Programme        | 1–2 GWh | <0.01%      | DNO            |
| VAR compensation project            | 2–4 GWh | 0.01-0.02%  | DNO            |
| Unregistered MPANs                  | 4 GWh   | 0.02%       | DNO            |
| Theft                               | 50 GWh  | 0.2%        | DNO/Supplier   |
| Data Cleansing / other data changes | 300 GWh | 1.2%        | Supplier       |

| Units distributed | ~ 25,000GWh<br>(Roughly 50/50 HH/NHH) |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Losses            | ~ 1250GWh<br>(5% Units Distributed)   |
| Cap/collar        | ~75GWh                                |