<u>Security of Supply SCR –</u> <u>A suppliers view</u>



PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING SLIDES DO NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF CORONA ENERGY.

THEY WERE CREATED AS AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR THEMES AND COMMENTS PROVIDED BY ALL SHIPPERS AND SUPPLIERS DURING THE OFGEM SCR WORKSHOPS.

Process



Negatives

- •Closed 'invite only' workshops
- •Time was limited in the workshops
- Focused purely on supply deficit emergencies
- Minutes difficult for non-attendees to follow



Positives

- •Ofgem representatives appear open to views
- •Good, open dialogue (each meeting all attendees contributed)
- Debate was not curtailed
- •Ofgem team clearly making active efforts to engage outside of Workshops (Gas Forum, DSWG etc)
- •Willing to discuss previous Ofgem decisions and assumptions

Major Themes - Prior to an Emergency

Principle

• Where is the problem?

Shipper/supplier incentives and obligations to balance are in place now Historic customer interruptions have been Transporter led

• Would measures result in supply-side investment?

Incentives would drive the least cost option (insurance, flexibility products or accept the risk) Obligations would distort the market and destroy competition (small suppliers could not compete with vertically integrated suppliers).

Would VoLL be set prior to the day?

Is the current approach in the best interest of consumers?
Costs will be passed to consumers (flex costs reflect 5%-10% price increase)
Customer choice? Opt Out?

International competitiveness

Major Themes - Prior to an Emergency



Practical

- Different deficits causes may create differing issues
 - Cold weather/International disputes Medium/Long lead time allows market response and positions to be covered. International competition for energy.

Accidental damage/Terrorist Attack – Short lead time. Limited market response and response may not be possible.

Demand Side Response

Mod 90 changes never considered the benefit in supply deficit situations but these sites provided a significant degree of protection

Medium and Smaller customers demonstrate little appetite (only 10% of customer placed bids for interruptible contracts) for enduring arrangements

Smaller customer will need smart meters to make this viable

Scope to reform arrangements to create a demand side response market that NGG could access

• How to calculate VoLL?

Summer/Winter - Heat load values differently by season

Seasonal sites – May not be using energy

Business economics - Different processes will have different values for the energy content

Business dynamics - Different points in a business cycle may create different energy values

Reputation risk – Non delivery to a customer may be costly

Alternative Fuel - Mod 90 demonstrated how complex

Major Themes – During an Emergency



Should the market remain open or be suspended?

Consensus that where possible the market should remain open Credit is a significant problem

Idea of a central buyer not popular but could be a 'least worse' option

• Day 2

The market may responds and shippers could all be balanced or long but a network still maybe isolated. Who is responsible?

Obligations would distort the market and destroy competition (small suppliers could not compete with vertically integrated suppliers).

• Firm load shedding processes

Could the process be more flexible to recognise customer loss/costs

- Need joined up thinking with Europe to avoid protectionism and distortions
- Tutti Fruity approach?

Major Themes – After an Emergency

• Who should pay?

Consensus that short shippers should bear the majority of the risk Strong concerns raised of the risk of supplier/shipper default

- a) Affordability
- b) Timing Ability to raise funds
- c) Domino effect
- How to limit the impact on consumers

Smart meters may play a role

Transporters may need an incentive



Questions