
RIIO-T1 and GD1 **Price Control Review Forum**

24th January 2011


Session 1 – Introduction

Structure of the meeting

Based on December consultation documents and key issues raised.



RIIO-T1 and GD1 timeline of forthcoming publications



Way forward

We appreciate contributions that stakeholders have made to RIIO-T1 and GD1 to date

We would welcome comments on the initial strategy consultation by 4 February 2011

We are carrying out a number of stakeholder events in early 2011

The PCRF and meetings of the Consumer Challenge Group

Further output working group meetings to develop thinking on the measures and incentives

City event (1 Feb)

Financial issues working group (12 Jan & 17 Feb)

An opportunity for TOs and GDNs to meet with our Committee of the Authority

TOs and GDNs should also continue their stakeholder engagement during this period

We intend to publish a strategy decision document at the end of March 2011

The companies will be required to submit their business plans by end July 2011

Session 2 – Summary of stakeholder engagement

Network companies' stakeholder engagement

Update from network companies on their engagement to date and future plans (max 5 mins):

- o What have you learnt from your engagement to date?
- How do you intend to use this information to inform your business plan?
- o What are your engagement plans?

Questions for network companies on their engagement from PCRF members

Session 3 – Views of Generators and Shippers on the proposed RIIO-T1 and GD1 outputs and incentives

Presentation by EDF Energy

Session 4 – Overview of December documents

Incentivising output delivery

Developing the outputs-led framework

Primary outputs = reflect services network customers receive during the price control.

Secondary deliverables = outputs that network companies will be held to deliver in the coming price control to ensure the delivery of primary outputs in future periods

Consistent with RIIO handbook principles

We expect network companies to propose the output levels they intend to deliver Network companies should justify these levels based on costs and benefits to consumers

Range of output incentives

Financial rewards/
penalties

Symmetric, or penalty/reward only

Reputational incentives

Secondary deliverables monitored annually

Incentive strength

Strength of incentives will reflect value consumers attach to delivery and degree of network's control

Risk sharing

Mechanisms will ensure efficient risk sharing between companies and consumers

Delivery of primary outputs will be monitored using a balanced scorecard



RIIO-T1: Potential outputs and incentives

Output category	Output name	Incentive		
Safety	Compliance with legal requirements set by HSE and other bodies	No financial incentives		
	Suite of secondary deliverables to monitor asset risk	Potential financial incentives if material over/under delivery of asset risk		
Reliability & availability	Minimise energy not supplied (elec)	Financial incentive approx £16k per MWH - Natural cap on reward; Uncollared penalty		
	Reliable delivery of gas to users (gas)	Financial incentives based on existing framework		
	Potential secondary deliverable for network system flexibility (gas)	Potential financial incentive		
	Suite of secondary deliverables to monitor asset risk	Potential financial incentives if material over/under delivery of asset risk		
Customer satisfaction	Customer satisfaction survey	Symmetric financial incentive +/- 0.5% of revenue		
	Effective stakeholder engagement	Discretionary reward +0.5% of revenues		





RIIO-T1: Potential outputs and incentives

Output category	Output name	Incentive
Environmental impacts	`Low carbon economy' – networks' contribution to UK's environmental goals e.g. • Emission intensity of network energy flows •% renewable of network energy flows	Potential financial reward or reputational incentive
	Losses (elec)/shrinkage (gas)	Potential symmetric financial incentive
	Business carbon footprint	No financial incentive – reputational
	Release of SF ₆ (elec)	Symmetric financial incentives building on current framework and rollover proposal
	Release of Methane (gas)	Potential symmetric financial incentive
Connections	Timing of preconnection period (elec)Timing of build (gas)	Further data sought to understand the degree of financial incentives (if any)
Social	No outputs proposed	NA



RIIO-GD1: Potential outputs and incentives

Output category	Output name	Incentive
Safety	Compliance with HSE safety case (in particular emergency response and repair activities) and level of risk removed associated with repex	Requirement to comply with safety case and licence. For repex propose to use a revenue driver based on risk removed rather than length abandoned.
Reliability & availability	Number and duration of interruptions to supply	Incentivised as part of Guaranteed Standards. Secondary output covered by asset health measures.
	Maintaining operational performance (incl. offtake meter error management)	Reputational
	Suite of secondary deliverables to monitor asset health	Potential financial incentives if material over/under delivery asset health (covers multiple output categories)
	Network capacity: Meeting 1 in 20 obligations	Ex-post review of asset utilisation against target
Customer satisfaction	Customer satisfaction survey	Symmetric financial incentive +/- 0.5% of revenue
	Effective stakeholder engagement	Discretionary reward +0.5% of revenues
	Complaints handling	Penalty -0.5% of revenue





RIIO-GD1: Potential outputs and incentives

Output category	Output name	Incentive
Environmental impacts	Reducing gas shrinkage and associated carbon emissions	Symmetric financial incentives on shrinkage and associated carbon emissions building on existing incentives
	Business carbon footprint	No financial incentive - reputational
	% biomethane connected to the network	No financial incentive - reputational
	Networks' non-CO2 emissions and resource use (inc. gravel extraction and water emissions)	No financial incentive – reputational
Connections	Timely connection for users of the network (inc. Gas entry customers)	Extension of existing financial penalties potentially akin to DPCR5
	Carbon monoxide risk awareness	No specific incentives
Social	Information on network extensions for fuel poor	No specific incentives. Review of existing funding arrangements

Repex – gas distribution

HSE led review of repex

- CEPA appointed
- •Draft findings by end of February
- •Final report by end of March
- •HSE will then consider the results of this work

Change to repex driver

Move to a risk removed driver

Development of asset health and risk metrics for all assets

•Requiring GDNs to improve their current understanding of asset health and criticality, and to develop systems to optimise and plan investment on the basis of risk indices.

Questions for forum members

- •Do you consider the proposed outputs and associated incentives, along with the other elements of the proposals, will ensure companies deliver value-for-money for consumers and play their role in delivering a sustainable energy sector?
- •Do you consider that the proposed outputs and incentive arrangements are proportionate?
- •Do you have any views on the proposed outputs?
- •Do you have any views on the proposed incentive mechanisms?
- •Do you agree with the approach to changing the repex revenue driver from length of mains decommissioned to a volume driver of risk removed?

Business plans and proportionate treatment

Well-justified business plans

Companies will be required to develop well-justified business plans setting out

How they will deliver in the interests of current and future consumers How they will meet the challenge of moving to a low carbon economy

A strategy for dealing with risks and uncertainties

Key
messages
emphasised
in our
business
plan
guidance


Companies need to justify their strategy for output delivery against an understanding of the long-term trends they face

Companies need to show they have considered a range of stakeholder views and opportunities for innovative approaches

The plan should include a holistic view of the price control package including financeability metrics

Proportionate treatment

Under a proportionate approach the intensity and timing of assessment will reflect the quality of business plans and company records for output delivery



We have proposed 15 assessment criteria to assess quality of business plans.

High quality business plan may be **fasttracked -** concluding its price control early.

Key features of fast-tracking

Price control will be finalised approx 12 months before non-fast tracked companies

We will consult on any proposals for fast tracking

Fast-tracked companies will not be worse off than others

We do not think specific protection is needed but are seeking stakeholder views on this

Cost assessment

Companies must demonstrate cost efficiency and long-term value for money

Toolkit approach to assessment

Totex analysis

Disaggregated approaches

Evidence of market testing

Propose the use of a fixed and symmetric efficiency rate

Investors /consumers will share benefits of underspend and the costs of overspend

Criteria for assessing business plans

- Key content
- 2. Acceptance of our policies
- 3. Structure and proportionality

Approach the company has taken to the business planning process

The strategy underlying

- 4. Efficiency of costs
- 5. Long-term context
- Reflect uncertainty 6.
- 7. Deliverability
- 8. Effective engagement and
- Risk 9.
- 10. Reflecting best practice

the business plan understanding of stakeholder views

- 11. Accurate and full completion of a business plan template in a timely manner
- 12. Quality of information on primary outputs
- 13. Quality of information on secondary outputs
- 14. Fyidence
- 15. Linking forecasts to historical performance

Reflection of strategy in the plan

Questions for forum members


- •Is our proposed approach to cost assessment appropriate?
- •Do you have any views on our proposed process for proportionate treatment?
- •Do you have any views on the criteria for assessing business plans? Are any of the criteria highlighted inappropriate? Should any additional criteria be added?
- •Do you have any views on the proposed role for competition in third party delivery?

¹For details of criteria see paras 3.46 − 3.74 (p.22-27) of 'Supplementary Annex - Business plans, innovation and efficiency incentives .'

Uncertainty mechanisms and the mid-period review

Managing uncertainty

Uncertainty mechanisms allow changes to the revenues a company is allowed to collect during a price control in light of developments during the control



Mid-period review

Recognising the scope for significant changes in outputs over an eight year price control, RIIO includes a mid-period review of outputs

of the midperiod review

Changes to existing outputs justified by changes in govt policy

Introduction of outputs to meet the needs of consumers/network users

As part of the mid-period review, we will consider the risks and downsides associated with any potential changes e.g. instability of outputs

3 months to consult and decide whether to progress a review progress a review 3 months to consult and make amendments 3 months to consult and make amendments

Questions for forum members

- •Do you have any views on the uncertainty mechanisms identified?
- •Are there any additional uncertainty mechanisms required that we have not identified?
- •Are there any mechanisms that we have included that are not necessary and, if so, why?
- •Do you have any views on the scope of the mid-period review and the process?

Innovation

Innovation

RIIO has a number of elements that are designed to drive innovation

Longer price control period

Outputs focus

Strong efficiency incentives

Companies can propose innovation in business plans

RIIO also include an innovation stimulus for gas and one for electricity

Innovation stimulus gas

Transmission and Distribution

Innovation stimulus electricity

Transmission

Low carbon networks (LCN) fund: Distribution*

Funding for all types of innovation e.g. R&D, trials

Funding available to third parties to allow them to lead innovative network projects

*Expect electricity distribution to be included in the innovation stimulus in 2015

In addition to innovation stimulus, we propose an innovation allowance within revenue allowances: up to 2% of revenue depending on quality of innovation strategy

The innovation stimulus

The innovation stimulus is being developed in parallel to the price controls

Three key elements will inform network companies in developing their business plans

Amount of funding

Greater scope for innovation

- in distribution than transmission
- > in electricity than gas

Proposal

- ➤ Funding of £25-£35m a year in electricity transmission
- > Funding of £45-£50m a year for gas

Scope of funding

Proposed approach

Focused on projects to inform a low carbon future
 In gas, should projects need to contribute to longterm network sustainability?

Partial project funding

Proposed approach

- Propose to provide a maximum level of project funding of 80%
- Decreased from 90% under LCN Fund

This the subject of a separate impact assessment published alongside the RIIO-T1 and GD1 documents

Questions for forum members

- •Do you have any views on the role of innovation in RIIO-T1 and GD1?
- •Do you have any views on the time limited innovation stimulus?
- Do you have any views on the inclusion of an innovation allowance within the price controls

Financing efficient delivery

Financing efficient delivery: Capitalisation policy and asset lives

Capitalisation policy

Propose that repex should be treated as investment in longer life assets with 100% capitalised


Asset lives

▶ Propose to retain 45 year asset life for gas and a range of 45-55 for electricity
 ▶ Propose front end loaded depreciation profile to protect against a potential

future decline in gas distribution use

May need transition arrangements for repex treatment as well as asset life changes

Financing efficient delivery: The allowed return



Question for forum members

•Do you consider that the package of financial measures identified will enable required network expenditure to be effectively financed?

Session 5 – Willingness to pay research on designated landscapes and RIIO-T1

Presentation by Campaign for National Parks

Session 6 – Wrap up