



OFGEM

GAS DISTRIBUTION PRICE CONTROL REVIEW

ONE YEAR CONTROL

FINAL REPORT 2

NORTHERN NETWORK

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Report 62533 – 2

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report has been prepared by PB Power for Ofgem based on returns made by Northern Gas Networks (NGN) in April 2006. Our conclusions are summarised against two principal periods. The period January 2001 to March 2002 is presented based on the expenditure and workloads of all 8 Gas Distribution Networks (GDNs) as Northern (No) figures are not available prior to April 2002. The period April 2002 to March 2007 is presented based on the expenditure and workloads of the Northern GDN.

1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

1.1.1 CAPEX

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported		429.5	71.3	500.8
Net Investment				
LTS & Storage		158.9	14.2	173.1
3.2				
Mains (General Reinforcement)		50.8	8.2	59.0
5.2				
Governors		14.1	2.2	16.3
5.2				
Connections (Mains)		17.7	6.2	23.9
4.2				
Connections (Services)		68.2	22.8	91.0
4.2				
Other Operational Capex		27.1	4.0	31.1
6.2				
Non-Operational Capex		92.7	13.6	106.3
7.2				

Table 1

1.1.1.1 Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	429.5	71.3	500.8
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	24.5	9.5	34.0
LTS & Storage 3.2	2.9	0.0	2.9
Mains (General Reinforcement) 5.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Governors 5.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Connections (Mains) 4.2	3.1	1.1	4.2
Connections (Services) 4.2	11.9	4.0	15.9
Other Operational Capex 6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Operational Capex 7.2	6.6	4.4	11.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	405.0	61.8	466.8

Table 2

Connections, reinforcement mains and governors workload and costs over the 15 months to 31 March 2002 have been reviewed. Adjustments to Connections Net Capex are proposed to take account of inefficient recovery of contributions.

1.1.2 REPEX

Net Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	367.2	105.5	472.7
Mains 8.3	276.7	77.0	353.6
Services 8.3	89.1	27.6	116.7
LTS 9.2	1.4	0.9	2.3

Table 3

1.1.2.1 Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

Net Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	367.2	105.5	472.7
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mains 8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Services 8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
LTS 9.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	367.2	105.5	472.7

Table 4

Replacement workload and costs over the 15 months to 31 March 2002 have been reviewed. Overall, costs are consistent with the reported workload and no adjustments are proposed.

1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)

1.2.1 CAPEX

The Net Capex summary figures are given in Table 5. These show the initial Allowed Net Investment from the last control, NGN's Reported Net Investment and finally PB Power's initial recommendation for Ofgem's Adjusted Net Investment.

Overspend

- The GDN is forecast to be £27.4m (22%) in excess of the Net Capex allowance for all activities.
- The combined mains and services Connections Net Capex is over spent by £32.3m. This is mainly due to the forecasts which were inaccurate because competition in one-off domestic Connections did not develop as expected.

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency:

- Review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects.
- Assessment of Net Capex drivers.
- Unit cost trends and comparisons.
- Management of contract arrangements.
- Review of processes to manage direct labour productivity.
- Procurement policies and procedures.

Key Issues

- Data quality, particularly for Connections activities, has inhibited analysis and comparison of cost performance.
- NGN does not have management information systems that provide detailed analysis of Net Capex performance to ensure effective monitoring and control.
- IS systems under NGG ownership have elements of wasteful expenditure and forecasts are far higher than allowances.

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- Adjustments to Connections Net Capex are substantially associated with inefficient recovery of costs via contributions.

Categorisation of Forecast Expenditure

- Adjustments to Connections Net Capex are substantially associated with inefficient recovery of costs via contributions.
- Adjustments to Non-Operations Net Capex are substantially associated with inefficient management of IS and in particular the Quarterback Programme.

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 prices	2002/03		2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07		5 year Total		2007/08											
Allowed Net Investment	43.9		23.4		20.4		16.4		22.1		126.2													
Total GDN Variance	-3.8		-9%		8.6		37%		0.8		4%		13.6		83%		8.2		37%		27.4		22%	
LTS & Storage 3.3.1 and 3.4.1	-6.0		-28%		12.2		324%		-3.6		-59%		0.8		46%		-7.2		-99%		-3.8		-9%	
Mains (General Reinforcement) 5.3.2 and 5.4.1	0.6		15%		-1.3		-37%		0.2		6%		-0.7		-23%		0.9		30%		-0.3		-2%	
Governors 5.3.2 and 5.4.1	0.2		21%		0.4		43%		-0.2		-15%		0.2		21%		-0.5		-42%		0.3		5%	
Connections (Mains) 4.3.1 and 4.4.1	1.5		341%		0.8		231%		1.1		1456%		2.1		660%		1.9		656%		7.4		507%	
Connections – (Services) 4.3.1 and 4.4.1	4.8		125%		2.1		71%		5.1		199%		6.5		411%		6.4		465%		24.9		202%	
Other Operational Capex 6.3.1 and 6.4.1	-1.0		-101%		-0.6		-66%		-0.4		-44%		-0.6		-63%		-0.6		-59%		-3.2		-67%	
Non-Operational Capex 7.3.1 and 7.4.1	-4.1		-33%		-5.0		-46%		-1.5		-24%		5.3		69%		7.3		89%		2.0		4%	
Reported Net Investment	40.1		32.0		21.2		30.0		30.3		153.5		38.6											
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual Expenditure	3.5		2.1		2.9						8.6													
Adjustments to Forecasts							7.4		5.1		12.5		3.4											
LTS & Storage 3.3.3 and 3.4.3 and 3.4.4	0.0		0.0		0.0		2.2		0.0		2.2		0.0											
Mains (General Reinforcement) 5.3.3 and 5.4.3 and 5.4.4	0.2		0.1		0.1		0.0		0.0		0.4		1.0											
Governors 5.3.3 and 5.4.3 and 5.4.4	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.1		0.0											
Connections (Mains) 4.3.3 and 4.4.3 and 4.4.4	0.9		0.5		0.5		1.4		1.2		4.5		1.1											
Connections – (Services) 4.3.3 and 4.4.3 and 4.4.4	1.6		0.9		1.9		1.5		1.4		7.3		1.3											
Other Operational Capex 6.3.3 and 6.4.3 and 6.4.4	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0											
Non-Operational Capex 7.3.3 and 7.4.3 and 7.4.4	0.8		0.6		0.4		2.3		2.4		6.5		0.0											
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	36.6		29.9		18.3		22.6		25.2		132.5		35.2											
Allowed Workload	34.3		29.9		16.7		19.6		19.6		120.1													
Additional Workload	2.3		0.0		1.5		2.8		5.6		12.2													
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0													

Table 5

1.2.2 **REPEX**

Mains and services replacement expenditure is directed at reducing the risk of incident arising from cast, spun and ductile iron mains. Northern Network follows a programme, aligned to a policy set out by the HSE, aimed at decommissioning all iron mains within 30m of premises by 2032.

The Repex summary figures, which include LTS, are given in table 6. These show the Allowed Net Investment from the current control and the Reported Net Investment as presented by NGN. Net Investment is re-stated after re-allocation of mains and services costs and finally the PB Power initial recommendation for Ofgem's Adjusted Net Investment is detailed

Overspend

- The Network is forecast to be £36m (13%) in excess of the Net Repex allowance for all activities.
- The overspend is principally due to higher volumes and costs of replacement services.

Analysis Carried Out

- Review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects.
- Assessment of the HSE's requirements.
- Unit cost trends and comparisons.
- Contract arrangements and management.
- Review of processes to manage direct labour productivity.
- Procurement policies and procedures.

Key Issues

- The visibility of costs is poor and a reporting regime should be introduced to enable reliable cost comparison within and between GDNs.
- The Supplementary Incentive Mechanism should be discontinued to avoid possible cost distortion.
- A proportion of services costs (06/07) have been re-allocated to mains and the Supplementary Incentive Mechanism.

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- An adjustment has been made to services costs to reflect contract and direct labour inefficiencies.

Categorisation of Forecast Expenditure

- There is a reallocation from services to mains in 2006/07 to address high forecast services costs.
- There is no reallocation in 2007/08, assuming the removal of the Supplementary Incentive Mechanism and allowing a return to appropriate cost allocation.

There are continuing adjustments to services reflecting on-going contract and direct labour inefficiencies under the current arrangements.

Net Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03		2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07		5 year Total	2007/08	
Allowed Net Investment	59.8		44.4		51.8		55.9		54.1		266.0		
Total GDN Variance	4.4	+7%	9.7	+22%	3.1	+6%	6.9	+12%	11.5	+21%	35.7	+13%	
Mains (as reported) 8.4.1 and 8.5.1	0.7	+1%	5.3	+15%	-2.4	-6%	0.3	+1%	-1.6	-4%	2.3	+1%	
Services (as reported) 8.4.1 and 8.5.1	5.0	+67%	5.4	+61%	5.5	+46%	6.8	+52%	10.5	+89%	33.2	+62%	
LTS 9.3.1	-1.2	-100%	-1.0	-93%	-0.1	+0%	-0.2	+0%	2.6	+0%	0.1	+5%	
Reported Net Investment	64.3		54.1		54.9		62.8		65.6		301.6		69.7
Total GDN Variance (after re-allocation by PB Power)	4.4	+7%	9.7	+22%	3.1	+6%	6.9	+12%	11.5	+21%	35.7	+13%	
Mains (after re-allocation) 8.4.1 and 8.5.1	0.7	+1%	5.3	+15%	-2.4	-6%	0.3	+1%	0.3	+1%	4.2	+2%	
Services (after re-allocation) 8.4.1 and 8.5.1	5.0	+67%	5.4	+61%	5.5	+46%	6.8	+52%	8.6	+73%	31.3	+59%	
LTS 9.3.1	-1.2	-100%	-1.0	-93%	-0.1	+0%	-0.2	+0%	2.6	+0%	0.1	+5%	
Restated Net Investment (after re-allocation)	64.3		54.1		54.9		62.8		65.6		301.6		69.7
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual/Forecast Expenditure	0.4		0.5		0.6						1.5		
Adjustments to Actual/Forecast							0.7		0.2		0.9		0.0
Mains 8.4.3 and 8.5.3 and 8.5.4	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
Services 8.4.3 and 8.5.3 and 8.5.4	0.4		0.5		0.6		0.7		0.2		2.4		0.0
LTS 9.3.3 and 9.4.1 and 9.4.2	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	63.8		53.6		54.3		62.0		65.4		299.2		69.7
Mains	51.9		39.9		37.3		43.0		42.7		214.6		
Services & LTS	12.0		13.8		17.0		19.0		22.7		84.6		
Allowed Workload	12.0		11.9		16.4		17.6		20.1		78.0		
Additional Workload	0.0		1.9		0.6		1.4		2.6		6.5		
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		

Table 6

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 PRICE CONTROL REVIEW TIMETABLE

The current price control period for all gas distribution networks (GDNs) runs from 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2007. Ofgem has decided in consultation with the businesses, to extend this period by one year to 31 March 2008. This process is known as the 'One Year Control' and is described below.

The One Year Control will be followed by a further review which will result in a new price control being set for the five years from 1 April 2008 to 31 March 2013. This will be known as the Main Review.

The full process is shown in the following diagram.




Figure 1

2.2 ONE YEAR CONTROL

Ofgem appointed PB Power working in partnership with Rune Associates Limited to assist them in the preparation of the Capex and Repex elements of the BPQ and to analyse and report on the submissions by the GDNs.

As part of the consultation process a number of meetings were held with the GDNs and a Business Plan Questionnaire was issued on 17 February 2006. The latter were returned to Ofgem on 7 April and PB Power has prepared this report for Ofgem on its findings from these submissions from the GDN.

This report covers the NORTHERN network owned by Northern Gas Networks Limited.

2.3 BUSINESS PLAN QUESTIONNAIRE

A combined BPQ was issued on 17 February. This covered the Financial Statements, Opex, Capex and Repex requests. The Capex and Repex areas covered by this report were in the form of 20 Excel worksheets, a section (4) giving guidance to the GDNs as to how to complete the worksheets and a section (6) containing 209 additional narrative questions.

GDNs were asked to respond to Ofgem by 7 April and were asked to upload all the data onto PB Power's file management system, PBShare. All parties in the process were granted appropriate access to relevant folders and documents. Some documents had to be provided in paper copy and these were sent both to PB Power and to Ofgem.

As the analysis of the submissions progressed and where the return was either unclear or insufficient it became necessary to ask the GDNs for additional information. These requests and the additional information which was presented in reply, were logged and stored on PBShare.

At the end of the process the worksheets were updated to include all amendments submitted and should be read in conjunction with this report.

2.4 PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to present the results of the analyses such that Ofgem may make a determination of the necessity and efficiency of the Capex and Repex expenditure by NGN using the actual results for the three years from April 2002 to March 2005 to permit the RAV roll forward to be fixed up to March 2005. The estimated outturns for 2005/06 will be +revisited later in the process when audited accounts are available. These figures along with forecasts for 2006/07 and 2007/08 will be used to fix the allowances for 2007/08, the one year control period.

2.5 ANALYSIS AND REPORTING PROCESS

The BPQ was designed to collect all the data required for analysis. The spreadsheets were designed with the Main Review in mind to ensure that the data collected for the One Year Control was collected in a format which would roll forward into the Main Review. This would also ensure that the GDNs did not have to provide the same information twice.

The GDNs would also be able to see in advance what data was likely to be needed for the Main Review and hence to prepare for this. The narrative questions were mainly focused on the historic period, but again the intention was not to collect the same information twice. The Main Review narrative will focus on the future and require more detailed and substantiated forecasting than was expected for the One Year Control.

PB Power has structured this report to follow the workstrands in Ofgem's tender document as far as is practicable. We have broken the work down into four main workstreams:

- i) Capital expenditure (Capex): for all works on the below 7 bar network including Connections
- ii) Replacement expenditure (Repex): for all replacement work above and below 7 bar including the Policy Mains Replacement Programme.
- iii) Local Transmission System (LTS) and Storage: for all work on the network from 85 bar down to 7 bar, including HP and LP storage.
- iv) Other: covers all I.T. and System Operation work and other operational and non operation Capex.

The report reviews the actual expenditure from April 2002 to March 2005 with a view to determination of the Regulatory Asset Value (RAV) for that period. The forecast years from April 2005 to March 2008 are reviewed to permit the determination of allowances for the One Year Control, April 2007 to March 2008.

2.6 COSTS

All costs in the report are in 2005/06 prices unless otherwise stated.

At the time the analysis was carried out the final RPI value for the year 2005/06 was not known. An estimated value of 192.8 was therefore provided by Ofgem for the analysis. The table below shows the factors which have been used to convert pre 2005/06 costs to 2005/06. These factors have been used throughout the analysis.

		Convert from						
Convert to		2000	2001	Q1 2002	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
	Index	170.3	173.4	173.9	177.5	182.5	188.2	192.8
	2000	1.00	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.93	0.90	0.88
	2001	1.02	1.00	1.00	0.98	0.95	0.92	0.90
	Q1 2002	1.02	1.00	1.00	0.98	0.95	0.92	0.90
	2002/03	1.04	1.02	1.02	1.00	0.97	0.94	0.92
	2003/04	1.07	1.05	1.05	1.03	1.00	0.97	0.95
	2004/05	1.11	1.09	1.08	1.06	1.03	1.00	0.98
	2005/06	1.13	1.11	1.11	1.09	1.06	1.02	1.00

Table 7

After this report had been prepared, a final RPI figure of 193.11 for the year 2005/06 became available. This revision would require some values in this report to be inflated to show the accurate pricing in 2005/06 prices. All **Allowed Net Investments** and pre 2005/06 **Reported Net Investments** require inflating by 0.14%.

2.7 **REPORTING DEFINITIONS**

A number of terms are used as headings within the tables in the document. The following table sets out the definition of these terms in the context of the report:

Definition of Headings used in tables	
Additional Workload	Expenditure on additional work (above the volume allowed in PCR) that PB Power considers timely, justified and efficiently incurred which could not have reasonably been forecast at the last review
Allowed Workload	Expenditure on allowed work that PB Power considers efficiently incurred (gross)
Allowed Net Investment	The Ofgem allowance (net of contributions)
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	Expenditure on work that PB Power considers was efficiently incurred, but either could have been deferred to the next control period or should have been anticipated and correctly forecast in the current control
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	PB Power's recommended adjusted net expenditure for the area of work
Reported Net Investment	The GDN's reported (net) expenditure for the area of work
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	Expenditure on work that PB Power considers was wasteful or unnecessary

Table 8

2.8 **DATA FOR PERIOD JAN 2001 TO MAR2002**

Data for this period was provided by NGG only, for the whole UK Distribution business. In most cases the information is aggregated such that the analysis can only be undertaken for UKD as a whole and the breakdown of expenditure categories is not always the same as required for the period after April 2002, thereby affecting and limiting the extent of any analysis.

2.9 **ADJUSTMENTS**

Where the analysis has led to a conclusion that an adjustment is recommended, it is sometimes the case that this will be a range rather than a specific figure. In these cases the relevant table will show a mid point figure and the range itself will be annotated in the attendant text in either monetary or percentage terms.

3 LTS AND STORAGE CAPEX

3.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

3.1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	158.9	14.2	173.1
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	2.9	0.0	2.9
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	156.0	14.2	170.2

Table 9

Analysis Carried Out

The LTS data provided for this period by NGG is in aggregate form only except for named large pipeline projects. These named projects were:

- Reviewed to determine efficiency of spend
- Reviewed to determine effectiveness of planning and procurement activities
- Examined for financial controls across their phased expenditure period

Key Issues

- Project expenditure spans up to four years
- A single project may span three RAV assessment periods
- Inefficiencies are estimated and applied to a nominal central year

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- Two projects have been identified with some wasteful/unnecessary expenditure totalling £2.9m

3.1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)

Overspend

- Although there is an overspend of £2.7m at the end of the three year period, this reverses into an underspend of £3.6m at the end of the five year control.

Analysis Carried Out

- All named projects were reviewed in respect of outline data
- Selected projects were reviewed in depth for justification and efficiency

Key Issues

- Projects are clearly identified and well planned

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- No wasteful or unnecessary expenditure has been identified and the total expenditure is recommended to be allowed

Categorisation of Forecast Expenditure

- £2.2m of wasteful/unnecessary expenditure has been identified

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total	2007/08
Allowed Net Investment	21.5	3.8	6.1	1.7	7.3	40.3	
Total GDN Variance	-6.0 -28%	12.2 324%	-3.6 -59%	0.8 46%	-7.2 -99%	-3.8 -9%	
Reported Net Investment	15.6	16.0	2.5	2.4	0.1	36.6	2.2
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0			0.0	
Adjustments to Forecasts				2.2	0.0	2.2	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	15.6	16.0	2.5	0.2	0.1	34.4	2.2
Allowed Workload	15.6	16.0	2.5	0.1	0.1	34.3	
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 10

3.2 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	158.9	14.2	173.1
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	2.9	0.0	2.9
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	156.0	14.2	170.2

Table 11

Data provided by NGG for LTS expenditure for the period 1 January 2001 to 31 March 2002 was provided as aggregate UKD data only. The total expenditure was £173.1m . This was mainly on 11 named pipeline projects.

Not only does the expenditure for any given project extend over a period of up to four or five years, but the expenditure also crosses the threshold of the two price control periods at 31 March 2002 and there was some expenditure pre January 2001. This requires special consideration in terms of the treatment of adjustments.

For these purposes each project has been allocated a 'central' year: the year of peak expenditure. Any adjustment will be applied to that year only.

Detail relating to the justification for any adjustment is to be found in the GDN report for the Network in whose area the project is located. The summary of these adjustments is:

- a) Projects with a central year of 2002/03 or beyond: £10.5m (2005/06 Prices)
- b) Projects with a central year of 2001 £2.9m (2005/06 Prices)

Adjustments for those in (a) are in the LTS sections of the relevant GDN report in which the project is located.

Adjustments for those in (b) are given below:

Breakdown of the adjustments;

Horndean to Newalls Lane: due to inefficient planning processes and contract management it was considered that this project overspent unnecessarily by £0.7m.

Newbury Reinforcement: due to inefficient planning processes and contract management this project incurred an inefficient and unnecessary overspend of £2.2m.

3.3 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (APR 2002 TO MAR 2005)

3.3.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS

LTS and Storage Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
Gross	Actual	15.6	16.0	2.5	34.0
	Allowance	21.5	3.8	6.1	31.3
	Variance	-6.0	12.2	-3.6	2.7
Contributions	Actual	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Allowance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Variance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net	Actual	15.6	16.0	2.5	34.0
	Allowance	21.5	3.8	6.1	31.3
	Variance	-6.0	12.2	-3.6	2.7

Table 12

3.3.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

The adverse variance of £2.7m after three years is due to the changed phasing of the projects actually carried compared with the plan. However this variance reverses in the next period to give a net underspend of £3.9m. No reason was provided for this variance.

3.3.3 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

LTS and Storage Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Reported Net Investment	15.6	16.0	2.5	34.0
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	15.6	16.0	2.5	34.0
Allowed Workload	15.6	16.0	2.5	34.1
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 13

3.3.3.1 Project Review

To assess the efficiency of LTS expenditure, the GDN's processes were reviewed to determine whether they had appropriate procedures for planning, procurement, contract management and financial controls.

For Northern Network two projects were selected for detailed review;

Project Selection

The first project selected is the West Hull Reinforcement. This project was selected because the actual costs were 30% over the approved sum and it was completed 18 months later than planned in 2002. The second project is Cowpen Bewley to Warden Law. This project was selected because the actual costs were 32% higher than the original approved sum.

Project Descriptions

i) West Hull Reinforcement

Pressure uprating of the existing 18" (450mm) pipeline between Ganstead and Wawne from 17 bar to 38 bar, the modification of the existing regulator streams at the NTS Ganstead AGI, the modification of the existing pipework arrangement within the existing Wawne AGI, the construction of a new 38bar to 17 bar pressure reduction installation at the Wawne AGI, the construction of a 42" (1050mm) 38 bar pipeline between Wawne AGI and Elloughton, the construction of a new 38 bar to 7 bar pressure reduction station at Elloughton, the construction of 2.2 km of 12" (300mm) 7 bar outlet at Elloughton and a 7bar to 2 bar governor to feed the existing MP network. This project reinforces supplies to Hull and provides additional LTS diurnal storage.

ii) Cowpen Bewley to Warden Law

Construction of 30.3km of 300mm high-pressure steel pipeline between Cowpen Bewley and Warden Law and the upgrading of the Warden Law PRI to reinforce supplies to South Wearside.

Summary of findings

i) West Hull Reinforcement

The network analysis data provided clearly demonstrated that this reinforcement was required for 2001 to avoid a failure to supply statutory loads in West Hull in peak winter conditions but the project was overspent by 30% which we have determined was necessary but inefficient in part.

ii) Cowpen Bewley to Warden Law

The network analysis data provided clearly demonstrated that this reinforcement was required for Winter 2003 to avoid a failure to supply statutory loads in South Wearside. The project was overspent by 32% of the original approval, which we have determined was justified as the causes were unforeseeable and unavoidable.

Conclusions

i) West Hull Reinforcement

We consider that the overall project was necessary. However, we are concerned that no detailed evidence for the reasoning behind the £2.2million settlement of a disputed [REDACTED] million claim for increased costs due to welding difficulties was properly documented in the submission. The claim was "*settled at a senior level of NGT*". Information provided on the 'welding' issue describes WHAT the extra money was spent on but not WHY. Welding problems of this magnitude could only be attributed to the welding contractor's competence or to the quality of the linepipe; in either case, in our opinion, Transco should have been able to reclaim (or not pay) the additional costs. Alternatively, if the linepipe was of proper quality when purchased, but had deteriorated in Transco's keeping, then this also would be deemed as wasteful/unnecessary.

ii) Cowpen Bewley to Warden Law

We consider that the only way to have brought the project back to a truly efficient expenditure level would have been to defer it until 2004. But this would have jeopardised security of supply. We accept that the factors causing the compression of the construction period and hence the increased costs were unforeseeable and unavoidable and are therefore allowable.

The full reports can be seen in Appendices 7 and 8.

3.3.3.2 Network Planning and Design

Replies have been supplied by NGN for all questions in the BPQ and the level of detail provides a thorough and comprehensive set of answers.

We have reached the conclusion that the planning work for development of the network and in particular that of the local transmission and storage system has been carried out in a competent manner.

- i) Information relating to forecast system flows for the 1 in 20 condition for 2005/06 and actual system peak days for each year were provided. In conjunction with other narrative these provided sufficient information to allow identification of entry and exit flows and pressures at key points.
- ii) A spreadsheet was provided containing actual data recorded on GTMS for the maximum demand day in 2005/06 winter and a validation report was provided. The validation report gives a high degree of confidence in the depth of understanding of the GDN regarding network simulation. It indicates that a reasonable degree of confidence in the models is appropriate and also highlights that the GDN is taking suitable steps to investigate some of the anomalies thrown up in the validation exercise.
- iii) A brief overview was given and reference to the formal procedure was submitted. A copy of the low pressure log was provided which shows how operations and planning interface when poor pressures are experienced. We conclude that the log demonstrates understanding by the planners as to the possible causes of differences between theory and practice.
- iv) A comprehensive description of changes to the recorded weather data used in the forecast methodology was provided as well as an indication of the anticipated future trends. The reasons for the change and anticipated effect provide a sound response to the question.
- v) Changes to the methodology have been identified and we consider that the reasons given are sound.
- vi) An adequate description of trends in demand forecasting over the last 4 years was provided along with sensible reasons for the variations.
 - a. The information and an explanation of the peak demand used in derivation of the percentages were provided. There was some variation in storage requirement figures between those given in the narrative responses which appeared to be inconsistent. However the answer provided in response to a supplementary question gave a satisfactory explanation and demonstrated thought in determining diurnal storage requirements.

A full report can be seen in Appendix 2.

3.4 FORECAST EXPENDITURE

LTS and Storage Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
Gross	Actual	15.6	16.0	2.5	2.3	0.1	36.4
	Allowance	21.5	3.8	6.1	1.7	7.3	40.3
	Variance	-6.0	12.2	-3.6	0.6	-7.2	-3.9
Contributions	Actual	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Allowance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Variance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net	Actual	15.6	16.0	2.5	2.4	0.1	36.6
	Allowance	21.5	3.8	6.1	1.7	7.3	40.3
	Variance	-6.0	12.2	-3.6	0.6	-7.2	-3.9

Table 14

3.4.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

All named projects were reviewed in outline. Two named projects were reviewed in detail.

3.4.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

A planned pipeline from Keighley to Sowerby Bridge has been cancelled and this accounts for the majority of the favourable variance in this period of £6.6m. Other works in first three years of the control overspent, but the net variance for the five year period is an underspend of £3.9m.

3.4.3 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

LTS and Storage Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total	2007/08
GDN Forecast Net Investment	15.6	16.0	2.5	2.4	0.1	36.6	2.2
Adjustments	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.0	2.2	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Forecast Net Investment	15.6	16.0	2.5	0.2	0.1	34.4	2.2
Allowed Workload	15.6	16.0	2.5	0.1	0.1	34.3	
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 15

Transmission pipelines will normally become visible in the planning process between five and ten years ahead of their required commissioning date. In the first instance the long term planning process will identify a supply/demand mismatch usually at zonal level. This will be entered into the plan as a potential reinforcement need in a particular year. A simplistic solution (the most obvious) may be costed to permit a figure to be entered into the financial plans.

As the 'project' comes closer in time, other actions and events may affect the design data for this project and in particular the timing. Demands are reassessed annually and networks are

validated against real data on a cyclical programme following each winter's experiences. New economic industrial loads may significantly move the size and timing of any proposal. Adjacent LTS projects can influence proposals and in particular NTS projects will have a major impact. It is critical that a link is maintained between the NTS planning processes and the LTS otherwise suboptimal solutions will be implemented. This is particularly critical as the lead times for both NTS and LTS pipelines are 3 to 4 years. Last minute changes in design and timing will lead to unnecessary and/or inefficient expenditure.

Diurnal storage requirements also directly impact on the pipeline requirements and timings and these are a dynamic and complex set of calculations changing as increasing connected load reduces available linepack over time and as the availability of Low Pressure Gasholders diminishes with age.

As the decision time for a project approaches, alternative solutions are worked up in more detail and refined. These are costed accurately to permit selection of the optimum solution.

Transmission Pressure Reduction Installations (PRIs) will either be part of a pipeline project in which case their evolution follows the same process, or they may be rebuilt to give additional capacity while the inlet and outlet pipelines are still satisfactory. It is normal that any PRI rebuilds will deliver significant extra capacity such that the expenditure will be treated as capital. Rebuilds due to obsolete equipment would also be classed as Capex for the same reason. Piecemeal replacement of (some) equipment which does not give material extra capacity to the whole installation will be treated as Repex.

NGN have been able to stay within their LTS Capex allowance primarily due to the cancellation of a planned pipeline from Keighley to Sowerby Bridge. Other planned works have changed, but the overall effect is an underspend in this period of £6.6m

The forecast net spend of £2.4m for this period is considered to be efficient and allowable.

3.4.4 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2007 TO MAR 2008)

NGN's forecast LTS spend for 2007/08 is £2.2m on NTS offtakes; there is no planned work on pipelines or PRIs. This work is deemed necessary and allowable.

3.5 FORECAST TRENDS (2002 TO 2013)

3.5.1 HIGH LEVEL TREND

NGN's submission shows work on four named pipeline projects from 2008/09 to 2012/13 at a cost of £30m. However, one project to reinforce supplies for a power station represents £20m of this. There is some evidence in the NGN submission that their plans include for a steady rebuilding of LTS plant and equipment over the next price control period. This is evidenced by the inclusion of 6 named NTS offtake projects and 6 named LTS PRI projects over the period 2006/07 to 2012/13 at a cost of £16m. This all appears to be well planned and clearly identified. These plans will be revisited in the main review.

3.5.2 COMMENTS ON TREND

It is normal not to see trends in an LTS programme.

4 CONNECTIONS CAPEX

4.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This section considers total Connections Capex.

4.1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	85.9	29.1	114.9
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	15.0	5.1	20.1
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	70.9	24.0	94.8

Table 16

The Net Capex summary figures are given in Table 15, together with Reported Net Investment as provided by the GDN and PB Power's initial recommendation for Ofgem's Adjusted Net Investment.

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account:

- Assessment of Net Capex drivers.
- Unit cost trends and comparisons.
- Review of workload trends.

Key Issues

- Information for the period January 2001 to 31st March 2002 is reported by NGG on a total UK basis only. Therefore we are unable to provide an assessment of investment performance specifically relating to NGN.
- Recovery of costs via contributions is inefficient and appropriate adjustments have been recommended.

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- £20.1m of Connections expenditure is considered wasteful.

4.1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)

The Net Capex summary figures are given in Table 16. These show the initial Allowed Net Investment from the last control, NGN's Reported Net Investment and finally PB Power's recommendation for Ofgem's Adjusted Net Investment.

Overspend

- The GDN is forecast to be £32.3m (234%) in excess of the Net Capex allowance.

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account:

- Review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects.
- Assessment of Net Capex drivers.
- Unit cost trends and comparisons.
- Management of contract arrangements.
- Review of processes to manage direct labour productivity.
- Procurement policies and procedures.

Key Issues

- Data quality, particularly for Connections activities, has inhibited analysis and comparison of cost performance.
- NGN does not have management information systems that provide detailed analysis of Net Capex performance to ensure effective monitoring and control.
- Recovery of costs via contributions is inefficient and appropriate adjustments have been recommended.

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- £6.3m of Connections expenditure has been assessed as inefficient.

Categorisation of Forecast Expenditure

- £5.5m of Connections expenditure has been assessed as inefficient.

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total	2007/08
Allowed Net Investment	4.3	3.3	2.6	1.9	1.7	13.8	
Total GDN Variance	6.3 147%	2.9 87%	6.2 236%	8.6 453%	8.3 499%	32.3 234%	
Reported Net Investment	10.6	6.2	8.9	10.5	9.9	46.2	9.6
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual Expenditure	2.5	1.4	2.4			6.3	
Adjustments to Forecasts				2.9	2.6	5.5	2.4
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	8.2	4.7	6.5	7.7	7.3	34.3	7.2
Allowed Workload	7.0	4.7	5.0	4.8	4.3	25.9	
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	1.5	2.8	3.0	8.4	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 17

4.2 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	85.9	29.1	114.9
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	15.0	5.1	20.1
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	70.9	24.0	94.8

Table 18

4.2.1 GROSS CAPEX

Information for the period January 2001 to March 2002 is reported by NGG on a total UK basis only. Therefore we are unable to provide an assessment of investment performance specifically relating to NGN.

We have reviewed the unit costs and workload for the period based on comparison with trends for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05.

The following charts indicate total UK unit cost movements over the period 2001 to 2004/05.






Figure 2

*Figure 3*

The following charts indicate total UK workload movements over the period 2001 to 2004/05.

*Figure 4*




Figure 5

Connections workload and unit cost performance levels for the period 2001 to Q1 2002 are consistent with the trend to 2004/05 and no issues have been identified.

We recommend that the reported Net Capex and work volumes for Connections activities are accepted as we have not identified any issues in these respects.

4.2.2 NET CAPEX

Separation of Connections activities was at the very early stages of implementation during the period. We are of the opinion that it would be unreasonable to assume that the Net Capex inefficiencies identified and considered in Section 4.3.3 were at the same level of effect as in the later years covered by the Connections Net Capex performance information provided by NGG and detailed in Appendix 3 – Fulcrum Connections. Therefore, we recommend that adjustments should be applied to reported Net Capex at the level of -10% for time lag and -7.5% for under recovery of costs. The combined adjustment of -17.5% reduces the reported Net Capex from £114.9m to £94.8m.

4.2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

- i) We recommend that the reported Gross Capex and work volumes for Connections activities are accepted as we have not identified any issues in these respects.
- ii) We recommend that adjustments should be applied to reported Net Capex at the level of -10% for time lag and -7.5% for under recovery of costs. The combined adjustment of -17.5% reduces the reported Net Capex from £114.9m to £94.8m.

4.3 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (APR 2002 TO MAR 2005)

This section of the report provides a review of Connections expenditure performance compared to allowances for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05. Workload information is included to support understanding of expenditure variances.

Expenditure and allowances are inclusive of capitalised overheads.

4.3.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS

4.3.1.1 Connections - Mains

The gross expenditure and workload variances for the 3 year period are 8% and -31% respectively. The actual work volume undertaken is driven by customer requirements and, therefore, we consider it to be necessary.

Contributions for the 3 year period are 30% below the allowance.

Connections (Mains) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
Gross (£m)	Actual	3.7	3.2	3.6	10.6
	Allowance	3.7	3.2	2.9	9.8
	Variance	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8
Contributions (£m)	Actual	1.8	2.1	2.4	6.3
	Allowance	3.3	2.9	2.8	9.0
	Variance	-1.5	-0.8	-0.4	-2.7
Net (£m)	Actual	2.0	1.1	1.2	4.3
	Allowance	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.9
	Variance	1.5	0.8	1.1	3.4
Workload (km)	Actual	48	37	45	130
	Allowance	69	62	59	191
	Variance	-21	-25	-14	-60

Table 19

4.3.1.2 Connections – Services

The gross expenditure and workload variances for the 3 year period are 62% and 17% respectively. The actual work volume undertaken is driven by customer requirements and, therefore, we consider it to be necessary.

Contributions for the 3 year period are 21% above the allowance which reflects the workload variance.

Connections (Services) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
Gross (£m)	Actual	14.2	10.8	15.1	40.1
	Allowance	9.5	8.1	7.2	24.8
	Variance	4.7	2.7	7.9	15.3
Contributions (£m)	Actual	5.5	5.7	7.4	18.7
	Allowance	5.6	5.1	4.6	15.4
	Variance	-0.1	0.6	2.8	3.3
Net (£m)	Actual	8.7	5.1	7.7	21.4
	Allowance	3.9	3.0	2.6	9.4
	Variance	4.8	2.1	5.1	12.0
Workload (No.)	Actual	15,582	12,078	14,934	42,594
	Allowance	13,065	12,157	11,074	36,296
	Variance	2,517	-79	3,860	6,298

Table 20

4.3.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

4.3.2.1 NGN explanations

NGN explanations for the variances associated with all Connections activities are limited and are summarised as follows:

- i) Market forecasts assumed a lower level of activity than actually occurred, primarily because assumptions about competitive penetration did not materialise. As a consequence the BPQ understated the Connections work volumes.
- ii) FC EPC rates rose by more than the rate of inflation.

4.3.2.2 Principal Factors affecting Variances

Connections Gross Capex

In our view, the principal factors affecting the variance between PCR allowances and reported gross expenditure are:

- i) Ongoing Costs of separation

The creation of FC as a separate business was an outcome of the issue of the Enforcement Order. It seems reasonable to presume that both Transco and Ofgem were aware, and accepted, that overheads on Connections activities would increase as a consequence. It is not clear whether this increase in overheads was anticipated when setting the allowances.

ii) EPC prices

In 2000 the Engineering Period Contracts (EPCs) were separated into two distinct contract types (generic and Connections) to remove any element of cross-subsidy and to support the development of a competitive Connections market. This resulted in a higher contractor cost for the Connections activity due to contractors requiring a premium for the geographic dispersion and unpredictable nature of this work, preferring instead the stability and predictability of larger long-term projects such as mains replacement.

Competitively tendered contractor rates have been increasing at a rate faster than RPI and, therefore, in excess of the rate incorporated into expenditure forecast

iii) Workload forecasts

Transco's BPQ assumptions predicted that the Connections workload would fall as a consequence of competition eroding market share and, therefore, overall cost would fall. The BPQ submission proved to be unrealistic.

Connections Net Capex

The net cost of Connections activities incorporates the effects of the following:

- i) Domestic Load Connection Allowance (DLCA)
- ii) Non-domestic allowances
- iii) Employer Ordered Works (EOW)
- iv) Time lag
- v) Overheads associated with unaccepted quotations
- vi) Under recovery of costs

The allowances significantly undervalued the effects of these factors. A broad indication of the degree is provided by calculation of the average Net Capex per service connection. The services allowances Net Capex for the 3 year review period equates to an average of the order of £259/connection whereas as the actual average Net Capex is £502/connection.

The principal component of Net Capex is the DLCA which applies to approximately 90% of new services to existing housing at an NGN estimated average cost of £500/connection. If it is assumed that approximately 70% of total services are to existing housing then this is indicative of £13.4m actual cost attributable to the DLCA for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05.

On request, NGN has since provided the following detailed cost assessment of the DLCA which indicates costs in line with the original estimate:

Table 21

The DLCA cost estimate at £13.4m over the period to 2004/05 represents 63% of actual services Net Capex.

It should be noted that information requested from and provided by NGG following the review meeting indicates that the total cost for all allowances, including the DLCA, is of the order of 60% of Connections total Net Capex.

4.3.3 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Connections Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Reported Net Investment	10.6	6.2	8.9	25.7
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	2.5	1.4	2.4	6.3
Connections Mains	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.9
Connections Services	1.6	0.9	1.9	4.4
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	8.2	4.7	6.5	19.4
Allowed Workload	7.0	4.7	5.0	16.7
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	1.5	2.6
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 22

4.3.3.1 Introduction

During the period 2002/03 to September 2005, Fulcrum Connections (FC) undertook all Connections activities on behalf of Northern. The Service Provider Contract (SPC) formed the basis for the contractual relationship between Northern and FC. NGG coordinated the interface between FC and the GDNs. Appendix 3 provides information regarding Fulcrum Connections and Connections business processes relevant to review of Connections expenditure and assessment of efficiency. Information provided by NGG relating to the retained networks is included in the appendix and, as appropriate, forms the basis for consideration and analysis of Connections expenditure for Northern, and all other GDNs also.

NGG's management information systems employed to monitor and control Connections expenditure were not adequate to provide accurate expenditure and work volume information to support detailed analysis in alignment with the allowances. Historic information provided by NGG has been synthesised by Northern into the activities format required by the BPQ. Discussions with NGN indicated that this has been a difficult process and, as a result, the separate activity category information cannot be relied upon entirely as a basis for accurate variance and GDN comparison analysis. Unit cost movements are inconsistent in some cases and without apparent workload balance justification.

No information has been returned regarding governors and we presume that this expenditure is allocated elsewhere within Connections Capex and cannot be identified separately.

The analysis process described below has been applied to the individual activity categories within Connections. However, this report focuses on the analyses at the level of total mains and total services which we consider to be sufficiently accurate for detailed examination.

4.3.3.2 Connections Gross Capex

We have carried out various analyses to assess the efficiency of Connections Gross Capex, including:

- Review of the process for monitoring expenditure and cost control, both by NGG and FC.
- Assessment of the process for determination of the Management Fee.
- Trends in unit costs.
- Unit cost comparisons
- Review of the processes to manage direct labour productivity.
- Procurement processes – EPCs and materials.

Expenditure Monitoring:

Examination and review of the management information systems employed within NGG and FC did not provide evidence of information to monitor activity expenditure efficiency, e.g. activity unit costs, at any organisational level. We conclude that the information systems employed by NGG and FC do not adequately monitor and manage the efficiency of Connections expenditure and performance improvement.

It is difficult to assess the degree of efficiency benefit from appropriate MI systems but we are of the opinion that a 3% improvement is reasonable based on the information submitted. This degree of efficiency improvement is, in our opinion, achievable with appropriate MI systems to monitor performance. Therefore, a -3% adjustment been applied to costs and this adjustment has been incorporated in the analyses.

Management Fee:

We have assessed NGG's management of the process to control and determine the Management Fee charges levied by FC. This assessment covered the management fee build-up, inclusion of a profit element and the application of the performance incentive mechanism to take into account performance against a range of KPIs substantially based on Standards of Service. No evidence was found to indicate that the charges were not determined in accordance with the SPC and we conclude that NGG has effectively managed the contractual terms on behalf of the GDNs.

Unit Cost Trends:

The analysis process incorporates examination of unit cost trends to identify exceptional misaligned movements. We regard such exceptional unit costs as an indication of inefficiency, unless there is relevant workload balance justification (based on examination of workload pipe diameter split information provided by NGN) or narrative response information providing an explanation. Where there is no evidence to justify the unit cost level we have applied an appropriate adjustment to the contract labour cost element in order to determine the efficient unit cost.

The following graph provides an example of the effect of this adjustment on actual unit costs and an indication of the resulting efficient unit cost in alignment with the overall trend.




Figure 6

Unit Cost Comparisons:

The charts below show the actual unit costs, inclusive of overheads, for all GDNs at 2005/06 prices adjusted by indexation to take into account regional (geographic) price variations. Indexation in this way facilitates meaningful comparison of unit cost performance. The indices used are based on the RICS Building Cost Information Service published indices, as used by Ofwat for this purpose.

The validity of these comparisons is dependent on the consistency of the expenditure and workload information reported by all GDNs. We are of the opinion that the information reported by the GDNs is not sufficiently reliable for use as a basis for comparison analysis and efficiency assessment. Therefore we regard the results as indicative only and no assessment of relative efficiency has been undertaken.




Figure 7




Figure 8

Direct Labour Productivity:

Review of the processes to manage direct labour productivity did not reveal evidence of routine, detailed information, including unproductive time analysis, to monitor, manage and set performance improvement targets for direct labour productivity on an individual basis. We consider that direct labour cost performance is, to a degree, inefficient without the focus provided by appropriate management information and periodic review. Therefore, we have applied a -7.5% adjustment to direct labour costs in the analysis process, which in our opinion is achievable with such an approach.

Procurement – EPCs:

In 2000 the Engineering Period Contracts (EPCs) were separated into two distinct contract types (generic and Connections) to remove any element of cross-subsidy and to support the development of a competitive Connections market.

Separation of Connections activities had a direct impact on FC's competitively tendered EPC arrangements and their ability to obtain the best market rates comparable to the rates for this work type prior to separation. Connections work is geographically spread, low volume and is driven by Standards of Service performance. These factors combine to inhibit operational flexibility in terms of forward planning and work scheduling, and hence reduce efficiency. It is to be expected that a premium will have to be paid in order to attract contractors to this work, particularly in periods when contractors are in demand to meet generally high workloads in other gas and utilities activities which would be more profitable.

The cost effectiveness of EPC operations is highly sensitive to work mix, work volume and the demand for competent labour in the utilities contracting market. Any significant and ongoing change in these respects affects profitability and has generated requests for a review of rates to take account of the circumstances and to ensure that continuity of EPC services is not disrupted. The decision by NGN to in-source Connections activities will address these issues to some degree and should alleviate the upward pressure on costs in due course.

In conclusion, we have found no evidence to indicate that the EPC procurement and management processes are inefficient.

Procurement - Materials

Connections materials required by Fulcrum are obtained via NGG group contracts and, therefore, FC derives benefit from NGG group leverage which should ensure that the best prices are available. We have found no evidence to indicate that materials procurement and usage management processes are inefficient.

Appendix 2 provides further information regarding FC procurement processes.

Summary of Adjustments to Connections Gross Capex:

The adjustments applied to Connections Gross Capex are summarised as follows:

- i) Improved contract labour management: -3% applied to contract labour cost for all years except where a higher adjustment for unit cost alignment is made.
- ii) Contract labour cost adjustment to align unit cost with trend:
 - Mains - no adjustments applied.
 - Services - 2004/05 -10%
- iii) Improved direct labour management: -7.5% applied to direct labour costs for all years.

4.3.3.3 Connections Net Capex

We have carried out an analysis to identify the various components of Connections Net Capex and assess the proportional effect of each component in terms of total Net Capex. The analysis is based on information requested from, and provided by, NGG regarding its' networks for the period 2002/03 to 2005/06.

Having reviewed the information provided by NGG and taking account of representations made by GDNs, we have adjusted the proportions for time lag, unaccepted quotations and under recovery. Also, we have taken account of evidence presented which suggests that the balance between mains and services should be amended to reflect the impact of allowances more accurately. In adjusting the values we have ensured that, taking account of relative Net Capex for mains and services, the resulting effect is consistent with the original information provided by NGG. (See Section A.3.6.8)

DLCA (Domestic Load Connection Allowance) and Other Allowances

Clearly, domestic and non-domestic allowances comprise the major element of Net Capex. In the process of discussing this matter with the GDNs and examining the information provided, we did not find any evidence of inefficiency in the calculation and application of these allowances.

Our analysis attributes 37.3% of mains Net Capex and 74.0% of services Net Capex to the cost of allowances.

Employer Ordered Works

EOW are essential works (e.g. mains upsizing to ensure network capacity to supply additional connections) additional to the customer quotation scope of work and are subject to authorisation by GDNs before work is undertaken and payment is made. We did not find any evidence of inefficiency in specification of EOW and the management processes to control the associated expenditure.

Our analysis attributes 12.7% of mains Net Capex and 3.0% of services Net Capex to the cost of EOW.

Unaccepted Quotations

The cost of providing quotations for connections work that are not accepted has been emphasised in BPQ submissions and in responses from GDNs. Our analysis takes into account the views expressed and attributes 7% of mains and services Net Capex to unaccepted quotations.

Time Lag

A significant proportion of Net Capex results from work in progress, i.e. work that was quoted before a price increase but executed after the price change. Connection charges are based on current costs at the time of quotation and, therefore, when costs are increasing under recovery occurs and this under recovery passes into Net Capex. There is no evidence of information to monitor the costs of time lag and initiate revision of the quotation process to reduce. Therefore, we conclude that action should have been taken to mitigate the cost consequences of time lag and the resultant expenditure is inefficient.

A -15% adjustment to mains and services Net Capex has been applied in the analysis process.

Under Recovery of Costs

The analysis process identified a significant component of Net Capex associated with inherent under recovery of costs and there is no evidence of routine management information to monitor and control these costs. We conclude that action should have been taken to mitigate the consequences of under recovery of costs in the customer quotation process and the resultant expenditure is therefore inefficient.

A -28.0% adjustment to mains Net Capex and a -1.0% adjustment to services Net Capex has been applied in the analysis process.

Summary of Adjustments to Connections Net Capex:

The adjustments applied to mains Net Capex are summarised as follows:

- i) Time lag: -15% adjustment to Net Capex for all years
- ii) Under recovery of costs: -28.0% adjustment to Net Capex for all years.
- iii) Total adjustment: -43.0% to Net Capex for all years.

The adjustments applied to services Net Capex are summarised as follows:

- i) Time lag: -15% adjustment to Net Capex for all years
- ii) Under recovery of costs: -1.0% adjustment to Net Capex for all years.
- iii) Total adjustment: -16.0% to Net Capex for all years.

4.3.3.4 Analysis Process

The expenditure analysis process has been designed to take into account appropriate indexation for inflation, applied to both expenditure and allowances, and identified adjustments due to inefficiency.

All analysis has been undertaken at 2005/06 Prices and GDN actuals, forecasts and allowances are re-stated on this basis.

A volume analysis has been carried out to establish the allowed and additional work volumes. Our analysis has not found any evidence to determine that any of the work volumes fall into the category of deferrable or unplanned but predictable work. This category of work volume is therefore nil.

Our expenditure analysis has been carried out in three stages. At each stage of the analysis the three figures, Gross Capex, Contributions and Net Capex are restated.

The first stage is to restate the reported Gross Capex, Contributions and Net Capex.

The second stage is to adjust the Contributions for the percentage of Net Capex that has been estimated as under-recovered. Thus the Contributions are increased by this amount and the Net Capex reduced by the same amount. The Gross Capex remains unchanged.

The third stage is to adjust all three figures (Gross, Contribution & Net) for the percentage that the Gross expenditure has been estimated as being inefficient. This second stage gives the final Net Capex figure which has been used to adjust the Reported Net Investment figure.

Finally having established an estimate for the efficient Gross Capex, this sum is divided by the reported workload to obtain the efficient unit cost.

The Net Capex Investment Category table details the allocation of expenditure to categories as specified in Section 2.7

4.3.3.5 Efficiency Analysis Summary

The following tables summarise the outputs from the analysis. Efficient Net Capex and unit costs are assessed by the analysis process.

Connections – Total Mains:

Analysis Summary – Total Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Actual Gross Capex		3.7	3.2	3.6
Actual Contributions		1.8	2.1	2.4
Actual Net Capex		2.0	1.1	1.2
% of Net Capex Invalid Due to Under Recovery		43%	43%	43%
Actual Gross Capex		3.7	3.2	3.6
Contribution Adjusted for Under Recovery		2.6	2.6	2.9
Net Capex		1.1	0.6	0.7
% of Gross Capex which is Inefficient		3%	3%	3%
Efficient Gross Capex		3.6	3.1	3.5
Efficient Contributions		2.6	2.5	2.8
Efficient Net Capex		1.1	0.6	0.7
Actual Volume (km)		48	37	45
Efficient Unit Cost (£/m)		76	84	78

Table 23

Analysis Summary – Total Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Reported Net Investment	2.0	1.1	1.2
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.9	0.5	0.5
Allowed Workload	1.1	0.6	0.7
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 24

Connections – Total Services:

Analysis Summary – Total Services All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Actual Gross Capex	14.2	10.8	15.1
Actual Contributions	5.5	5.7	7.4
Actual Net Capex	8.7	5.1	7.7
% of Net Capex Invalid Due to Under Recovery	16%	16%	16%
Actual Gross Capex	14.2	10.8	15.1
Contribution Adjusted for Under Recovery	6.9	6.5	8.7
Net Capex	7.3	4.2	6.4
% of Gross Capex which is Inefficient	3%	3%	10%
Efficient Gross Capex	13.8	10.5	13.6
Efficient Contributions	6.7	6.3	7.8
Efficient Net Capex	7.1	4.1	5.8
Actual Volume (No.)	15,582	12,078	14,934
Efficient Unit Cost (£/service)	885	866	909

Table 25


Analysis Summary – Total Services All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Reported Net Investment	8.7	5.1	7.7
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	1.6	0.9	1.9
Allowed Workload	5.9	4.1	4.3
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	1.5
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 26

4.4 FORECAST EXPENDITURE

Connections Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total	2007/08
GDN Forecast Net Investment	10.6	6.2	8.9	10.5	9.9	46.2	9.6
Adjustments	2.5	1.4	2.4	2.9	2.6	11.8	2.4
Connections Mains	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.4	1.2	4.5	1.1
Connections Services	1.6	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.4	7.3	1.3
Ofgem Adjusted Forecast Net Investment	8.2	4.7	6.5	7.7	7.3	34.3	7.2
Allowed Workload	7.0	4.7	5.0	4.8	4.3	25.9	
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	1.5	2.8	3.0	8.4	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 27



Traffic Management Act (TMA)

We understand that NGNs' forecasts do not include any costs associated with the TMA.

4.4.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

4.4.1.1 Connections – Mains

The gross expenditure and workload variances for the 2 year period are 174% and -9% respectively. The actual work volume undertaken is driven by customer requirements and, therefore, we consider it to be necessary.

Contributions for the 2 year period are 113% in excess of the allowance.

Connections (Mains)		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices							
Gross (£m)	Actual	3.7	3.2	3.6	7.0	7.4	25.1
	Allowance	3.7	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.5	15.1
	Variance	0.0	0.0	0.8	4.3	4.9	10.0
Contributions (£m)	Actual	1.8	2.1	2.4	4.6	5.2	16.1
	Allowance	3.3	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.2	13.6
	Variance	-1.5	-0.8	-0.4	2.2	3.0	2.5
Net (£m)	Actual	2.0	1.1	1.2	2.4	2.2	8.9
	Allowance	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	1.5
	Variance	1.5	0.8	1.1	2.1	1.9	7.4
Workload (km)	Actual	48	37	45	48	49	227
	Allowance	69	62	59	54	51	296
	Variance	-21	-25	-14	-6	-3	-69

Table 28

Connections - Services

The gross expenditure and workload variances for the 2 year period are 189% and 81% respectively. The actual work volume undertaken is driven by customer requirements and, therefore, we consider it to be necessary.

Contributions for the 2 year period are 90% above the allowance which reflects the workload variance.

Connections (Services)		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices							
Gross (£m)	Actual	14.2	10.8	15.1	14.7	15.4	70.2
	Allowance	9.5	8.1	7.2	5.5	4.9	35.2
	Variance	4.7	2.7	7.9	9.2	10.5	35.0
Contributions (£m)	Actual	5.5	5.7	7.4	6.6	7.7	33.0
	Allowance	5.6	5.1	4.6	3.9	3.6	22.9
	Variance	-0.1	0.6	2.8	2.7	4.1	10.1
Net (£m)	Actual	8.7	5.1	7.7	8.1	7.7	37.2
	Allowance	3.9	3.0	2.6	1.6	1.4	12.3
	Variance	4.8	2.1	5.1	6.5	6.4	24.9
Workload (No.)	Actual	15,582	12,078	14,934	16,268	16,231	75,093
	Allowance	13,065	12,157	11,074	9,356	8,570	54,222
	Variance	2,517	-79	3,860	6,912	7,662	20,871

Table 29

4.4.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

We presume that the forecasts for 2005/06 and 2006/07 are based on historic expenditure performance and, therefore, the reasons stated by the GDN for historic variances also influence the forecasts. On this basis our views on the variances associated with Historic Expenditure (Apr 2002 to Mar 2005) are also relevant in terms of the forecasts. See Section 4.3.2.

4.4.3 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

4.4.3.1 Management of Connections activities

During the period 2002/03 to August 2006, Fulcrum Connections undertook all Connections activities on behalf of Northern. The Service Provider Contract (SPC) formed the basis for the contractual relationship between Northern and FC. NGG coordinated the interface between FC and the GDNs.

Immediately following acquisition of the network in June 2005, NGN transferred management of the Fulcrum Connections (FC) Service Provider Contract (SPC) to United Utilities Operations Ltd (UUOL). The primary concerns leading to that decision were regarding FC's ability to achieve standards of service, alignment with NGN's business model, reputation issues and availability of an 'in-house' service provider capability by UUOL.

NGN intends to assign delivery of the entire Connections business to UUOL with effect from 1st August 2006. The cost benefits from these arrangements will be assessed as implementation proceeds and develops. NGN forecasts currently assume no real cost increases in Connections activities during the next review period. The 4.0% forecast contractor cost increases will be mitigated and not passed on to customers.

UUOL is exclusively contracted to NGN to provide asset services under the terms of the Asset Services Agreement (ASA). The ASA incentivises UUOL against a range of KPIs aligned with NGN's objectives, and the licence and HSE obligations. Importantly, in terms of Connections activities, the KPIs incorporate standards of service performance.

Since June 2005, NGN has increased the management focus on FC to ensure that FC meets overall and guaranteed standards of service. In the period December 2005 to February 2006 NGN recovered [REDACTED] via the scorecard performance mechanism due to failure on completions. An NGN audit of FC quotation and completion systems revealed failure to update completion date systems and other front end work management system routine issues.

UUOL management of the FC SPC currently includes contract delivery, invoice validation and billing, closure file completion and SPC performance (scorecard process). UUOL has also taken over responsibility for customer billing, which was carried out centrally by NGG prior to June 2005. Until final take-over on the 1st August UUOL has access to NGG systems, via a Service Agreement, to monitor FC's performance. New IT systems to manage Connections processes and generate comprehensive management information will be implemented.

FC's EPC contractor withdrew from the contract when the network was acquired by NGN. The new FC contractor also provides EPC services to NGN and benefits from synergies with the networks' Repex workload. NGN challenged the proposed increases in the FC EPC rates which were reduced from in excess of [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] as a consequence. FC will continue to manage the Connections EPC until 1st August 2006.

4.4.3.2 Analysis Process

As stated previously, we presume that the forecasts for 2005/06 and 2006/07 are based on historic performance. Therefore, the inefficiencies identified and quantified for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05 will also influence the forecasts which, in our opinion, are inaccurate as a consequence. Our analysis process for the historic period has also been applied to the forecasts in order to assess the degree of inaccuracy.

Section 4.3.3 provides full details of the analysis process and the adjustments applied for the forecast period follow in this section of the report.

Summary of Adjustments to Connections Gross Capex

The adjustments applied to forecast gross Connections Capex are summarised as follows:

- i) Improved contract labour management: -3% applied to contract labour cost for all years except where a higher adjustment for unit cost alignment is made.
- ii) Contract labour cost adjustment to align unit cost with trend:
 - Mains : 2005/06 -25%
 - Mains : 2006/07 -20%
 - Services : no adjustments
- iii) Improved direct labour management: -7.5% applied to direct labour costs for all years.

Summary of Adjustments to Connections Net Capex

The adjustments applied to mains Net Capex are summarised as follows:

- i) Time lag: -15% adjustment to Net Capex for all years
- ii) Under recovery of costs: -28.0% adjustment to Net Capex for all years.
- iii) Total adjustment: -43.0% to Net Capex for all years.

The adjustments applied to services Net Capex are summarised as follows:

- i) Time lag: -15% adjustment to Net Capex for all years
- ii) Under recovery of costs: -1.0% adjustment to Net Capex for all years.
- iii) Total adjustment: -16.0% to Net Capex for all years.

4.4.3.3 Analysis summary:

The following tables summarise the outputs from the analysis. Efficient Net Capex and unit costs are assessed by the analysis process and are indicated.

Connections – Total Mains

Analysis Summary – Total Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Actual Gross Capex	3.7	3.2	3.6	7.0	7.4
Actual Contributions	1.8	2.1	2.4	4.6	5.2
Actual Net Capex	2.0	1.1	1.2	2.4	2.2
% of Net Capex Invalid Due to Under Recovery	43%	43%	43%	43%	43%
Actual Gross Capex	3.7	3.2	3.6	7.0	7.4
Contribution Adjusted for Under Recovery	2.6	2.6	2.9	5.6	6.2
Net Capex	1.1	0.6	0.7	1.4	1.3
% of Gross Capex which is Inefficient	3%	3%	3%	24%	20%
Efficient Gross Capex	3.6	3.1	3.5	5.3	6.0
Efficient Contributions	2.6	2.5	2.8	4.3	5.0
Efficient Net Capex	1.1	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.0
Actual Volume (km)	48	37	45	48	49
Efficient Unit Cost (£/m)	76	84	78	110	122

Table 30

Analysis Summary – Total Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Reported Net Investment	2.0	1.1	1.2	2.4	2.2
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.9	0.5	0.5	1.4	1.2
Allowed Workload	1.1	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.0
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 31

Connections – Total Services

Analysis Summary – Total Services All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Actual Gross Capex	14.2	10.8	15.1	14.7	15.4
Actual Contributions	5.5	5.7	7.4	6.6	7.7
Actual Net Capex	8.7	5.1	7.7	8.1	7.7
% of Net Capex Invalid Due to Under Recovery	16%	16%	16%	16%	16%
Actual Gross Capex	14.2	10.8	15.1	14.7	15.4
Contribution Adjusted for Under Recovery	6.9	6.5	8.7	7.9	8.9
Net Capex	7.3	4.2	6.4	6.8	6.5
% of Gross Capex which is Inefficient	3%	3%	10%	3%	3%
Efficient Gross Capex	13.8	10.5	13.6	14.3	15.0
Efficient Contributions	6.7	6.3	7.8	7.6	8.7
Efficient Net Capex	7.1	4.1	5.8	6.6	6.3
Actual Volume (No.)	15,582	12,078	14,934	16,268	16,231
Efficient Unit Cost (£/service)	885	866	909	877	923

Table 32

Analysis Summary – Total Services All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Reported Net Investment Category	8.7	5.1	7.7	8.1	7.7
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	1.6	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.4
Allowed Workload	5.9	4.1	4.3	3.8	3.3
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	1.5	2.8	3.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 33

4.4.4 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2007 TO MAR 2008)

4.4.4.1 Analysis Process

The efficiency analysis process detailed in Section 4.3.3 is applied to assess efficient/adjusted unit costs. We recommend that forecast expenditure for 2007/08 reflects the historic efficient unit cost trend and we have adjusted the reported forecasts on this basis

4.4.4.2 Reported Workload Trend

Connections – Mains




Figure 9

Mains workload forecasts are aligned with historic trends and no issues are identified in this respect. Therefore we recommend that no adjustment is applied to the reported workload.

Connections – Services




Figure 10

Services workload forecasts are aligned with historic trends and no issues are identified in this respect. Therefore we recommend that no adjustment is applied to the reported workload.

4.4.4.3 Forecast Assessment

A critical issue in terms of forecast accuracy for the period post 2006/07 is assessment of efficient Connections Net Capex for both mains and services activities. The factors affecting Net Capex are detailed in Appendix 3 - Fulcrum Connections and are considered in Section 4.3.3 – Efficiency Analysis. A clear understanding of the cost implications of the factors is essential to inform the Net Capex forecasting process. We recommend that NGN identifies actions to address the inefficiencies identified and applies appropriate assumptions in this respect to develop an accurate assessment of Net Capex for 2007/08. As a minimum requirement, we are of the opinion that the reported Net Capex forecast be adjusted in accordance with Section 4.3.3. This results in an adjustment of -£2.4m.

Also, we recommend that management information systems employed include comprehensive, detailed analysis of Net Capex performance to ensure effective monitoring, and to inform review of standard charges.

Gross Capex- Mains




Figure 11

The workload balance does not provide any indication of the reason for the actual unit cost increases in 2005/06 and 2006/07. This matter has been addressed in the analysis process by adjustments to determine the efficient unit cost.

We recommend that forecast expenditure is based on the historic efficient unit cost trend. On this basis the unit cost inclusive of overheads will be in the range £115/m to £135/m.

The mid-point unit cost of £125/m applied to the forecast workload at 47.4 km results in an indicative 2007/08 expenditure forecast of £5.9m, including overheads, for Connections total mains. Compared to the reported forecast at £7.2m, the variance is -£1.3m.

Gross Capex- Services




Figure 12

We recommend that forecast expenditure is based on the historic efficient unit cost trend. On this basis the unit cost inclusive of overheads will be in the range £900/service to £940/service.

The mid-point cost of £920/service applied to the forecast workload at 15384 results in an indicative 2007/08 expenditure forecast of £14.6m, including overheads, for Connections total services. Compared to the reported forecast at £15.0m, the variance is -£0.4m.

4.4.4.4 Recommendations

- i) We recommend that management information systems employed include comprehensive, detailed analysis of Net Capex performance to ensure effective monitoring, and to inform review of standard charges.
- ii) We recommend that no adjustment is applied to the reported workloads for mains and services.
- iii) We recommend that NGN identifies actions to address the inefficiencies associated with Net Capex performance and applies appropriate assumptions in this respect to develop accurate Net Capex forecasts for 2007/08.

As a minimum requirement, we are of the opinion that the reported mains and services Net Capex forecast should be adjusted in accordance with Section 4.3.3. This results in an adjustment of -£2.4m.

- iv) Our recommendations regarding the forecasts are summarised below:

Summary – Connections Forecast 2007/08		
	Mains	Services
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		
Reported Gross Investment Forecast	7.2	15.0
Reported Contributions	5.1	7.6
Reported Net Capex	2.1	7.4
Ofgem Adjusted Gross Investment Forecast	5.9	14.6
Ofgem Adjusted Contributions	4.9	8.5
Ofgem Adjusted Net Capex	1.0	6.1

Table 34

4.5 FORECAST TRENDS (2002 TO 2013)

4.5.1 HIGH LEVEL TREND

Connections – Mains




Figure 13




Figure 14


Connections – Services

Figure 15




Figure 16

4.5.2 COMMENTS ON TREND

The mains workload balance does not provide any indication of the reason for the increased gross expenditure in 2005/06 and 2006/07. Expenditure continues at a similar high level to 2012/13. We recommend that this matter is re-visited under the main review.

We have not identified any issues regarding the mains and services forecast workload trends.

5 MAINS AND GOVERNOR CAPEX

5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This section considers the combined Reinforcement Mains and Governors Capex.

5.1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	65.0	10.4	75.4
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	65.0	10.4	75.4

Table 35

The Net Capex summary figures are given in Table 34. Reported Net Investment as provided by the GDN and PB Power's recommendation for Ofgem's adjusted Net Investment.

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account.

- Unit cost trends and comparisons.
- Review of workload trends.
- Review of expenditure trends

Key Issues

- Information for the period January 2001 to March 2002 is reported by NGG on a total UK basis only. Therefore we are unable to provide an assessment of investment performance specifically relating to NGN.

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- We consider the total expenditure of £75.4m to be efficiently incurred.

5.1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)

The Net Capex summary figures are given in Table 35. These show the initial Allowed Net Investment from the last control, NGN's Reported Net Investment and finally PB Power's recommendation for Ofgem's Adjusted Net Investment.

Overspend

- The GDN Reported Net Investment is forecast to be £21.8m which equals the Net Capex allowance.

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account.

- Review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects.
- Assessment of Net Capex drivers.
- Unit cost trends and comparisons.
- Management of contract arrangements.
- Review of processes to manage direct labour productivity.
- Procurement policies and procedures.

Key Issues

- Data quality has inhibited analysis and comparison of cost performance.

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- £0.4m of reinforcement mains and governors expenditure has been assessed as inefficient.

Categorisation of Forecast Expenditure

- We consider the forecast expenditure to be efficient.

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 prices	2002/03		2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07		5 year Total		2007/08
Allowed Net Investment	5.0		4.4		4.4		4.1		4.0		21.8		
Total GDN Variance	0.8	17%	-0.8	-19%	0.0	1%	-0.5	-11%	0.4	10%	0.0	0%	
Reported Net Investment	5.8		3.6		4.4		3.7		4.4		21.8		6.2
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual Expenditure	0.2		0.1		0.1						0.4		
Adjustments to Forecasts							0.1		0.0		0.1		1.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	5.6		3.5		4.3		3.6		4.3		21.3		5.2
Allowed Workload	4.4		3.5		4.3		3.6		4.3		20.2		
Additional Workload	1.1		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		1.1		
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		

Table 36

5.2 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	65.0	10.4	75.4
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	65.0	10.4	75.4

Table 37

5.2.1 ANALYSIS PROCESS

Information for the period January 2001 to March 2002 is reported by NGG on a total UK basis only. Therefore we are unable to provide an assessment of investment performance specifically relating to NGN.

We have reviewed reinforcement mains unit cost performance and workload for the period based on comparison with trends for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05. Similar analysis for governors is not possible as workload information has not been provided.

Governors gross expenditure levels for the period 2001 to Q1 2002 are consistent with the trend to 2004/05 and no issues have been identified in this respect.

The following chart indicates the reinforcement mains total UK unit cost movements over the period 2001 to 2004/05.




Figure 17

Reinforcement mains unit cost performance levels for the period 2001 to Q1 2002 are consistent with the trend to 2004/05 and no issues have been identified in this respect.

The following chart indicates the total UK workload movements over the period 2001 to 2004/05.




Figure 18

We presume that the high reinforcement mains workload in 2001 resulted from the Transco initiated validation programme in 1999/2000 to validate all low and medium pressure networks and was necessary to ensure security of supply.

5.2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the reported Net Capex for reinforcement mains and governors activities be accepted as we have not identified any investment efficiency issues that would indicate otherwise.

5.3 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (APR 2002 TO MAR 2005)

This section of the report provides a review of reinforcement mains and governors expenditure performance compared to allowances for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05. Workload information is included to support understanding of expenditure variances. Expenditure and allowances are inclusive of capitalised overheads.

5.3.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS

5.3.1.1 Reinforcement mains

The gross expenditure and workload variances for the 3 year period are -5% and 6% respectively.

Mains - General Reinforcement All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
Gross (£m)	Actual	4.5	2.1	3.5	10.1
	Allowance	3.9	3.4	3.3	10.6
	Variance	0.6	-1.3	0.2	-0.5
Workload (km)	Actual	34	19	21	73
	Allowance	25	23	22	69
	Variance	9	-4	-1	4

Table 38

5.3.1.2 Governors

The gross expenditure is in excess of the allowance for the 3 year period and the variance is 19%. The allowances did not specify workload for governors and variances in this respect are not available therefore.

Governors All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
Gross	Actual	1.2	1.5	1.0	3.7
	Allowance	1.0	1.0	1.1	3.2
	Variance	0.2	0.4	-0.1	0.6
Contributions	Actual	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
	Allowance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Variance	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Net	Actual	1.2	1.5	0.9	3.7
	Allowance	1.0	1.0	1.1	3.2
	Variance	0.2	0.4	-0.2	0.5

Table 39

5.3.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

5.3.2.1 Reinforcement Mains

The 2002/3 actual work volume is 36% in excess of the allowance which resulted in a variance of £0.6m for that year. We presume that the increase in workload in 2002/3 resulted from a Transco initiated validation programme in 1999/2000 to validate all low and medium pressure networks which led to higher levels of Reinforcement expenditure during 2002/3.

We are of the opinion that the full workload implications of the validation process were not evaluated prior to submission of the BPQ forecasts and were not predictable at that time therefore.

We assume that NGN policies and procedures regarding network planning were followed and the reinforcement works identified were necessary to ensure security of supply. There is no evidence to indicate that the additional work volume in 2002/3 was unnecessary.

NGN has indicated that both workload and costs include non-contiguous reinforcement work which could not be separated from connections specific reinforcement. This issue will be clarified for the 5 year PCR.

5.3.2.2 Governors

Expenditure is generally aligned with allowances and we have not identified any significant issues.

5.3.3 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Mains and Governor Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Reported Net Investment	5.8	3.6	4.4	13.8
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4
Reinforcement Mains	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3
Governors	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	5.6	3.5	4.3	13.4
Allowed Workload	4.4	3.5	4.3	12.2
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.1
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 40

5.3.3.1 Gross Capex

We have carried out various analyses to assess the efficiency of reinforcement mains and governors Gross Capex, including:

- Trends in unit costs.
- Unit cost comparisons
- Review of the processes to manage direct labour productivity.
- Project management processes
- Project review
- Overspend project review
- Procurement processes – EPCs and materials.

Unit Cost Trends:

The analysis process incorporates examination of unit cost trends to identify exceptional misaligned movements. We regard such exceptional unit costs as an indication of inefficiency, unless there is relevant workload balance justification or narrative response information providing an explanation. Workload balance is assessed by examination of workload pipe diameter split information and governor category split between replacement and growth. Where there is no evidence to justify the unit cost level we have applied an

appropriate adjustment to the contract labour cost element in order to determine the efficient unit cost.

The following graph provides an example of the effect of this adjustment on actual unit costs and an indication of the resulting efficient unit cost in alignment with the overall trend.




Figure 19

Unit Cost Comparisons

The charts below show the actual unit costs, inclusive of overheads, for all GDNs at 2005/06 prices adjusted by indexation to take into account regional (geographic) price variations. Indexation in this way facilitates meaningful comparison of unit cost performance. The indices used are based on the RICS Building Cost Information Service published indices, as used by Ofwat for this purpose.

The validity of these comparisons is dependent on the consistency of the expenditure and workload information reported by all GDNs. We are of the opinion that the information reported by the GDNs is not sufficiently reliable for use as a basis for comparison analysis and efficiency assessment. Therefore we regard the results as indicative only and no assessment of relative efficiency has been undertaken.




Figure 20




Figure 21

Direct Labour Productivity

Review of the processes to manage direct labour productivity did not reveal evidence of routine, detailed information, including unproductive time analysis, to monitor, manage and set performance improvement targets for direct labour productivity on an individual basis. We consider that direct labour cost performance is, to a degree, inefficient without the focus provided by appropriate management information and periodic review. Therefore, we have applied a -7.5% adjustment to direct labour costs in the analysis process, which in our opinion is achievable with such an approach.

Project Management Processes

NGN has adopted NGG Policies and Procedures which include requirements for project management.

Investment Steering Group (ISG) project monitoring processes are established and costs are monitored to ensure that control mechanisms are applied.

All operational Capex projects > £50k are submitted for review and approval by the ISG. Comprehensive project monitoring processes are established and costs are monitored to ensure that control mechanisms are applied. Live projects are monitored and projects forecast to fall outside of policy tolerances (-15%/+10%) are subject to re-submission. The ISG defines the requirements for post investment appraisal and projects are selected based on a 10% sample of small/medium size projects and large overspent projects. NGN has indicated that this process was not rigorously applied in the past.

Examination of project documents confirms that submissions include:

- Alternative proposals, including cost estimates.
- Consideration of network policy mains replacement plans to ensure that the optimum combined solution is adopted.
- Least cost optimum engineering solution recommendation
- Financial impacts, risks and sensitivities

A Project Completion Report (PCR) is required for all projects and these reports are approved in accordance with delegated levels of authority. The completion report is designed to review all aspects of the project against the original approval, including scope of works, expenditure, timescale etc., and to identify any lessons learnt that should be taken into account for similar projects in the future. The level of detail is determined by the value of the project. Also, the ISG would normally review the PCR where there has been material variance from the authorised expenditure presented to the committee by the project manager.

Individual reinforcement projects are designed using GBNA to determine the optimum solution for the particular network. Project cost estimations are based on EPC rates and are reviewed to ensure that all risks have been assessed and relevant issues have been taken into account in the planning/costing process.

Further information regarding network planning and design processes is provided in Appendix 1, the Network Planning and Design.

The management and control processes described for reinforcement expenditure also apply to governor replacement and upgrade projects.

We consider that project management policies and procedures are adequate in terms of overall expenditure control to ensure efficient investment.

Project Reviews

The Shap to Appleby MP Network Reinforcement project was selected for review.

The project submission to the Transco Investment Committee (TIC) in May 2002 sought approval for reinforcement of the MP system to meet the predicted peak demand for the 2002/03 winter period and beyond. The capacity of the existing MP system was not adequate to ensure supply into the downstream LP networks. Alternative options, including elevating the operating pressure of the existing MP system, were presented in the submission and the least cost solution was recommended for approval. Supporting information included an assessment of network risks.

The authorised project works comprised 5.65km of 250mm and 15.44km of 180mm MDPE mains £1.7m. This estimate was based on EPC rates and the use of cost effective pipelaying techniques, the use of which was dictated by the surface type. Completion within the authorised expenditure was highly sensitive to the proportion of pipelay within highway verge. The cost estimates were subject to a challenge and review process by the management team.

When construction commenced the verge was identified as a Verge of Special Interest and one section as a Site of Special Interest. As a consequence of these environmental issues and general congestion from other utilities plant it was necessary to adopt a carriageway route. Construction was completed in October 2002 at a total cost of £2.33m and the project was re-submitted to TIC in June 2003 to obtain authorisation for the additional expenditure. This submission indicates that project management had been focused on operational completion and financial control was secondary.

The BPQ response summary statement regarding this project indicates that a PIA was undertaken for this project. Lessons learnt related to the requirement for site investigations and surface category sensitivity analysis at the planning stage. The PIA document was not included with the documents for examination.

Project management processes did not ensure financial control and authorisation for the additional expenditure was not obtained in advance. We conclude that the procedures followed in this particular case were not adequate to ensure controlled and efficient investment.

In conclusion, we have found no evidence to indicate that project management processes are generally inefficient.

Overspend Project Review

The Rothbury LP Reinforcement project was selected for review.

The project submission to the DPSC in July 2004 sought approval for reinforcement of the LP network to remedy poor pressures and to meet the predicted peak demand for the 2004/05

winter period and beyond. Alternative options presented in the submission were rejected for safety and environmental reasons. Supporting information included an assessment of risks and sensitivities.

The authorised project works comprised 1056m pipelay of various diameters from 355mm PE to 150mm steel, and incorporated replacement and upsizing of policy DI mains. Costs were estimated at £137k. Site difficulties and local authority constraints resulted in restricted working hours and weekend working which increased costs. When it became apparent that the original authorised sum would be exceeded the project was resubmitted at a revised cost estimate of £168k. This resubmission did not cover the full overspend and the final cost on completion was £202k.

The BPQ response summary statement regarding lessons learnt indicates that a contingency was included in future estimates for projects of this type.

The documents provided confirmed general compliance with the project management processes described above and we have found no evidence to indicate that overspend project management processes are generally inefficient.

Procurement – EPCs

Most of the GDN's reinforcement mains and governors construction work is carried out by contractors via EPC contracts. Initially of the target price format with efficiency sharing incentives, these contracts were changed (w.e.f. April 2002) to a fixed price format through re-tender by the incumbents and subsequent negotiation.

The EPC contracts in place at this time were approaching their three year anniversary and possible termination. If the GDN wished to move to a new form of contract then an open market re-tender, rather than re-negotiation of the contracts, would have been appropriate.

We judge the increase relative to the move to fixed rates likely to be in the range 0 – 10% and have applied an adjustment of -5% to the contract labour cost element to reflect this for the period 2002/02 to 2005/06.

Procurement - Materials

NGN utilised NGG policies and procedures for pe pipe and fittings procurement and therefore benefited from the leverage resulting from large volume purchasing arrangements. The purchasing contracts were novated to NGN when the network was acquired in 2005.

We have found no evidence to indicate that materials procurement and usage management processes are inefficient.

Appendix 2 provides further information regarding procurement processes.

Summary of Adjustments to Gross Capex

The adjustments applied to reinforcement mains and governors Gross Capex are summarised as follows:

- Improved contract labour management: -5% applied to contract labour cost for all years except where a higher adjustment for unit cost alignment is made.
- Contract labour cost adjustment to align unit cost with trend:
Reinforcement mains - no adjustments applied.
Governors – no adjustments applied. .
- Improved direct labour management: -7.5% applied to direct labour costs for all years.

5.3.3.2 Net Capex

Reinforcement mains and governors activities are not rechargeable and do not result in contributions. Net Capex is therefore equal to Gross Capex.

5.3.3.3 Analysis Process

The expenditure analysis process has been designed to take into account appropriate indexation for inflation, applied to both expenditure and allowances, and identified adjustments due to inefficiency.

All analysis has been undertaken at 2005/06 Prices and GDN actuals, forecasts and allowances are re-stated on this basis.

A volume analysis is included to provide details of allowed and additional work volumes. This analysis identifies unnecessary and deferrable or unplanned work but we have not found any evidence to justify assigning any work to these categories.

The analysis summary tabulation sets out the information at each stage of the process to determine the efficient level of expenditure and unit cost:

- i) Actual gross expenditure including overheads – as reported by the GDN.
- ii) Efficiency adjustments to gross expenditure – expenditure adjustments based on the application of the adjustments specified.
- iii) Adjusted gross expenditure including overheads – actual gross expenditure (i) minus the efficiency adjustments (ii).
- iv) Contributions – as reported by the GDN.
- v) Actual Net Capex – actual gross expenditure including overheads (i) minus contributions (iv)
- vi) Adjusted Net Capex – adjusted gross expenditure including overheads (iii) minus contributions (iv).
- vii) Adjustments for under-recovery of contributions - expenditure adjustments based on the application of the efficiency adjustments specified.
- viii) Efficient Net Capex – adjusted Net Capex (vi) minus adjustments for under- recovery of contributions (vii).
- ix) Actual volume – as reported by the GDN.
- x) Efficient unit cost – based on the adjusted gross expenditure including overheads (iii) and the actual work volume (ix).

The Net Capex Investment Category table details the allocation of expenditure to categories as specified in Section 2.7.

5.3.3.4 Efficiency Analysis Summary

Reinforcement Mains

Analysis Summary – Reinforcement Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Actual gross expenditure including overheads	4.5	2.1	3.5
Efficiency adjustments to gross expenditure	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
Adjusted gross expenditure including overheads	4.4	2.0	3.4
Contributions	0.0	0.0	0.0
Actual Net Capex	4.5	2.1	3.5
Adjusted Net Capex	4.4	2.0	3.4
Adjustments for under-recovery of contributions	0.0	0.0	0.0
Efficient Net Capex	4.4	2.0	3.4
Actual Volume – km	34	19	21
Efficient Unit cost - £/m	128.4	108.0	165.6

Table 41

Analysis Summary – Reinforcement Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Reported Net Investment	4.5	2.1	3.5
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.2	0.1	0.1
Allowed Workload	3.2	2.0	3.4
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 42

Governors

Analysis Summary – Governors All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Actual gross expenditure including overheads	1.2	1.5	1.0
Efficiency adjustments to gross expenditure	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
Adjusted gross expenditure including overheads	1.2	1.4	1.0
Contributions	0.0	0.0	0.1
Actual Net Capex	1.2	1.5	0.9
Adjusted Net Capex	1.2	1.4	0.9
Adjustments for under-recovery of contributions	0.0	0.0	0.0
Efficient Net Capex	1.2	1.4	0.9
Actual Volume – No.	105	106	56
Efficient Unit cost - £/unit	11.6	13.6	17.7

Table 43


Analysis Summary – Governors		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices				
Reported Net Investment		1.2	1.5	0.9
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure		0.0	0.0	0.0
Allowed Workload		1.2	1.4	0.9
Additional Workload		0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable		0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 44

5.4 FORECAST EXPENDITURE

Capex		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total	2007/08
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices								
GDN Forecast Net Investment		5.8	3.6	4.4	3.7	4.4	21.8	6.2
Adjustments		0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.5	1.0
Reinforcement		0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.0
Governors		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Forecast Net Investment		5.6	3.5	4.3	3.6	4.3	21.3	5.2
Allowed Workload		4.4	3.5	4.3	3.6	4.3	20.2	
Additional Workload		1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 45



Traffic Management Act (TMA)

We understand that NGNs' forecasts do not include any costs associated with the TMA.

5.4.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Reinforcement Mains

The gross expenditure and workload variances for the 2 year period are 3% and -23% respectively.

Mains - General Reinforcement		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices							
Gross (£m)	Actual	4.5	2.1	3.5	2.3	3.7	16.2
	Allowance	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.0	2.9	16.5
	Variance	0.6	-1.3	0.2	-0.7	0.9	-0.3
Workload (km)	Actual	34	19	21	12	20	105
	Allowance	25	23	22	20	20	110
	Variance	9	-4	-1	-9	0	-5

Table 46

Governors

The gross expenditure is equal to the allowance for the 2 year period.

The allowances did not specify workload for governors and variances in this respect are not available therefore.

Contributions are not expected against this activity and we presume that the total £0.26m for the 2 year period is reported in error.

Governors		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices							
Gross	Actual	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.4	0.8	5.9
	Allowance	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.3
	Variance	0.2	0.4	-0.1	0.3	-0.3	0.6
Contributions	Actual	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.06	0.20	0.34
	Allowance	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Variance	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.06	0.20	0.34
Net	Actual	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.3	0.6	5.6
	Allowance	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	5.3
	Variance	0.2	0.4	-0.2	0.2	-0.5	0.3

Table 47

5.4.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Reinforcement mains and governors expenditure is closely aligned with the allowances over the 2 year period. We have not identified any issues and have no further comment to make.

5.4.3 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

5.4.3.1 Analysis Process

We presume that the forecasts for 2005/06 and 2006/07 are based on historic performance. Therefore, the inefficiencies identified and quantified for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05 will also influence the forecasts which, in our opinion, are inaccurate as a consequence. Our analysis process for the historic period has also been applied to the forecasts in order to assess the degree of inaccuracy.

Section 5.3.3 provides full details of the analysis process and the adjustments applied for the forecast period follow in this section of the report.

Summary of Adjustments to Gross Capex

The adjustments applied to reinforcement mains and governors Gross Capex are summarised as follows:

- Improved contract labour management: -5% applied to contract labour cost for the period 2002/03 to 2005/06, except where a higher adjustment for unit cost alignment is made.
- Contract labour cost adjustment to align unit cost with trend:
No adjustments applied.
- Improved direct labour management: -7.5% applied to direct labour costs for all years.

5.4.3.2 Analysis Summary

The following tables summarise the outputs from the analysis. Efficient Net Capex and unit costs are assessed by the analysis process and are indicated.

Reinforcement Mains

Analysis Summary – Reinforcement Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Actual gross expenditure including overheads	4.5	2.1	3.5	2.3	3.7
Efficiency adjustments to gross expenditure	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0
Adjusted gross expenditure including overheads	4.4	2.0	3.4	2.3	3.7
Contributions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Actual Net Capex	4.5	2.1	3.5	2.3	3.7
Adjusted Net Capex	4.4	2.0	3.4	2.3	3.7
Adjustments for under-recovery of contributions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Efficient Net Capex	4.4	2.0	3.4	2.3	3.7
Actual Volume – km	34	19	21	12	20
Efficient Unit cost - £/m	128.4	108.0	165.6	197.8	189.0

Table 48

Analysis Summary – Reinforcement Mains All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Reported Net Investment	4.5	2.1	3.5	2.3	3.7
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Allowed Workload	3.2	2.0	3.4	2.3	3.7
Additional Workload	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 49

Governors

Analysis Summary – Governors All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Actual gross expenditure including overheads	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.4	0.8
Efficiency adjustments to gross expenditure	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.00
Adjusted gross expenditure including overheads	1.2	1.4	1.0	1.4	0.8
Contributions	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2
Actual Net Capex	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.3	0.6
Adjusted Net Capex	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.3	0.6
Adjustments for under-recovery of contributions	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Efficient Net Capex	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.3	0.6
Actual Volume – No.	105	106	56	38	18
Efficient Unit cost - £/unit	11.6	13.6	17.7	35.6	45.8

Table 50

Analysis Summary – Governors All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Reported Net Investment	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.3	0.6
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Allowed Workload	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.3	0.6
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 51

5.4.4 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2007 TO MAR 2008)

5.4.4.1 Analysis Process

The efficiency analysis process detailed in Section 5.3.3 is applied to assess efficient/adjusted unit costs. We recommend that forecast expenditure for 2007/08 reflects the historic efficient unit cost trend and we have adjusted the reported forecasts on this basis.

5.4.4.2 Workload Trend

Reinforcement Mains




Figure 22

The 2007/08 workload is aligned with the historic trend and we have not identified any issues in this respect.

Governors




Figure 23

The 2007/08 workload is aligned with the historic trend and we have not identified any issues in this respect.

5.4.4.3 Assessment of Forecast Capex

We have made no adjustments to the workload forecasts.

Reinforcement Mains




Figure 24

We recommend that forecast expenditure is based on the historic efficient unit cost trend. The unit costs for 2005/06 and 2006/07 are high due to the proportion of larger size mains workload. From 2007/08 the forecasts are restored to a workload balance comparable with the period 2002/03 to 2004/05. On this basis the forecast unit cost inclusive of overheads for 2007/08 will be in the range £150/m to £170/m. The mid point unit cost of £160/m applied to the forecast workload at 25.0 km results in an indicative 2007/08 expenditure forecast of £4.0m, including overheads, for reinforcement mains. Compared to the reported forecast at £5.0m, the variance is -£1.0m.

Governors

Analysis of historic information to assess the efficient unit cost trend is distorted by inconsistent information, the significant cost difference between new and replacement activity and the inclusion of service governors.

We recommend that NGN reaffirms the workload and estimated unit cost of construction in each category to determine the expenditure forecast.

5.4.4.4 Recommendations

- We recommend that no adjustment is applied to the forecast workloads for reinforcement mains and governors.
- We recommend that NGN reaffirms the governors workload and estimated unit cost of construction in each category to determine the expenditure forecast, currently at £1.3m.
- Our recommendations regarding Gross Capex forecasts are summarised below

Summary – Reinforcement mains & Governors		
Forecast 2007/08		
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		
	Reinforcement Mains	Governors
Reported Gross Investment Forecast	5.0	1.3
Ofgem Adjusted Gross Investment Forecast	4.0	1.3**

Table 52

Note: ** Provisional pending review of forecast by NGN

5.5 FORECAST TRENDS (2002 TO 2013)

5.5.1 HIGH LEVEL TREND

Reinforcement Mains




Figure 25




Figure 26

Governors




Figure 27




Figure 28

5.5.2 COMMENTS ON TREND

5.5.2.1 Reinforcement Mains

Reinforcement mains workload projection is constant from 2007/08. We presume that detailed forecasts initially based on identified projects have not been made. This matter will be re-visited under the main review.

5.5.2.2 Governors

Governor workload is driven by replacement upgrade and outputs from network validation. The forecast workload is virtually constant from 2006/07

6 OTHER OPERATIONAL CAPEX

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This section considers the Other Operational Capex in the following two areas;

- i) Plant & Equipment
- ii) Land & Buildings

6.1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	27.1	4.0	31.1
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	27.1	4.0	31.1

Table 53

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account.

- Review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects.
- Procurement policies and procedures.
- Trend analysis.
- No detailed analysis was possible for Land & Building due to lack of data

Key Issues

- Plant and Equipment expenditure does not include any allocation to Leakage Management P & E.
- The expenditure on land and buildings looks modest.

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- No wasteful or unnecessary expenditure has been identified and the total expenditure is recommended to be allowed

6.1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)**Overspend**

- The whole category is under spent by £3,2m
- Land and Buildings are over spent by £0.2m for the full period.

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account.

- Review of leakage management policies and procedures.
- Review of project management procedures, including examination of sample project documentation.
- Review of procurement policies and procedures

Key Issues

- BPQ commentary does not reflect the expenditure levels reported in worksheet C5, hence does not provide an explanation for underspend variances with the allowances
- Responses indicate that expenditure is appropriately managed to ensure investment efficiency.
- Land & Buildings issues unexceptional and likely to move materially over the next control period
- Decontamination issues are not mentioned

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- No wasteful or unnecessary expenditure has been identified and the total expenditure recommended to be allowed

Categorisation of Forecast Expenditure

- No adjustments have been identified and the total forecast expenditure recommended to be allowed

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total	2007/08
Allowed Net Investment	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.8	
Total GDN Variance	-1.0 -101%	-0.6 -66%	-0.4 -44%	-0.6 -63%	-0.6 -59%	-3.2 -67%	
Reported Net Investment	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.6	3.7
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0			0.0	
Adjustments to Forecasts				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.6	3.7
Allowed Workload	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.3	1.5	
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 54

6.2 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

6.2.1 REPORTED EXPENDITURE

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	27.1	4.0	31.1
Plant & Equipment	14.1	3.3	17.5
Tools, Transport and other Mains	8.1	0.3	8.5
Buildings	2.7	0.0	2.7
Land	2.2	0.3	2.6

Table 55

The major component of expenditure in this category is on Plant and Equipment at £17.5m and the information reported does not include any allocation to Leakage Management. No explanation for the expenditure has been provided and we are unable to comment further. The expenditure on Tools, Transport and other mains including in this category has been moved to the Non-Operational expenditure for reporting after March 2002.

There are no details of the expenditure on Land or Buildings available from the BPQ submissions.

6.2.2 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	27.1	4.0	31.1
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	27.1	4.0	31.1

Table 56

Given the limited information available about the nature and breakdown of these costs the only analysis which has been carried out are; a review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects, procurement policies and procedures for Plant & Equipment. In addition a high level trend analysis of the levels of expenditure has been carried out.

No wasteful or unnecessary expenditure has been identified and the total expenditure recommended to be allowed.

6.3 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (APR 2002 TO MAR 2005)

6.3.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS

Other Operational Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
Plant & Equipment	Total Actual	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.5
	Allowance	0.9	0.8	0.9	2.5
	Variance	-0.9	-0.5	-0.7	-2.1
Land & Buildings	Total Actual	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4
	Allowance	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
	Variance	-0.1	-0.1	0.3	0.1
Total	Total Actual	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.8
	Allowance	1.0	0.9	1.0	2.9
	Variance	-1.0	-0.6	-0.4	-2.0

Table 57

6.3.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

NGN has not provided any commentary on the reason for the variances in respect of Other Operational Capex which was under spent by £1.0m.

6.3.3 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Net Other Operational Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Reported Net Investment	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.8
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Plant & Equipment	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Land & Buildings	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.8
Allowed Workload	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.8
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 58

6.3.3.1 Plant & Equipment

Plant and Equipment expenditure is primarily associated with the installation of leakage management systems and replacement/acquisition of plant to support network operations and activities. Actual expenditure is significantly below allowances for the period 2002/03 to 2004/05.

We have carried out various analyses to assess the efficiency of Plant and Equipment Gross Capex, including:

- Review of leakage management policies and procedures.
- Review of project management procedures, including examination of sample project documentation.
- Review of procurement policies and procedures

Policies and Procedures

NGNs' policies and procedures regarding leakage management are aligned with NGG and established practice, and are considered to be satisfactory.

More general plant and Equipment investment has only been allowed where the existing equipment has reached its optimum asset life, for new technology, to achieve safety improvements or to reduce operational costs.

Project Appraisal Processes

Expenditure during the period to 2004/05 was associated with projects developed from an extensive network analysis programme to identify LP networks with potential for cost savings. Proposals are assessed utilising a comprehensive financial model and those not meeting the specified economic criteria are rejected. Projects were only submitted for approval if efficient capital expenditure could be demonstrated. Post investment analysis is ongoing with each individual network monitored to ensure savings are being delivered.

Examination of sample project documentation confirms compliance with these processes.

Procurement

Leakage management equipment and control systems are purchased from recognised specialist suppliers with limited scope for competitive pricing.

General plant and equipment procurement initiatives include bulk purchasing and using an approved vendors listing to obtain lowest cost via a tendering procedure.

Summary

NGN's BPQ commentary does not reflect the expenditure levels reported in the BPQ C5 submission and does not, therefore, provide an explanation for underspend variances with the allowances.

However, the BPQ narrative responses indicate that expenditure is appropriately managed to ensure investment efficiency.

6.3.3.2 Land and Buildings

Property Portfolio

Northern Gas Network's property portfolio comprises multiple operational sites which are mainly freehold and small, depots which may be housed on these operational sites and depots, stores and offices on sites which are leasehold. NGN was unable to provide a list of such properties and land in their BPQ submission.

Land Sales Proceeds

NGN has sold no land or buildings since 1 June 2005 and NGG advise that 9 sites were sold in the Northern GDN area between April 2002 and March 2005 for an aggregate net income of £194k. They plan to sell one site at Cleckheaton which will net them [REDACTED].

Property Costs 2002 to 2005

NGN has indicated a spend of £0.4m of 'other operational' Capex in the period. It is not stated what this was for. This is considered an acceptable level of expenditure and therefore allowable even though it exceeds the allowance by £0.1m.

Summary

NGN's land and buildings expenditure for the period exceeds their allowance by £0.1m. This is considered to be reasonable and therefore allowable.

The issues relating to operational land and buildings in NGN are unexceptional and unlikely to move materially over the next control period. The majority of occupied property related costs sit in Opex. Decontamination liabilities, which may occur regardless of current land sales, are not mentioned in the submission; these may become an issue for the main review following recent legislation.

6.4 FORECAST EXPENDITURE

6.4.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

The tables below give the forecast expenditure, allowance and variance for each category of expenditure.

Other Operational Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
Plant & Equipment	Total Actual	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	1.0
	Allowance	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	4.3
	Variance	-0.9	-0.5	-0.7	-0.5	-0.7	-3.3
Land & Buildings	Total Actual	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.6
	Allowance	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5
	Variance	-0.1	-0.1	0.3	-0.1	0.1	0.1
Total	Total Actual	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.6
	Allowance	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.8
	Variance	-1.0	-0.6	-0.4	-0.6	-0.6	-3.2

Table 59

6.4.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Actual Plant and Equipment expenditure is below allowances for the 2 year period and the overall variance for the period is -76%. NGN has not provided any commentary on the reason for the variances.

There is no variance for land and buildings in this period.

6.4.3 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Net Other Operational Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total	2007/08
GDN Forecast Net Investment	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.6	3.7
Adjustments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Plant & Equipment	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Land & Building	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Forecast Net Investment	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.6	3.7
Allowed Workload	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.3	1.5	
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 60

6.4.3.1 Plant & Equipment

The forecasts for the 2 year period are minimal but aligned with the historic trend. We recommend that NGN reviews the forecasts to ensure that they are realistic.

6.4.3.2 Land & Buildings

The expenditure for land and buildings is £0.2m for this period. This is exactly as per their allowance and is considered to be reasonable and allowable.

6.4.4 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2007 TO MAR 2008)

Other Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2007/08
Plant & Equipment	3.5
Land & Buildings	0.2
Total	3.7

Table 61

6.4.4.1 Plant & Equipment

The Plant & Equipment forecast is increased from a historic level of the order of £0.3m to £3.5m, including overheads, for 2007/08 which is allocated totally to 'Other P & E Projects <£0.5m. We consider this level of expenditure to be much more realistic but no explanation has been provided and we are unable to comment further.

6.4.4.2 Land & Buildings

The Land & Buildings forecast for 2007/08 is £0.2m. No details have been provided, but is considered to be a reasonable level of expenditure and is therefore recommended as allowable.

6.5 FORECAST TRENDS (2002 TO 2013)

6.5.1 HIGH LEVEL TREND




Figure 29




Figure 30

6.5.2 COMMENTS ON TREND

6.5.2.1 **Plant & Equipment**

Expenditure is forecast to increase to £ 3.5m in 2007/08 declining to £2.0m in 2012/13, which is at much more realistic levels compared to the reported historic costs. NGN has not provided an explanation for the forecast levels but we are of the opinion that they are reasonable.

6.5.2.2 **Land & Buildings**

The expenditure shown by NGN for Land and Buildings in Other Operational costs from 2006/7 to 2012/13 is £0.2m per annum. It is not stated what this is for.

7 NON-OPERATIONAL CAPEX

7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This section covers all remaining Capex not already covered elsewhere in this review. This section considers the Non Operation Capex in 5 areas;

- i) Non-Operational Capex (Direct)
- ii) System Operation
- iii) IS
- iv) xoserve
- v) Other Non-Operational Capex (Allocated).

7.1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

Non Operational Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices			
	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	92.7	13.6	106.3
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	6.6	4.4	11.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	86.1	9.2	95.3

Table 62

The Capex summary figures are given in the table above. These show the starting Reported Net Investment from the last control, the Reported Net Investment as requested by NGN and finally PB Power's initial recommendation for Ofgem's adjusted Net Investment

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account.

- Review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects.
- Review of Large IS & System Control Projects

Key Issues

- Ulysses turnkey contract with [REDACTED] was terminated due to serious failings
- Quarterback programme incurred excessive initial investigation costs

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- £6.5m of Ulysses expenditure was considered inefficient
- £4.5m of Quarterback expenditure was considered wasteful

7.1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)

Overspend

- A total of £2.0m overspend due to the need to invest in new IS systems.

Analysis Carried Out

Various analyses have been carried out to assess investment efficiency taking into account.

- Review of processes to monitor and control expenditure & projects.
- Review of Large IS & System Control Projects
- Review of phasing on Vehicle expenditure
- Procurement policies and procedures.

Key Issues

- Large projects (Ulysses & Quarterback) have been associated with inefficient spend
- GEMINI costs have been incorrectly charged via Transco transaction model to GDNs
- Network sales has introduced the need to replace IS systems
- Speed of implementation of IS systems has eliminated investment analysis for these projects

Categorisation of Incurred Expenditure

- £1.4m of Ulysses expenditure has been assessed as inefficient
- £0.4m Quarterback programme cost has been assessed as inefficient

Categorisation of Forecast Expenditure

- £4.7m of NGN IS implementation costs judged to be not allowed due to these being considered part of the network sales process

Non Operational Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total	2007/08
Allowed Net Investment	12.2	11.0	6.4	7.7	8.2	45.4	
Total GDN Variance	-4.1 -33%	-5.0 -46%	-1.5 -24%	5.3 69%	7.3 89%	2.0 4%	
Reported Net Investment	8.1	6.0	4.8	13.0	15.5	47.4	16.8
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual Expenditure	0.8	0.6	0.4			1.8	
Adjustments to Forecasts				2.3	2.4	4.7	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	7.3	5.4	4.4	10.7	13.1	40.9	16.8
Allowed Workload	7.3	5.4	4.4	10.7	10.5	38.3	
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.6	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 63

7.2 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

7.2.1 REPORTED EXPENDITURE

Non Operational Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices			
	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	92.7	13.6	106.3
Other	10.5	2.1	12.6
Telecoms, Office	9.9	2.2	12.1
Vehicles	42.2	0.0	42.2
IS (Distribution Costs only)	30.1	9.3	39.5

Table 64

7.2.1.1 Vehicles

Vehicles accounts for largest element of expenditure for this period. The large expenditure on vehicles in 2001 would reflect a five to seven year replacement of vehicles after the formation of Transco in 1994. No detailed explanation has been provided on this expenditure although commentary in some GDN submissions has suggested that they are attempted to phase future expenditure on vehicles away from concentrated peaks of expenditure.

7.2.1.2 System Operation

The Ulysses project was approved in 1999 as a turnkey project to undertake the complete replacement of Transco's System Operation's systems support suite. This included:-

- i) Telemetry Outstations
- ii) Communications network (for telemetry purposes)
- iii) Control Systems (Both Transmission & Distribution)
- iv) Decision Support Tools
- v) Management Information

The total approved sum for the project was £70.4m, all Capex expenditure.

At the time of the last price review the Ulysses project was experiencing contractual difficulties between Transco and the main supplier [REDACTED] and it was clear in 2001 that the project would not deliver all of the components as originally specified in the approval,

We have had difficulty obtaining a definitive statement from NGG of the total project costs phased between January 2000 and March 2006. Together with TPA Solutions we have used the best costs available as the basis for our review. This review concludes that the total project expenditure in 2005/06 prices was £145.1m, of which £77.6m was the distribution element.

Our review concludes that there was inefficient expenditure associated with; the requirement to terminate the original supply turnkey supply contract, abortive costs associated with a replacement distribution control system, telemetry design and site preparation costs and poor project management. These conclusions are made in full in Appendix 4.

7.2.1.3 IS

The figures provided by NGG for the 15 months to April 2002 were combined transmission and distribution figures. They also provided a total Distribution allocation of these costs. We have estimated the split between projects to provide comparisons. The projects have been split between Systems and Infrastructure projects.

IS Infrastructure Capex All Figures £m 2005/06 Prices		PB Power Estimates		
		2001	2002 Qtr1	Total
Systems Projects	Quarterback (QB)	2.8	4.5	7.3
	MINE	0.6	0.0	0.6
	Total	3.3	4.5	7.8
Infrastructure Projects	Servers	6.9	2.3	9.2
	Desktop	10.6	0.7	11.3
	Data Centre Storage	3.1	0.0	3.1
	Telecoms	1.0	0.0	1.0
	Office Equipment	2.3	0.9	3.2
	Email Upgrades	1.7	0.0	1.7
	SAP	1.2	0.7	1.9
	Other	0.0	0.3	0.3
	Total	26.8	4.8	31.6
Total		30.1	9.3	39.4

Table 65

7.2.2 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Non Operational Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2001	Q1 2002	15 month Total
Reported Net Investment	92.7	13.6	106.3
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	6.6	4.4	11.0
System Operation	4.9	1.6	6.5
IS	1.7	2.8	4.5
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	86.1	9.2	95.3

Table 66

7.2.2.1 Systems Projects

The major element of expenditure is on the Quarterback Programme. We conclude that the expenditure incurred during this period was the initial investigations for the financial approval presented to the Lattice Executive in July 2002. We find the level of this expenditure

excessive for this element of work. We therefore believe that 50%-75% (£3.5m-£5.5m) of this expenditure was wasteful.

7.2.2.2 Infrastructure Projects

We note that during the separation of Transco from the gas supply & servicing parts of BG plc between 1994 and 1996, Transco put in place new desktop and server installations. The large expenditure to replace this infrastructure during 2001 would appear to reflect a reasonable life for this equipment. We have found no evidence of wasteful or unnecessary expenditure in this area.

7.3 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (APR 2002 TO MAR 2005)

7.3.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS

Non-Operational Net Capex		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices					
Non-Operational Direct	Adjustment to tie with NG	-0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0
	Furniture and fittings	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3
	NG Centre projects (VeSaS, Bus Svcs)	2.1	0.0	0.0	2.1
	Other Direct Capex	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Security	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Telecoms, Office	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
	Tools & Equipment	0.6	0.9	0.3	1.7
	Vehicles	2.1	0.2	0.0	2.3
	Total Actual	5.0	1.1	0.7	6.7
	Allowance	3.0	3.3	3.3	9.6
	Variance	1.9	-2.2	-2.6	-2.9
System Operation	Total Actual	0.9	1.2	1.0	3.0
	Allowance	0.9	0.2	0.4	1.5
	Variance	0.0	1.0	0.6	1.5
IS	Total Actual	2.3	3.7	3.2	9.2
	Allowance	7.8	7.3	2.5	17.6
	Variance	-5.5	-3.6	0.7	-8.4
xoserve ¹	Total Actual	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Allowance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Variance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Operational (Allocated)	Total Actual	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Allowance	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.9
	Variance	-0.4	-0.2	-0.2	-0.9
Total	Total Actual	8.1	6.0	4.8	18.9
	Allowance	12.2	11.0	6.4	29.5
	Variance	-4.1	-5.0	-1.5	-10.6

Table 67

¹ Note Xoserve was not set-up until April 2005

7.3.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

On Vehicles NGN note that there has been a significant underspend during the first three years of the control, of £7.1m. In 2003 a change to the replacement policy for commercial was implemented to take account of mileage and running costs. In addition, proposals were put forward to try and smooth out the existing replacement profile. They were also able to utilise vehicles released as a result of employees leaving the network to replace other older and/or more costly vehicles. Furthermore, the introduction of a vehicle safety and security system (VeSaS) enabled improved utilisation of the commercial vehicle fleet.

NGN comment that there has been a significant underspend on information technology (IT) during the first three years of the price control. They are also of the view that it is clear that significant investment is required to make the systems fit for purpose.

We note the need to improve the current FOMSA systems. We believe that in the absence of the sales process the whole of the FOMSA suite would not have required replacement in such a short period.

Given the sale it is not surprising that investment levels were kept low for some time before the sales process was concluded. This position, as you will see in the forecast submission, is reversed as NGN and the other new owners make the necessary investments to take the business forward.

We support the need to “catch-up” on investment that has been delayed during the sales period.

7.3.3 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Non Operational Net Capex Operational Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Reported Net Investment	8.1	6.0	4.8	18.9
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.8	0.6	0.4	1.8
Non-Operational Direct	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
System Operation	0.7	0.4	0.3	1.4
IS	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4
Xoserve	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Operational Allocated	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	7.3	5.4	4.4	17.1
Allowed Workload	7.3	5.4	4.4	17.1
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 68

Allocation of efficient overspend IS and System Operation costs into categories of expenditure (additional work or deferrable/reasonably predictable).

We have looked at the full 5 year allowance and where the phasing of the actual expenditure is out of line with the allowance the total allowed work has been adjusted to allow the GDN the full benefit of the total allowed expenditure for the full 5 year period. Where expenditure is over this total 5 year level we have to form a judgement as to whether the expenditure falls into the category additional work or deferrable/reasonably predictable work.

We have found very few situations where we believe the work should have been deferred as in most cases the work has an NPV and delivers (or intends to deliver) benefits. In the

examples where we have classified expenditure as deferrable we have made the appropriate comments.

Unless there are exceptional circumstances we have not regarded the overspending of an IS or System Operation project as predictable. Further, particularly in the case of the Ulysses project, when expenditure has been disallowed as inefficient spending we have treated any subsequent expenditure to deliver the same functionality as additional work, so as not to penalise the Network twice. Should any expenditure which has been disallowed be subsequently re-classified, a review of the overspend should also be undertaken at the same time.

We have not discovered any material IS project which we believe had no forecast in the allowance and which should have been reasonably predicted.

7.3.3.1 Non-Operational Capex (Direct)

One of the largest elements of expenditure in this category is vehicles. We have carried out analysis based on the total UKD expenditure (both historic and forecast) on vehicles. This has been carried out on a rolling 5 year total expenditure and has enabled us to show the relative timing of NGN expenditure relative to the UKD weighted average.

The results demonstrate NGN view that they have depressed the amount of expenditure considerably in 2003/04 & 2004/05. Hence they are considerably under the 5 year weighted average in the early years of the analysis. We believe this expenditure was efficiently incurred.




Figure 31

7.3.3.2 System Operation

We understand that the expenditure on System Operation during this period was associated with the Ulysses project. As a result of the management of the Ulysses project as discussed in section 7.2.1.2 we have concluded that during the period April 2002 to March 2005 Northern networks' share of the inefficient spends was £1.4m.

7.3.3.3 IS

Until the sale of the network occurred in June 2005 IS services to the network were centrally provided by NGG. Appendix 4 gives the background to our analysis of the IS provision for this period.

The main conclusions drawn from our analysis are that NGG have an IS project control system in place which does provide an adequate element of control particularly for small projects. However, the larger projects (Ulysses & Quarterback) seem to suffer initial project under-estimates and large overspends to complete the project. We believe a major reason is the lack of a full understanding of the project scope and complexity at the outset.

There were significant delays between the time that potential for overspends were identified and the formal re-sanction being obtained. These delays reduced the options for the Executive to cancel or amend projects as expenditure was already committed.

A benchmarking exercise has been carried out by Compass for the provision of IS services to the whole NGG group for the financial year 2004/05.

The report concludes: *“The sourcing strategy of NG clearly delivers benefits in terms of reduced costs to the organisation. As with any organisation there are areas where performance could be improved, but the overall conclusion is that NG is doing the majority of things well. Compass considers that both the CSC contract and the selective sourcing of the ADSM services are consistent with leading practice in the sourcing of IT services.”*

Based on the compass report we conclude that in general the provision of IS services for the period to March 2005 does not have systemic inefficiency associated with IS provision.

We do, however, believe that in the large Quarterback Programme/Project (QB) there is inefficient expenditure. QB costs have been reported in both the Opex and Capex regulatory accounts. A total £51.3 million of software development costs for QB was classed as Opex in the regulatory accounts but has been reclassified as Capex for the purposes of the RAV roll forwards tables in the BPQ submission. In reviewing the project we have taken the total project costs into account. However, as this additional "Capex" has not been included in the non-operational Capex tables in the BPQ it does not form part of PB Power's adjustments to costs.

We have concluded that in outturn prices the project in total spent £76.8m, comprising £51.3m Opex and £25.5m Capex (charged to distribution). We believe there is inefficient expenditure included within this sum of between £8m and £26m. Taking the midpoint of this estimate, uplifting to 2005/06 prices and taking a pro-rata figure for just the reported Capex elements; we have deemed a total of £3.4m to have been inefficiently spent across all GDNs. The total value for the No network on a percentage basis is therefore £0.4m.

Whilst we believe it is possible that further inefficiencies have occurred within other projects undertaken during the period we have not found sufficient reason to apply percentage inefficiencies across all projects.

7.3.3.4 xoserve

The company xoserve was not formed until May 2005. Therefore there was no xoserve expenditure during this period. Prior to xoserve being created the activities were carried out as part of NGG normal operations.

7.3.3.5 Non-Operational Allocated

There is no expenditure in this category

7.4 FORECAST EXPENDITURE

7.4.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Non-Operational Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
Non-Operational Direct	Adjustment to tie with NG	-0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Furniture and fittings	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.8
	NG Centre projects (VeSaS, Bus Svcs)	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
	Other Direct Capex	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.8
	Security	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Telecoms, Office	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.4
	Tools & Equipment	0.6	0.9	0.3	0.9	0.3	2.9
	Vehicles	2.1	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.6	3.5
	Total Actual	5.0	1.1	0.7	2.0	1.9	10.6
	Allowance	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	16.5
	Variance	1.9	-2.2	-2.6	-1.4	-1.6	-5.9
System Operation	Total Actual	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.0	2.1	5.1
	Allowance	0.9	0.2	0.4	1.1	1.0	3.6
	Variance	0.0	1.0	0.6	-1.1	1.1	1.5
IS	Total Actual	2.3	3.7	3.2	11.0	11.6	31.7
	Allowance	7.8	7.3	2.5	3.0	3.5	24.1
	Variance	-5.5	-3.6	0.7	8.0	8.0	7.6
xoserve ²	Total Actual				0.0	0.0	0.0
	Allowance				0.0	0.0	0.0
	Variance				0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Operational (Allocated)	Total Actual	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Allowance	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.2
	Variance	-0.4	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-1.2
Total	Total Actual	8.1	6.0	4.8	13.0	15.5	47.4
	Allowance	12.2	11.0	6.4	7.7	8.2	45.4
	Variance	-4.1	-5.0	-1.5	5.3	7.3	2.0

Table 69

7.4.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

NGN state that the IT investment will see the replacement of the existing suite of the legacy National Grid Front Office Systems, comprising some 37 applications, with a new integrated suite of seven applications. This will enable the business to go forward and sever its reliance on National Grid. The current investment will deliver like for like functionality replacement. It is envisaged that further investment will be needed in the next review period to drive forward further efficiencies in the business. Alongside the FOMSA project, investment will commence in 2006/7 to replace the existing Distribution Control Centre Systems (GTMS) and establish a

² Note Xoserve was not set-up until April 2005

standalone control centre within NGN. When this is delivered it will signal the end of all dependence on National Grid.

NGN state that investment in vehicles will increase in 2007/08 and reflects the need to purchase new light and heavy good vehicles, as they have now become uneconomic to maintain and keep road worthy

NGN state that in 2006/7, accelerating into 2007/8, NGN will make the investments required to replace the outdated distribution National Control Centre system (GTMS) with a like for like system using supportable technology to create a separate standalone control centre within NGN.

7.4.3 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Non Operational Net Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total	2007/08
GDN Forecast Net Investment	8.1	6.0	4.8	13.0	15.5	47.4	16.8
Adjustments	0.8	0.6	0.4	2.3	2.4	6.5	0.0
Non-Operational Direct	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
System Operation	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0
IS	0.1	0.2	0.1	2.3	2.4	5.1	0.0
Xoserve	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Operational Allocated	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Forecast Net Investment	7.3	5.4	4.4	10.7	13.1	40.9	16.8
Allowed Workload	7.3	5.4	4.4	10.7	10.5	38.3	
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.6	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 70

7.4.3.1 Non-Operational Direct

As explained in section 7.2.3.1 the largest item of expenditure in the area is on vehicles. As explained previously we believe No forecast expenditure is in line with a weighted UKD average and we find no reason to adjust their forecast.

7.4.3.2 System Operation

During 2005/06, expenditure was associated with the installation of telemetry by the Ulysses project. As a result of the management of the Ulysses project as discussed in section 7.2.1.2 we have concluded that during this year there was no additional inefficient spend in Northern network.

The forecast expenditure for 2006/07 is associated with the replacement of GTMS system. We consider the estimates for this project to be reasonable and have therefore not made any adjustments to these forecasts.

7.4.3.3 IS

Prior to the network sales the majority of IS expenditure within Transco was associated with the central development of software applications and infrastructure. As part of the sales process the systems supporting the Network was split between those labelled the "back office" systems and those labelled "front office" systems. Essentially the back office systems are those required to run any business such as financial accounting, payroll and general procurement. The front office systems are those systems which have over the years been

created or procured by Transco for the specific purpose of managing activities associated with running a gas distribution business.

In order to demonstrate the operation of a new standalone business the back office systems were required to be put in place at the time of the sale process. Following the sale, the front office systems continued to be provided by National Grid to the sold networks on a contractual basis, under the Front Office Managed Service Agreement (FOMSA). Whilst the FOMSA systems continued past the network sales strong contractual terms required that the new owners migrated away from these services at least 18 months after the sale. NGN has commissioned a programme of activities aimed at migrating from the FOMSA suite of systems.

We have review the GDNs expenditure on the implementation of new back office systems and their plans for the replacement of the FOMSA systems. We believe the steps NGN have taken to minimise these costs are well founded and efficient. We do believe that costs have been tightly controlled and it is possible that these may increase beyond those intended once all of the systems have been implemented successfully. We have taken the fact that the costs may increase by between 10%-20% into account when assessing the elements of cost which should be considered relating to the network sales process. NGN have not provided details of their own assessment of such costs we have therefore tabled our own estimates below.

The table below documents these conclusions

IS Expenditure Categorisation All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	Back Office	Infrastructure	Front Office	Other	Totals
Sales	3.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	8.0
Inefficient	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Allowed	2.9	3.4	9.0	0.0	15.4
Additional	0.5	0.6	1.5	0.0	2.5
Deferrable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	6.4	4.0	15.5	0.0	25.9

Table 71

7.4.3.4 Xoserve

The company xoserve provides transactional services, information system (IS) support and change management on behalf of the GDNs and the NTS. The company was formed in May 2005, The primary recipients of xoserve's services are the networks customers, the gas shippers. NGN has a 10.38% shareholding in xoserve. During the period to March 2007 xoserve will be preparing detailed expenditure plans to replace the technology which their systems are running. This technology refresh, as it is termed, is aimed at minimising the possibility of serious performance and storage issues impacting the competitive gas market. We consider these plans to be necessary and appropriate.

We note that NGN have now forecast any Capex associated with xoserve.

7.4.3.5 Non-Operational Allocated

There is no forecast expenditure in this area.

7.4.3.6 Summary

Whilst the total 5 year Non-Operational Capex expenditure shows an overspend of £2m against the allowances, when the expenditure is considered excluding IS expenditure there is an underspend of £5.6m.

7.4.4 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2007 TO MAR 2008)

Non-Operational Net Capex		2007/08
All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		
Non-Operational Capex Other (Direct)		9.1
System Operation		7.2
IS		0.5
Xoserve		0.0
Non-Operational Capex Other (Allocated)		0.0
Total		16.8

Table 72

We recommend that for 2007/08 the categories of Non-Operational Direct and Allocated (other) are combined into a single category Non Operational (Other)

7.4.4.1 Non-Operational (Other)

NGN state that tools and equipment expenditure reduced in 2006/07 following a period of high investment in 2005/06. To facilitate the replacement of safety related equipment and to tool-up new teams following apprenticeship training investment will increase to £0.7m in 2007/08.

Following advice from local police force, NGN have undertaken a review of key sites the GDN. These will require funding to improve security on the majority of its operational sites. Investment has been kept at a minimum level but in line with security requirements and will commence in 2007/08.

We believe these forecast are appropriate and recommend they are allowed unadjusted.

7.4.4.2 System Operation

The forecast expenditure for 2007/08 is associated with the replacement of GTMS system. We consider the estimates for this project to be reasonable and have therefore not made any adjustments to these forecasts.

7.4.4.3 IS

We have reviewed the plans for the implementation of the FOMSA replacement and consider the forecast expenditure for 2007/08 to be appropriate. We therefore recommend the forecast allowed unadjusted.

7.4.4.4 Xoserve

We note that NGN have not forecast any Capex associated with xoserve.

7.5 FORECAST TRENDS (2002 TO 2013)

7.5.1 HIGH LEVEL TREND




Figure 32




Figure 33






Figure 34

**Figure 35****Figure 36**

7.5.2 COMMENTS ON TREND

7.5.2.1 Vehicles

The expenditure on vehicles suggests essentially a five year replacement cycle. The GDN is the third highest in plans for vehicle expenditure of the full period. It is recommended that vehicles are specified as a line item in the 5 year review.

7.5.2.2 Non-Operational Other

The following table provides visibility of the breakdown of the Non-Operational “Other” category over the period 2002-2013.

Non-Operational Other Capex Breakdown of Items All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03 - 2006/07	2007/08 - 2012/13	Total
Adjustment to tie with NG	0.0	0.0	0.0
Furniture and fittings	0.8	0.0	0.8
NG Centre projects (VeSaS, Bus Svcs)	2.1	0.0	2.1
Other Direct Capex	0.8	0.0	0.8
Security	0.0	0.7	0.7
Telecoms, Office	0.4	0.0	0.4
Tools & Equipment	3.0	4.7	7.7
Totals	7.1	5.4	12.5

Table 73**7.5.2.3 System Operation**

The forecast reflect a peak of expenditure around 2007/08 associated with the planned replacement of the GTMS system.

7.5.2.4 IS

Following two years (2005/06 to 2006/07) of very high expenditure the forecasts currently fall to low levels. Such a low level is surprising in the NGN have identified that further improvements in efficiency and customer outputs will require further investment after the FOMSA systems have been replaced.

7.5.2.5 xoserve

We note that NGN have not forecast any Capex associated with xoserve.

8 MAINS AND SERVICES REPEX

8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

8.1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

The period was unusual in that Transco, (under an Improvement Order from the HSE) was engaged on the medium pressure ductile iron replacement programme to be completed by the end of 2002. Mains within the programme included larger diameter pipes in urban situations.

Mains unit costs increased by about 30% as Transco ramped-up production from around 1750km of mostly small diameter main (2000) to 2000km (2001) including about 1000km of larger diameter ductile iron. Cost increases reflect the nature of the work and the urgency to complete the programme on time.

Domestic services costs, largely unaffected by the MPDI programme, remained steady. The volume of non-domestic service replacement increased with little change in cost over the period.

Overall, costs are consistent with the reported workload.

8.1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)

Replacement mains & services (after re-allocation of services costs)

Net Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
Allowed Net Investment	58.6	43.3	51.8	55.9	54.1	263.7
Total GDN Variance	5.6 +10%	10.7 +25%	3.2 +6%	7.1 +13%	8.9 +16%	35.5 +13%
Reported Net Investment	64.3	54.0	55.0	63.0	63.0	299.3

Table 74

8.1.2.1 Mains Workload

Accepted NGN Programme

The GDN is following a programme approved by the HSE. The programme started in 2002 and aims to de-commission all iron mains within 30m of property over the 30 years to 2032. Northern is currently raising de-commissioning rates to 528km of iron mains/year to achieve this. The need to replace other mains (usually steel) as part of iron mains projects raises the total level of de-commissioning to 573km/yr from 2007/08.

HSE requirement was separately defined for Northern as follows:

Iron Mains to be De-commissioned	2005/06	2006/07
HSE Requirement (km decommissioned)	482	520
GDN actual (Policy)	482	520
GDN total decommissioned (includes some PE & protected steel; excludes re-chargeable mains relays.)	529	566

Table 75

The programme for earlier years was agreed at national level. Northern met the HSE requirement, but also decommissioned a significant length of other associated main, mostly small diameter unprotected steel. At the time the Price Control was set, these associated mains were replaced on a condition basis, but a change to the GDN's policy & procedures in October 2003 required unprotected steel mains $\leq 2"$ to be routinely replaced as part of iron mains projects.

The volume of associated main has thus grown, and since Northern must comply with its Safety Case, and defined policies and procedures, such replacement is now unavoidable in so far as it is associated with the de-commissioning of iron mains under the HSE programme.

8.1.2.2 Services Workload

The services workload allowance will be exceeded by around 11,000 (5%) over the five years.

8.1.2.3 Mains Costs

Reported mains costs are broadly within the allowance. A feature of the control is that the replacement mains price control allowance is re-calculated each year under the Supplementary Incentive Mechanism. This offers an incentive to the GDN for meeting or beating a forecast cost developed from the mains actually de-commissioned in year. Under the mechanism the GDN also bears half the cost any overspend.

The mains allowance (not re-calculated) will be exceeded by around £4m (2%) over the five years, after the re-allocation of costs from services.

8.1.2.4 Services Costs

Services costs are consistently high. Increased volume accounts for about a 8% of the variance and increased costs for the remainder. The services allowance (after reallocation of costs to mains) will be exceeded by around £31m (59%) over the five years.

8.1.2.5 Allowances

In forming a view on the efficient level of unit costs we have examined the assumptions made in the control and find that features within the mains and services allowances, (distorted by disaggregation) such as the EfV reduction (mains; -5% each year), the EPC reduction (mains and services; increasing reductions after 03/04 reaching -7.9% in 2006) and the effect of reducing real price effects (added in anticipation of costs rising above RPI during the “ramp-up” phase) combine to produce unit costs that are challenging for the GDN in the current economic environment.

8.1.2.6 Completed Years

Adjustments are recommended in respect of direct and contract costs.

8.1.2.7 Future Years

There is a reallocations from services to mains in 2006/07.

There is no reallocation in 2007/08, assuming the review of the Supplementary Incentive Mechanism and allowing a return to unconstrained cost allocation.

There are continuing adjustments to services reflecting on-going contract and direct labour inefficiencies under the current arrangements. No adjustment is made for 2007/08 as the GDN's forecast workload and costs are accepted.

8.1.2.8 Re-chargeable Diversions

For clarity re-chargeable diversions are omitted from the tables.

The net costs arising from this work are not material and we recommend that these are categorised as allowed workload.

Net Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03		2003/04		2004/05		2005/06		2006/07		5 year Total	2007/08	
Allowed Net Investment	58.6		43.3		51.8		55.9		54.1		263.7		
Total GDN Variance	5.6	+10%	10.7	+25%	3.2	+6%	7.1	+13%	8.9	+16%	35.5	+13%	
Mains (as reported)	0.7	+1%	5.3	+15%	-2.4	-6%	0.3	+1%	-1.6	-4%	2.3	+1%	
Services (as reported)	5.0	+67%	5.4	+61%	5.5	+46%	6.8	+52%	10.5	+89%	33.2	+62%	
Reported Net Investment	64.3		54.0		55.0		63.0		63.0		299.3		64.3
Total GDN Variance (after re-allocation by PB Power)	5.6	+9%	10.7	+24%	3.2	+6%	7.1	+13%	8.9	+16%	35.5	+13%	
Mains (after re-allocation)	0.7	+1%	5.3	+15%	-2.4	-6%	0.3	+1%	0.3	+1%	4.2	+2%	
Services (after re-allocation)	5.0	+67%	5.4	+61%	5.5	+46%	6.8	+52%	8.6	+73%	31.3	+59%	
Restated Net Investment (after re-allocation)	64.3		54.0		55.0		63.0		63.0		299.3		64.3
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual/Forecast Expenditure	0.4		0.5		0.6						1.5		
Adjustments to Actual/Forecast							0.7		0.2		0.9		0.0
Mains	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0
Services	0.4		0.5		0.6		0.7		0.2		2.4		0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	63.8		53.6		54.4		62.2		62.8		296.9		64.3
Mains	51.9		39.9		37.3		43.0		42.7		214.6		
Services	12.0		13.7		17.1		19.3		20.1		82.2		
Allowed Workload	12.0		11.8		16.4		17.6		20.1		78.0		
Additional Workload	0.0		1.9		0.7		1.6		0.0		4.2		
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		

Table 76

8.2 **BACKGROUND**

The replacement of metallic mains and services is an essential part of NGN's strategy for controlling the risk arising from the network. The rate of replacement and the procedures associated with the selection of pipes and development of projects are regulated by the HSE using the Gas Safety (Management) Regulations and the Pipelines Safety Regulations to enforce its policy. Ofgem's role is to ensure that NGN can fund the programme and that it is efficiently executed.

During the period under review HSE requirements and Transco policy and procedures have changed, and the key events are listed below.

Changes to HSE and other requirements

Time Line	
2000	HSE issues an Improvement Notice in September 2000 requiring 2360 km of MP DI main within 30m of premises to be de-commissioned by 31.12.2002.
2001	<p>HSE publishes its Enforcement Policy for the replacement of iron gas mains. 91,000km of cast and ductile mains believed to be within 30m of premises. Note that the policy does not include steel mains or service pipes.</p> <p>Ofgem increases mains and services Repex allowances to accommodate the HSE requirement.</p>
2002	<p>Transco introduces T/PR/REP2 policy and procedure for replacement. REP2 requires steel services to be replaced irrespective of condition (previously PE clad steel services could be transferred if in satisfactory condition) and unprotected steel $\leq 2"$ to be replaced in the course of routine replacement work. $> 2"$ steel subject to risk assessment. Previously these pipes replaced on a condition basis.</p> <p>Initial (20/70/10) policy introduced (supported by "Smallworld")</p>
2003	<p>Pipeline Safety Regulations amended to require GDN's to submit a replacement programme for approval.</p> <p>Physical survey reveals that actual population of iron mains was 101,000km at 01.04.02 requiring a 10% increase in production to complete the programme within 30 years.</p> <p>Transco submit an amended 20/70/10 policy (supported by MRDST) to HSE for approval. Agreed providing an equivalent amount of risk is removed from the system each year, and requiring an additional 10% of mains to be de-commissioned.</p> <p>HSE requires a minimum national rate of 3,500km/yr de-commissioned mains (an increase from 3,240km) from 06/07 to meet the 30 yr programme.</p>
2004	Steel pipe included in the risk model.

Table 77

8.3 **HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)**

Workload and costs for the 15 months to 31.03.02 have been examined. The period was unusual in that Transco, (under an Improvement Order from the HSE) was engaged on the medium pressure ductile iron replacement programme to be completed by the end of 2002. Mains within the programme included larger diameter pipes in urban situations.

Mains unit costs increased by about 30% as Transco ramped-up production from around 1750km of mostly small diameter main (2000) to 2000km (2001) including about 1000km of larger diameter ductile iron. Cost increases reflect the nature of the work (larger diameters,

medium pressure, urban and often in main thoroughfares rather than side streets) and the urgency to complete the programme on time.

Domestic services costs, largely unaffected by the MPDI programme, remained steady. The volume of non-domestic service replacement increased with little change in cost over the period.

Overall, costs are consistent with the reported workload.

8.4 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (APR 2002 TO MAR 2005)

8.4.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS

Length of mains abandoned All figures km	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Ofgem Allowance	424.0	454.0	477.9
GDN Actual	412.0	419.0	479.0
Variance	-12.0	-35.0	1.1

Table 78

There is a significant variance in 02/03 due to the effects of the national MPDI replacement programme, this continues into 03/04.

Broadly neutral variance in 04/05 is followed by increasingly large forecast variances driven by:

- The ramp-up of the GDN programme
- The discovery of additional mains within 30m of property following survey.
- The HSE requirement that GDN's increase production by 10% on introduction of the 20/70/10 policy.
- The re-classification by GDNs of unprotected (without cathodic protection) steel mains as non-standard and the routine inclusion of smaller diameters within replacement projects where associated with CI or DI mains. (Not part of the HSE's iron pipe programme)

At the end of the five year period, Northern is forecast to be 14km (0.6%) below the allowance.

Services Replaced or Transferred	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05
Ofgem Allowance	34,185	38,716	47,052
GDN Actual	33,482	45,030	49,001
Variance	-703	6,314	1,949

Table 79

There is an underperformance in 02/03 due to the effects of the national MPDI replacement programme.

There are variances from 03/04 driven by:

- The ramp-up of the GDN programme.
- An insufficient allocation within the allowance.

At the end of the five year period, Northern is forecast to be 11,000 services (5%) above the allowance.

8.4.1.3 Mains Costs

Mains Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Mains (as reported)	51.9	39.9	37.3	129.0
Re-allocation from Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Mains	51.9	39.9	37.3	129.0
Allowance	51.2	34.6	39.7	125.4
Variance	0.7	5.3	-2.4	3.6

Table 80

Mains expenditure is £3.6m above the allowance.. Note that the allowance used is the disaggregated price control allowance without re-calculation.

At the end of the five year period, Northern is forecast to be £4.2m (2%) above the allowance.

8.4.1.4 Services Costs

Services Repex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Services (as reported)	12.4	14.2	17.7	44.3
Re-allocation to Mains	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Services	12.4	14.2	17.7	44.3
Allowance	7.4	8.8	12.2	28.4
Variance	5.0	5.4	5.5	15.9

Table 81

Services expenditure is £15.9m above the allowance.

There are significant and increasing variances driven by the volumes variances detailed in 8.4.1.2 above and changes to the proportions of services relaid and transferred, and:

- A rate of price inflation within the construction sector that is significantly higher than RPI.
- A combination of features within the allowance (forecast EPC cost reductions from 03/04 + reducing RPEs (real price effects) from 04/05) that act to reduce the allowed unit costs in real terms.

8.4.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

Key points raised by the NGN in their submission are:

8.4.2.1 The workload is significantly more than the allowance

Mains volumes are significantly less than the allowance and the GDN has a variance of 46km over the period 02/03 – 04/05 and a forecast variance of 14km over five years.

GDN service volumes (03/04 – 05/06) are greater than those allowed at separation of the price control. We have found no evidence that any of the work in the period 02/03 – 04/05 was unnecessary or avoidable and therefore we recommend that these volumes be allowed as additional workload. (Note that Transco service forecasts were scaled-back at the last review.)

8.4.2.2 Unit costs included in the NG 2000 BPQ was not the market rate

Allowed mains and services costs were developed from the Transco submissions at the 2001 price control review. We understand that these submissions reflected contemporary costs but note the adjustments made for anticipated efficiencies (replacement by the servi-flex method, EPC cost reductions, and EfV savings (mains)) combined to exert a downward pressure on costs. These downward cost pressures are offset by RPEs (real price effects) that anticipate cost inflation over and above RPI over the review period, increasing to 03/04 but then decreasing as the market, and Transco's proposed recruitment and training programme, responded to increasing demand. The net effect, obscured to an extent by adjustments at separation, is decreasing unit cost allowances from 04/05 onwards.

8.4.2.3 Allowance was not made for construction industry inflation.

Allowances are indexed to RPI rather than the equivalent construction index. However, as described above, replacement mains and services allowances include real price effects (RPEs, that are additional to RPI) of 7.8% (2002) and 12.0% (2003) reducing to zero in 2007.

8.4.3 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

8.4.3.1 Project Review

A mains and services replacement project (Fabian Rd, Middlesborough, estimated cost £344,235) was reviewed and from the information supplied we can confirm that the selection of pipes for replacement, the design and project costing substantially followed the required processes. We have not been able to examine the completion report and so final costs are not known. The project was authorised under the delegated authority of the Head of Network.

A short report of the project is attached as an appendix 9.

The real relationship between mains and services costs in some GDNs is uncertain and the use of bundled rates introduces further uncertainties unless these costs are properly allocated.

Comparative analysis of unit costs has thus proved difficult as within the GDN there are significant year to year unit cost variances; there are also significant (within year) variances between the unit costs of similar jobs. Similar issues exist in other GDNs and it would be unsafe at present to draw conclusions about efficiency from inter-GDN unit cost comparisons.

Long term, after appropriate cost reporting arrangements have been introduced to remove these anomalies, cost comparison between GDN's will become a key part of efficiency assessment.

Most of Northern's Repex work is carried out by contractor via EPC contracts. Initially of the target price format with efficiency sharing incentives, these contracts were changed (w.e.f. 01.04.02) to a fixed price format through re-tender by the incumbents and subsequent negotiation.

The EPC contracts in place at this time were of five year duration, but were approaching their three year anniversary and possible termination under the contract terms. If NGN wished to move to a new form of contract then an open market re-tender, rather than re-negotiation of the contracts, would have been appropriate.

The format of the revised contracts is unusual, with the replacement mains & services schedule linked to RPI-2%, and other schedules linked to RPI, and all subject to regular rate review. It is likely that the GDN accepted increased overall costs in exchange for fixed (RPI-2%) replacement rates and more certain financial performance relative to the Supplementary Incentive Mechanism.

We judge the increase relative to the move to fixed rates likely to be in the range 0 – 10% and have applied an adjustment of -5% to services to reflect this. Note that we have not applied this adjustment to mains because the Supplementary Incentive Mechanism deals with variances within the control.

A small proportion of Repex work is carried out by direct employees, often when emergency work levels are low. Personal/crew productivity is no longer recorded and managers have to rely on proxy measures when undertaking performance reviews. We acknowledge that direct employees may be disrupted by emergency work or other duties, and in some circumstances may not appear to be efficient, however we believe it fundamental to the management of this resource that individual or team achievement is recorded and available to managers on a weekly basis.

In respect of this we regard up to 15% of production to have been at risk and have adjusted costs by 7.5% to reflect this.

Materials procurement was found to be generally well managed with Northern using effective measures to apply downward pressure on costs.

The cost of overheads is clear and we have made a comparison between the GDNs (04/05), comparing gross mains and services expenditure and the associated overhead. Overheads form a significant part of Northern's costs – 15% in 2004/05 compared with an average for all GDNs of 14% in the same year. Overheads are driven by a mixture of semi-fixed (e.g. project preparation and design) and variable costs (e.g. Employee Related Overheads in so much that the proportions of direct labour working on Repex projects may change) and are not therefore meaningfully compared at this level. However we recommend that overhead allocation is included as part of the forthcoming five year review.




Figure 37

Net Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Reported Net Investment	64.3	54.0	55.0	173.3
Mains (as reported)	51.9	39.9	37.3	129.0
Re-allocation from Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Mains	51.9	39.9	37.3	129.0
Services Net Investment	12.4	14.2	17.7	44.3
Wasteful/Unnecessary	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.5
Mains	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Services	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.5
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	12.0	13.7	17.1	42.8
Allowed Workload	12.0	11.8	16.4	40.2
Additional Workload	0.0	1.9	0.7	2.6
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 82

An adjustment is made to reflect contract inefficiencies relative to services work

Categorisation of expenditure is according to the reporting definitions at 2.7.

8.5 FORECAST EXPENDITURE

8.5.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Mains Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total
Mains (as reported)	51.9	39.9	37.3	43.0	40.7	212.7
Re-allocation from Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.9
Total Mains	51.9	39.9	37.3	43.0	42.7	214.6
Allowance	51.2	34.6	39.7	42.7	42.3	210.4
Variance	0.7	5.3	-2.4	0.3	0.3	4.2

Table 83

Replacement mains trends are expected to continue much as in the first three years of the control period.

Services Repex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total
Services (as reported)	12.4	14.2	17.7	20.0	22.3	86.6
Re-allocation to Mains	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.9
Total Services	12.4	14.2	17.7	20.0	20.3	84.6
Allowance	7.4	8.8	12.2	13.2	11.8	53.3
Variance	5.0	5.4	5.5	6.8	8.6	31.3

Table 84

Services variance is driven largely by higher unit costs, offset by a re-allocation to mains.

8.5.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Reasons for the variance are unchanged from 2002/03 – 2004/05.


8.5.3 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

Net Repex (Excluding Re-chargeable Mains Diversions) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total	2007/08
Reported Net Investment	64.3	54.0	55.0	63.0	63.0	299.3	64.3
Mains (as reported)	51.9	39.9	37.3	43.0	40.7	212.7	41.6
2.3.1.3							
Re-allocation from Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.9	0.0
2.3.1.3							
Total Mains	51.9	39.9	37.3	43.0	42.7	214.6	41.6
Services Forecast Net Investment	12.4	14.2	17.7	20.0	20.3	84.6	22.7
Adjustments	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.2	2.4	0.0
Mains	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2.3.1.3							
Services	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.2	2.4	0.0
2.3.1.3							
Ofgem Adjusted Forecast	12.0	13.7	17.1	19.3	20.1	82.2	64.3
Allowed Workload	12.0	11.8	16.4	17.6	20.1	78.0	
Additional Workload	0.0	1.9	0.7	1.6	0.0	4.2	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 85

There are continuing adjustments to services reflecting on-going contract (to 04/05) and direct labour inefficiencies under the current arrangements. There is no adjustment to the GDN's proposals for 2007/08.

8.5.4 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2007 TO MAR 2008)



8.5.4.1 Recommendations

Volumes

For mains and services we have accepted the forecast volumes.

Costs

We have considered and tested various forms of analysis to assess the efficiency of the proposed expenditure.

Direct inter-GDN comparison is unreliable because the real relationship between mains and services costs in some GDNs is uncertain. The use of bundled mains rates introduces another uncertainty, as does the contract position of each GDN, with some at the end of long contracts and others entering or in the early stages of new arrangements.

To take an overview of efficiency, the GDN workloads for the year have been re-costed using the unit costs (unadjusted) provided by Transco at the last review. This is the best information available to us and there is some confidence that the relationship between the unit costs is representative. The purpose is to apply a common yardstick to the volumes and assess, after adjustments for regional cost differences, the relative positions of the GDNs.

Because of the uncertainties involved, and because this is a comparison of forecasts rather than actual costs, we suggest that GDNs above a benchmark: the 4th most efficient in cost terms, should close 1/3 of the gap between GDN and benchmark. In this case no reduction is required.

For reasons described above unit costs are as presented and, where anomalies existed, these remain.

Mains (excluding re-chargeable diversions)	As Presented				Proposed inc O/H		
	Vol	Unit Cost	Total	O/H	Vol	Unit Cost	Total
	km	£m	£m	£m	km	£m	£m
<=75mm	221.0	53.7	11.9	1.6	221.0	60.9	13.5
>75mm to 125mm	223.3	61.1	13.6	1.8	223.3	69.3	15.5
>125mm to 180mm	36.6	107.1	3.9	0.5	36.6	121.5	4.4
>180mm to 250mm	10.5	178.3	1.9	0.3	10.5	202.2	2.1
>250mm to 355mm	13.7	238.1	3.3	0.4	13.7	270.1	3.7
>355mm to 500mm	5.6	339.7	1.9	0.3	5.6	385.4	2.2
>500mm to 630mm	0.5	515.5	0.2	0.0	0.5	584.9	0.3
>630mm				0.0			0.0
Total all sizes	511.1		36.7	4.9	511.1		41.6

Table 86

Replacement Services Domestic	As Presented				Proposed inc O/H		
	Vol	Unit Cost	Total	O/H	Vol	Unit Cost	Total
	Units	£/m	£m	£m	Units	£/m	£m
Relaid services associated with mains replacement	27,156	389.3	10.6	1.4	27,156	441.7	12.0
Relaid services not associated with Mains replacement (bulk relays)	100	390.0	0.0	0.0	100	442.5	0.0
Services relaid after escape	5,883	363.4	2.1	0.3	5,883	412.3	2.4
Service test & transfer to new or other main	16,540	200.7	3.3	0.4	16,540	227.7	3.8
Reposition domestic meter - service relays	1,524	1637.1	2.5	0.3	1,524	1857.4	2.8
Purge & relight after domestic service work	49,427	16.3	0.8	0.1	49,427	18.5	0.9
Service relay domestic meterwork				0.0			0.0
Other domestic services	416	363.0	0.2	0.0	416	411.8	0.2
Total domestic services	101,046	193.2	19.5	2.6	101,046		22.1

Table 87

Replacement Services Non Domestic	As Presented				Proposed inc O/H		
	Vol	Unit Cost	Total	O/H	Vol	Unit Cost	Total
	km	£m	£m	£m	km	£m	£m
Non-domestic service replacement	379	1226.9	0.5	0.1	379	1392.0	0.5
Non-domestic meterwork associated with mains replacement				0.0			0.0
Other non-domestic service work				0.0			0.0
Total non domestic services			0.5	0.1			0.5

Table 88

8.5.4.2 Supplementary Incentive Mechanism

The Supplementary Incentive Mechanism was introduced to address the “diameter effect” where a workload of smaller diameter mains (than forecast) could produce savings for the GDNs. The scheme also focuses on mains de-commissioned, rather than new main laid, and rewards efficiency in mains replacement.

During the operation of the scheme a number of issues have arisen across the GDNs:

(Some of the points below are not applicable to all GDNs.)

- i) Contract rates are skewed in favour of mains and cost transparency of mains and services has been lost.
- ii) The correlation between the matrix allowance and actual cost of abandonment is suspect.

-
- iii) The matrix has had an untoward influence on the design of replacement schemes; for example we have heard of instances where one of a pair of mains in a street has been de-commissioned, causing the services to be transferred/relaid to the new main on the other side, when the optimum solution would have been to replace both mains and transfer/relay to the existing mains position.
 - iv) Replacement projects are being supported by reinforcement mains (Capex) and the true cost of the programme is obscured. "Capitalisation" rules have been changed to include a formula for the situation where a single main replaces two existing mains in a street.
 - v) In certain circumstances mains may be cut-off e.g. demolition sites and charged to Opex.

In view of the above our recommendation is that the scheme should be reviewed. Mains volumes are reasonably certain through the programme accepted by the HSE, although gaming with the diameter effect remains possible, and could be addressed with a matrix for new rather than de-commissioned pipe. But this is likely to perpetuate the current price distortion. The inclusion of services is another option, but most of the issues above would remain unaddressed and we think it more appropriate that the GDN is rewarded for accurate forecasting of Repex as a whole, perhaps by comparing the forecast volumes and costs with actuals at each year end.


8.6 FORECAST TRENDS (2002 TO 2013)

8.6.1 HIGH LEVEL TREND

8.6.1.1 Mains Activity

Mains Volumes

There is considerable variance at the end of the period between the Ofgem Price Control and the GDN actuals/forecast.

**Figure 38**

The price control assumed the HSE requirement plus about 12% condition replacement based on historical volumes.

The GDN agreed with the HSE to increase the rate of de-commissioning of iron mains by 10% and so total mains de-commissioning is now forecast to run at 573km/yr from 06/07. Given that the condition element of the workload is forecast to run at historical proportions we regard the forecast as accurate.

8.6.1.2 Services Activity

Services estimates within the price control were based on historical ratios with mains de-commissioned. Going forward, the level of services jobs is consistent with the mains volumes.




Figure 39

8.6.1.3 Forecasting Issues

Workload

The ramping-up of de-commissioned mains is completed in 06/07 and the GDN then has to retain, rather than increase its workforce each year. This should help to mitigate cost pressures, although a greater proportion of larger diameter pipes (and human effort) will need to be included as the programme progresses.

The removal of the highest risk pipes is progressing and GDNs have the opportunity to move towards larger projects, subject to acceptance of revised procedures by the HSE. As well as the benefits of scale, these larger projects offer opportunities for innovative management, improved techniques and further (albeit modest) cost reduction. Consumers should also benefit from a more carefully planned and managed operations.

Contracts

The GDN has entered into new contracts that are the key to efficient investment. We would expect market testing, new forms of contract, improved processes and larger projects to lead to cost reductions.

Large Diameter Pipes

The size for size replacement of large diameter pipes is expensive and we would expect to see a strategy for each mains network that identified the large diameter mains in the programme and considered alternatives to size for size replacement.

System Condition

The replacement programme is focussed on reducing risk, but as it progresses the network should respond to the investment made. The GDN has reported on a number of indicators of network condition e.g. the number of instances of gas in buildings; the number of public reports of escapes received; tonnes of methane lost through leakage etc. Five of the seven indicators are reacting as expected and responding to the investment, but public reports of external escapes and actioned repairs are not declining as expected. We recommend that the matter is investigated further at the five year review.

Further details of the indicators and their behaviour are attached at appendix 10

8.6.2 COMMENTS ON TREND

Disaggregation of the price control allowances, and events since the control was set, has led to a poor match between allowances and actual workload and cost. Volume and cost trends are now clearer although further work is required to give good cost visibility to activity level.

9 LTS REPEX

9.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

9.1.1 15 MONTH PERIOD (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

The Gross Repex spend for all GDNs for the 15 month period was £6.7m with contributions of £4.4m giving a net UK total of £2.3m. There is no specific detail as there is no single project above £0.5m. This expenditure is therefore deemed efficient and allowable. There are no Repex allowances given for this period.

9.1.2 5 YEAR PERIOD (APR 2002 TO MAR 2007)

NGN's BPQ submission listed 3 named projects, plus some minor unnamed works, on which there will be expenditure in the current review period. One of these named projects is rechargeable. Two projects are not rechargeable: these are required for a mining diversion and other 'lift and shift' orders under the wayleave agreements.

Net Repex All figures £m 2005/06 prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total	2007/08
Allowed Net Investment	1.2	1.0	0	0	0	2.2	
Total GDN Variance³	-1.2	-1	-0.1	-0.2	2.6	0.1	
	-100%	-100%				5%	
Reported Net Investment	0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	2.6	2.4	5.4
Wasteful/Unnecessary Actual Expenditure	0	0	0			0	
Adjustments to Forecasts				0	0	0	0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	2.6	2.4	5.4
Allowed Workload	0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	2.5	2.2	
Additional Workload	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Table 89

³ Variance percentage values not included where allowance or actual expenditure values are zero

9.2 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (JAN 2001 TO MAR 2002)

The RAV adjustment for the period 1 Jan 2001 to 31 March 2002 was not included in the previous review. The LTS Repex expenditure for this period has been submitted by NGG only as a UKD total.

The Gross Repex spend for all GDNs for the 15 month period was £6.7m with contributions of £4.4m giving a net UK total of £2.3m. There is no specific detail as there is no single project above £0.5m. This expenditure is therefore deemed efficient and allowable. There are no Repex allowances given for this period.

9.3 HISTORIC EXPENDITURE (APR 2002 TO MAR 2005)

9.3.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS

LTS Repex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total
Gross	Actual	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.6
	Allowance	1.2	1.1	0.0	2.3
	Variance	-1.2	-0.7	0.2	-1.7
Contributions	Actual	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.6
	Allowance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Variance	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.6
Net	Actual	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0
	Allowance	1.2	1.0	0.0	2.2
	Variance	-1.2	-1.0	-0.1	-2.2

Table 90

9.3.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

NGN has under spent its net allowance by £2.2m in the first three years of the period and projects an outturn of £0.1m over spent for the full period. In our view all these works are necessary and allowable.

9.3.3 EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

LTS Repex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 Year Total
Reported Net Investment	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0
Wasteful/Unnecessary Expenditure	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Net Investment	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0
Allowed Workload	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 91

9.3.3.1 Project Review

There were no Repex projects reviewed in this period.

9.4 FORECAST EXPENDITURE

9.4.1 HIGH LEVEL VARIANCES ANALYSIS (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

LTS Repex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 Year Total	2007/08
GDN Forecast Net Investment	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	2.6	2.4	5.4
Adjustments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ofgem Adjusted Forecast Net Investment	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	2.6	2.4	5.4
Allowed Workload	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	2.5	2.3	
Additional Workload	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	
Deferrable/Unplanned but Predictable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Table 92

LTS Repex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
Gross	Actual	0.0	0.4	0.2	1.0	2.7	4.3
	Allowance	1.2	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3
	Variance	-1.2	-0.7	0.2	1.0	2.7	2.0
Contributions	Actual	0.0	0.3	0.3	1.2	0.1	1.9
	Allowance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Variance	0.0	0.3	0.3	1.2	0.1	1.9
Net	Actual	0.0	0.1	-0.1	-0.2	2.6	2.4
	Allowance	1.2	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2
	Variance	-1.2	-1.0	-0.1	-0.2	2.6	0.1

Table 93

NGN will overspend their allowance by £2.4m in this period, but their net position over the five year period is an overspend of £0.1m.

9.4.2 REASONS FOR VARIANCES

Unplanned expenditure of £2.0m in 2006/07 is due to two non-rechargeable projects over which the GDN had no control and which are therefore allowable. They will still not exceed their allowance for the five year period.

9.4.3 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2005 TO MAR 2007)

These two non-rechargeable projects which are outside their control will cause NGN to overspend their allowance for these two years by £2.4m.

9.4.4 REVIEW OF FORECAST (APR 2007 TO MAR 2008)

In 2007/08 there is a significant and well documented programme of five named rechargeable projects and four named non rechargeable projects plus some work under £0.5m This has an estimated net cost of £5.4m and is deemed to be allowable.

9.5 FORECAST TRENDS (2002 TO 2013)**9.5.1 HIGH LEVEL TREND**

Pipeline replacement is nearly always rechargeable. Planning and budgeting for these projects is always difficult as the requirements and especially the timings are driven by third parties; e.g. local authorities, highways agency, network rail. The policy is to recover the true uplifted costs of the work.

9.5.2 COMMENTS ON TREND

NGN has a well documented and fully detailed LTS Repex programme; the submission lists this up to 2008/09. It is quite normal that LTS replacement works will not be known beyond this point.

10 INVESTMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

10.1 REVIEW OF INVESTMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Expenditure incurred in the years to 2004/05 will have resulted from the Investment Policies and Procedures under NGT and NGG. Much of the expenditure in 2005/06 and possibly 2006/07 will also have been committed under the same processes.

Indeed, some of the longer term project commitments up to 2012/13 showing in NGN's current plans will have carried forward from the NGG era. NGN has been through a transitional phase of managing legacy commitments whilst making a start on implementing its own business model as part of United Utilities.

It is not clear yet what impact this will have on the Capex spend up to 2013. The effect of any policy changes should become apparent in the main review, especially any outcome from the revision to the NTS offtake rules and the impact on an LTS pipeline storage programme.

10.2 CRITERIA USED FOR INVESTMENT DECISIONS

For LTS investment decisions, there are two primary sources of data. Firstly the network planning models (Falcon for >7 bar) will identify capacity shortfalls in the network and will validate potential solutions. However, the model will only be as good as the data fed into it. The Network Planning and Design Report for NGN indicates that their planning processes are satisfactory. (see Appendix 1)

There is no stated intention by NGN to move policy away from the current planning criteria as these are of course a licence obligation.

The second criterion for investment decisions derives from asset condition and the balancing of capital or replacement expenditure against ongoing increasing Opex (and increased risk of failure). NGN gave a satisfactory response to this in their submission.

10.2.1 PROJECT APPROVAL PROCESSES

There is no evidence that NGN is moving away from the legacy process on which its current investment will have been authorised.

10.2.2 CONTROLLING COSTS

NGN appear to have cost control processes.

10.2.3 MANAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT TRADE-OFFS

NGN gave a satisfactory response to managing lifetime costs for their assets.

“NGN is currently developing procedures based on the principals (sic) of BSI PAS55. These procedures will prioritise actions to ensure the type and quality of data is available to support key business decisions in investment management”

This gives confidence that looking at trade-offs in general terms is embedded into their processes.

10.2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY OBLIGATIONS

NGN has given a comprehensive response to the safety and environmental questions in the BPQ. They have a comprehensive suite of safety and environmental standards and there is no indication that these are any less than those previously implemented under the NG regime.

For example, they have stated that “*NGN operates under the environmental management system specification ISO 14001*”

In LTS terms, environmental issues impact heavily on cross country pipeline work; indeed it would not be possible to obtain the necessary consents without a very comprehensive review (Environmental Impact Assessment) well ahead of the works. There is no indication that NGN intends to lessen this obligation.

They have committed to a programme of remediation of contaminated land (but say costs not yet included in the submission) and to compliance with waste water discharge consent on LP holder sites.

APPENDIX 1 NETWORK PLANNING AND DESIGN

A1.1 TASK DESCRIPTION / PROCESS

In the one year price control review, Ofgem called for information from NGN on the different elements which comprise the network planning procedure. The information requested included numerical data regarding network analysis and storage simulation as well as qualitative explanations of a number of factors.

The information provided has been studied in order to evaluate the overall network planning process carried out for NGN. This has principally related to local transmission and storage systems. Diurnal storage requirement and availability as well as transmission capacity evaluations have been carried out since these must be taken together. Additionally load forecasting and demand allocation processes have been examined. The validity of the simulated networks and their appropriateness for use as definitive planning aids have been examined and a view arrived at as to the robustness of the actual networks and plans for their reinforcement to meet future requirements.

For NGN there is a separate LTS report which looks at the overall spend, the summary data for all the projects and a detailed report on selected projects, plus generic data from narrative answers.

A1.2 PLANNING PROCESS REVIEW: NORTH OF ENGLAND

A1.2.1 SUMMARY OF DATA SUPPLIED

Replies have been supplied by NGN for all questions in the BPQ and the level of detail provides a thorough and comprehensive set of answers.

A1.2.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Having examined the data provided for Northern Gas Network, we can confirm that it was sufficient to ascertain the planning capability within the GDN.

We have reached the conclusion that the planning work for development of the network and in particular that of the local transmission and storage system has been carried out in a competent manner.

A1.2.3 PROCESS REVIEW

- i) Additional narrative questions relating to LTS and Storage Capacity

Diagrams in the form of a Powerpoint presentation were provided detailing the Local Transmission System (LTS). These were satisfactory.

- ii) System flow study report.

Information relating to forecast system flows for the 1 in 20 condition for 2005/06 and actual system peak days for each year were provided. In conjunction with the textual response to 6.192 these provided sufficient information to allow identification of entry and exit flows and pressures at key points.

- iii) LTS network capacity report at 1 in 20 peak day demand for each year.

A spreadsheet was provided containing actual data recorded on GTMS for the maximum demand day in 2005/06 winter and a validation report was provided. The validation report gives a high degree of confidence in the depth of understanding of the GDN regarding network simulation. It indicates that a reasonable degree of confidence in the models is appropriate and also highlights that the GDN is taking suitable steps to investigate some of the anomalies thrown up in the validation exercise.

- iv) Provide a summary report highlighting any problem areas for networks other than the LTS

A brief overview was given and reference to the formal procedure was submitted. A copy of the low pressure log was provided which shows how operations and planning interface when poor pressures are experienced. We conclude that the log demonstrates understanding by the planners as to the possible causes of differences between theory and practice.

- v) Describe how load forecasts are derived and what level of load disaggregation is used.

A brief overview of the process was provided. This was satisfactory.

- vi) Identify any significant changes, if any, in demand and supply forecasts, or forecasting methods, since the last published ten-year statement.

A comprehensive description of changes to the recorded weather data used in the forecast methodology was provided as well as an indication of the anticipated future trends. The reasons for the change and anticipated effect provide a sound response to the question.

- vii) Describe how the total GDN peak day forecast and the LP network pk6 demands are reconciled with each other.

A brief description of the process used in developing GBNA and Falcon network analysis models and how demands are derived for both was provided. This indicates an established liaison route between analysis sections dealing with different pressure tiers.

- viii) Is the demand forecasting methodology likely to change in the forecast period? If so please describe the changes.

Changes to the methodology have been identified and we consider that the reasons given are sound.

- ix) Describe the trends in the GDN's demand forecasting performance over the reporting period.

An adequate description of trends in demand forecasting over the last 4 years was provided along with sensible reasons for the variations.

Explain the basis for estimating future large customer Connections and the contributions receivable.

A comprehensive response outlining the approach adopted by NGN was provided.

- x) Explain how diurnal storage requirements are determined.

A brief overview of the procedure adopted illustrating an adequate understanding of the process within the GDN.

-
- xi) Describe any network analysis programmes used and the network validation process

The network analysis programmes used were identified and copies of the validation procedures for below and above 7 barg pressure tiers submitted. A copy of the network validation document for both systems which constitute Northern Gas Networks was also submitted. The information provided gave a satisfactory explanation of the process and the results contained in the validation report indicate that an appropriate degree of confidence in the network analysis models used is justified

- xii) Provide details of the maximum volume of diurnal storage required and express this as a percentage of the 1 in 20 peak day demand in each year. Give reasons for any trends.

The information and an explanation of the peak demand used in derivation of the percentages were provided. There was some variation in storage requirement figures within the data provided in the submission. However the answer provided in response to a supplementary question gave a satisfactory explanation and demonstrated thought in determining diurnal storage requirements.

APPENDIX 2 REPORT ON PROCUREMENT & LOGISTICS

A2.1 INTRODUCTION

Procurement can influence the costs of a business significantly. The review of the procurement and logistics operation within NGN was done to ascertain whether or not the strategic approach and process is robust and effective in minimizing costs whilst maintaining security of supply.

A2.2 SOURCING STRATEGY

NGNs' sourcing strategy is to outsource its procurement to United Utilities Operations Limited. UUOL on behalf of NGN sources materials and vendors in accordance with United Utilities' policies and procedures.

A2.3 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The policies and procedures manual has processes that are robust and demonstrate that there is a set of rules that must be followed for all aspects of procurement. There is also a procedure for contract management which enables NGN to ensure the effectiveness of the contracts they have put in place.

A2.4 STRATEGIC PURCHASES

A2.4.1 PE PIPE AND FITTINGS

NGN have tendered this procurement category and have managed to decrease prices by leveraging with other parts of the UU group. They have a good understanding of the price trends and forecasts in this market.

Their new contract has a comprehensive price review mechanism demonstrating a robust process that aims to keep costs to a minimum.

A2.4.2 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING


No details provided on their strategy for this commodity. They suggest that there has been no upward trend in prices and state that RPI would be a good indicator for the likely forward trend.

A2.4.3 STEEL PIPE AND FITTINGS

The use of steel pipe and fittings within the Network is relatively infrequent and used on a specific project by project basis. There have been significant upward movements in the price of steel which has been demonstrated by various ICE indices.

A2.4.4 CONTRACTORS (FOR PIPE LAYING AND REPLACEMENT ACTIVITIES)

Contractors' costs have increased significantly above the RPI throughout the plan period. Since 2001 RPI has increased by some 11% whereas contractor costs have increased by 28% around 4% per annum above RPI.



A2.4.5 LTS

LTS project management is provided by in house staff. The supporting services that are outsourced are planning services, QS services and environmental services. This is done on a project by project basis on tendered rates.

A2.4.6 MAINS TO METER

No details have been provided regarding the current supply arrangements. NGN forecast an upward trend in prices for this category.

For the above strategic purchases pricing trend information has been supplied which demonstrates an understanding of the market place and likely impacts on future costs. No evidence has been provided on what contractual arrangements are in place for these purchases with the exception of PE pipe and fittings which has been tendered and a contract awarded.

A2.5 PROCUREMENT PROCESS

The following areas were questioned to gain an understanding of how robust and effective the processes being used in NGN.

A2.5.1 COST EFFECTIVENESS

They have provided robust criteria and process for tender evaluation. They also use their purchasing power by collaborating with other businesses in United Utilities to gain better prices with higher volume. This has been demonstrated by their strategy for PE pipe and fittings.

A2.5.2 TOTAL COST OF ACQUISITION

They have demonstrated that they will be putting elements into future EPC and major contracts that will mitigate the risk of cost increases, e.g. target costing, gain/pain share and KPIs.

A2.5.3 SECURITY OF SUPPLY

They have contractual arrangements in place but have not provided any detail on how they mitigated the risk of materials not being available from the normal source.

A2.5.4 HEALTH SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT

Health and Safety information is required and assessed as part of the tender process. It forms part of the contract award process.

A2.5.5 SPECIFICATIONS

The Network Integrity Manager manages and maintains the Networks Engineering Policies and Procedures Manual which contain all of the material specifications. All materials must meet these specifications. There is no explanation of how this is achieved or what actually happens to establish that a product meets a specific specification, other than the logistics provider must ensure that material received meets the specification.

A2.5.6 COST REDUCTION

NGN have demonstrated that they are looking for ways to reduce costs by incentivising UUOL to seek cost reductions through the Asset Services Agreement (ASA) target costs. Areas that are being considered are packaging work together, new contract partnering approaches, rationalization of suppliers, rationalization of stock in [REDACTED] (UUOL's logistics provider), improved specifications and better performance of contractors and suppliers.

A2.5.7 SPEND DATA

This is being captured by the use of SAP. For one off contracts the information is stored on the contract file. UUOL's logistic provider NRG2 records all data for stock items. These processes should allow all costs to be managed and monitored.

A2.5.8 PROVISION OF LABOUR

UUOL on behalf of NGN operate a minor civils contract for the supply of labour. Although this is in place it doesn't seem to have been effective for supporting the shortage of labour for the EPCs.

A2.5.9 STOCK LEVELS

The current levels have been established based on historic information provided by National Grid. Levels are constantly reviewed.

A2.5.10 WAREHOUSING

This is outsourced by UUOL to [REDACTED]. A service level agreement is in place which incentivises performance by the use of a rebate mechanism if performance levels fall below set targets. If service levels fall below a set minimum level then there may be breach of contract.

The contract in place provides confidence that the warehousing operation is being monitored and costs are being managed.

A2.5.11 EMERGENCY STOCKS

The sold networks, Scotia Gas, Wales and West Utilities and Northern Gas Networks have jointly set up an emergency stock holding for PE and steel fittings. This is a good initiative and should provide a cost effective solution.

A2.6 MAINS AND SERVICE REPLACEMENT

Engineering Period Contracts (EPCs) were put in place in 1999. These contracts were for a 3 year period with an option to extend for a further 2 years. The contracts in the NGN region were all extended to July 2006.

These contracts were larger than previous ones and allowed for efficiencies in contract management and costs were kept down due to larger work volumes and increased cash flow.

The original contracts were based on target costing and in April 2002 these were changed to Established Prices. Thereafter the annual rate review was RPI-2% for schedule 1 (Repex) and RPI for all other schedules. In addition to this the contractor requested rate reviews based on costs incurred outside the contract terms e.g. legislative requirements, changes in operating procedures etc.



Based on the examples of rate increases as detailed above, contract management appears very flexible in allowing for percentage uplifts above the agreed formula and raises the question of whether the agreed formula is appropriate. Although the contractors have agreed to freeze rates based on an extension, they may try to recover this at a later date by providing information on cost increases..

The review mechanism should allow for actual costs to be checked against the efficiency of the contractor as costs may have increased due to ineffective operating methods. Future reviews need to ensure that the contractor is working to minimize increases.

The future strategy for the EPCs has not been provided.

A2.7 MATERIAL COSTS

NGN have identified a number of key materials that will affect costs.

The prime material cost used in gas distribution is polyethylene (PE) pipe. Other materials include steel (pipe and fittings), iron (fittings), aggregates and reinstatement material. One key feature of these materials is that they all have high energy production costs and PE uses oil-based feedstock (Ethylene). The material costs have therefore followed the rising costs of oil and gas since 2001 and this will continue to 2013.

Transport costs are another significant cost for a gas distributor. NGN pay an uplift of ■■■ on the price of their materials to cover the costs of UUOL's logistics supplier which covers stock management and all deliveries. Delivery costs have been impacted by the rising cost of fuel and this trend is likely to continue.

NGN have shown by the use of graphs and ICE indices that the main commodities they purchase have shown an upward trend in cost increases. The evidence that they have provided demonstrates a good understanding of price trends and the key materials that affect their cost base.

They have also negotiated a comprehensive price review mechanism for their PE pipe and fittings contract demonstrating a robust process that aims to keep costs to a minimum.

A2.8 CONNECTIONS

The current contract for Connections is the one novated from National Grid. This contract has been extended to 1st August 2006. Until June 2005, the main contract interfaces with Fulcrum Connections Ltd were led by the NGT commercial team at a National level.

At a GDN level the contract is now managed by United Utilities Operations Ltd. (UUOL) for NGN.

UUOL manage:

- i) Contract delivery (quotations, construction of work and completion)
- ii) Invoice Validation and billing
- iii) Closure file completion
- iv) Contract Performance (via balance scorecard)


Until June 2005 customer billing was carried out centrally in National Grid. This activity is now carried out by UUOL who manage both the Connections Service Provider contract and Customer Billing.

From the 1st of August NGN plan to bring the whole of the Connections business into United Utilities. Until this time UUOL have access to National Grid systems via a Service Agreement to monitor Fulcrums performance.

In 2003 the rates in the Connections contracts were moved to a fixed schedule of rates from target costing.

These rates were then reviewed annually to accommodate changes to the direct cost base as evidenced by Baxter and also for trigger events that caused significant change to the economics of the contracts.

The following information shows the increase since September 2003.



On sale completion NGN brought in a new contractor and reduced this increase to an average of ■■■.

NGN have been proactive in changing their strategy and arrangements for the Connections business. As stated above they have reduced the average increase in rates to ■■■ by changing their contractor.

A2.9 LTS

From the investigations made there are no issues with the way in which the procurement has been completed to achieve cost effective results.

As long as there are multiple suppliers of materials and specialized labour contracts and time is allowed in the project planning processes to procure these without duress, this will achieve true market tested prices.

Along with other GDNs, NGN will need to consider how their future position as a smaller buyer in what is already a specialist materials market, will affect security of supply of such materials and services and the prices to be paid. This will be revisited in the main price control review.

A2.10 SUMMARY

NGN have outsourced their procurement and logistics to UUOL (United Utilities Operations Ltd.) who in turn out source their logistics to [REDACTED].

From the evidence provided UUOL have a robust set of policies and procedures and have demonstrated a proactive approach to procurement. They have already achieved reductions in prices for their PE contract by collaborating with other United Utilities businesses using volume leverage. A positive approach especially now that the volumes required within NGN are relatively small compared to the original volumes that National Grid were able to use to obtain the best market prices.

The procurement process being sourced by NGN through UUOL appears to be robust and should be able to support the business in minimising the risk of cost increases.

APPENDIX 3 FULCRUM CONNECTIONS

A3.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to provide information regarding GDN connections business processes and Fulcrum Connections (FC) relevant to expenditure on connections activities.

The Service Provider Contract (SPC) forms the basis for the contractual relationship between the Networks and FC. NGG managed the contractual interface on behalf of all networks, including those sold in 2005, until the new owners took these activities back in-house. NGN transferred their connections activities back in-house on 1 August 2006. As appropriate, information obtained from NGG or FC and included in this appendix has been used to consider and analyse connections expenditure for all GDNs.

A3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FC AS A SEPARATED BUSINESS

The Regulator (Ofgas/Ofgem) instigated an investigation into Transco performance on connections activities in the late 1990s. This resulted in the issue of the Enforcement Order in 1999, which was intended to improve Transco's connections performance and encourage competition in the connections market.

Ofgas found Transco to be in breach of section 9 (2) (a) of the Gas Act due to failing to avoid undue discrimination towards an independent connection provider (ICP) by over quoting for a quotation it offered that company whilst not over quoting other companies for the same connection. Also, Ofgas found Transco to be in breach of standard condition 11(1) of its licence for failing to conduct its transportation business in a manner best calculated to secure that neither Transco nor any person related to it, nor any shipper, obtains a commercial advantage.

To prevent the breaches from re-occurring Ofgas imposed an enforcement order against Transco under section 28 of the Gas Act. The Order obliged Transco to amongst other things:

- obtain ISO 9001 certification for its connections operations;
- introduce a compensation arrangements for parties receiving late or incorrect quotations;
- introduce arrangements for the audit of its performance; and
- publish a connection charging methodology.

Transco were required to implement comprehensive management systems and a compensation payments scheme for failure to meet Standards of Service. The management systems and processes were required to meet the requirements for ISO 9001 accreditation supported by quarterly audits to monitor compliance. Audit reports were to be shared with the Regulator.

The establishment of a separate business organisation was encouraged and development of Transco's proposals was shared with Ofgas. Separation was considered necessary in order to demonstrate that connections activities were not cross subsidised by transportation income and were not given unfair advantage by being part of the monopoly GT activity. It is understood that FC 'start up' total costs were incurred prior to July 2001 and no costs have carried over into the current PCR period.

The Gas Act Enforcement Order was revoked in 2005 and obligations with respect to connections were incorporated within a standard special licence condition on all Gas Distribution Network licensees.

We conclude that the creation of FC as a separate business was an outcome of the issue of the Enforcement Order and that this was discussed and shared with the Regulator. It is understood that Transco did not provide a cost analysis to quantify the effects of separation but, nonetheless, it seems reasonable to presume that both parties were aware, and accepted, that overheads on connections activities would increase as a consequence.

A3.3 SPC PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

A3.3.1 PERFORMANCE REVIEW

Under the terms of the SPC, FC is required to comply with all NGG policies and procedures.

Bi-monthly performance management interface meetings are held between NGG and FC. These meetings comprise the following:

- i) Operational Performance Meeting
- ii) Financial Interface Meeting
- iii) Credit and Risk Forum
- iv) Engineering Consistency Forum

A3.3.2 AUDIT

FC has implemented and maintains an Integrated Management System (IMS) to ensure effective management of risk, processes and resources. The audit framework is specified in the IMS and covers a comprehensive range of business processes and systems. Generally, audit reports are appropriately shared with NGG particularly where the actions identified impact on the GDNs.

The 1999 Enforcement Order specified the requirement for an Audits regime which was carried by external auditors appointed by NGG at quarterly intervals until April 2005. Audit findings were briefed to NGG and FC, and action plans were produced. Final Reports were shared with Ofgem. External audits ceased with the cancellation of the Enforcement Order and the Fulcrum Data Integrity Manual now incorporates quotation accuracy.

The SPC requires FC to maintain compliance with appropriate and recognised standards, in particular ISO 9001 which is subject to compliance audit by Lloyds Register.

A3.3.3 PAYMENTS PROCESS

FC invoices to the GDNs include:

- i) Management Fee
- ii) Work execution costs – schedule of SPC rates claimed per job completed – validated by Networks.
- iii) Employer Ordered Works (EOW)

EOW are essential works additional to the customer quotation scope of work and are subject to authorisation by GDNs before work is undertaken and payment is made. Associated costs are controlled by NGG via the Connections Invoices File Validation System (CIFVS) which was introduced in 2004. An equivalent manual system was used prior to that date.

A3.3.4 EXPENDITURE CONTROL AND MONITORING BY NGG

NGG indicated that control over FC expenditure is achieved as follows:

- Compliance
 - Compliance with relevant NGG policies and procedures leads to economic and efficient connections designs and their construction.
 - NGG Framework Responsible Businesses - sound & efficient financial control is a key underpinning principle
 - Fulcrum Integrated Management System (IMS)
- SPC Management
 - Ensures that correct drivers exist within FC to manage and control expenditure
 - Ensures that only the costs that are reasonably incurred in discharging the obligations under the SPC are passed on to NGGD
- Financial Control
 - Invoice approval
 - Approval process for EOW
 - Expenditure approval levels

Connections expenditure and income is monitored at Distribution Review Committee (DRC) level within NGG. The management information utilised for this purpose essentially comprises high level Capex, Repex and Opex information to compare actual cost with budget and forecast. In terms of connections activities, the expenditure information is disaggregated to some degree, particularly for services. We have found no evidence of information to monitor activity expenditure efficiency and performance improvement at DRC or any other level within NGG, e.g. activity unit costs. This observation is further supported by the inaccuracy of NGG's initial submissions on Capex activity expenditure and workload information as requested in the BPQ.

Connections related projects are managed in accordance with NGG policies and procedures. NGG's Distribution Project Sanctioning Committee is required to approve all connections related projects, and/or authority to quote the customer, above £250k. All other projects are approved under delegated authority.

A3.3.5 EXPENDITURE CONTROL AND MONITORING BY FC

Expenditure control within FC is at the level of each connection and is based on direct reference to work activities undertaken as specified in the job pack and work instructions relating to the original quotation design, EOW and any subsequent customer variations. Inconsistencies are investigated to determine the cause, initiate adjustments to payments and identify appropriate actions to feed back into business processes.

FC target and monitor engineering period contract (EPC) productivity levels at GDN and individual contractor level in terms of the average number of jobs completed per day by each team. The information is cascaded down to Operations Manager level in the organisation and is discussed with contractors at monthly review meetings. The definition of a job covers all activities and ranges from one-off domestic services to mains projects. The effectiveness of the productivity measure is, therefore, sensitive to the workload mix which FC judge to be reasonably stable and comparable across networks, but no evidence to confirm this view has been provided. [REDACTED]

The productivity management process outlined supports achievement of improved performance through effective deployment and management of resources but has limitations without information to confirm the effects on expenditure. We have found no evidence of information to monitor activity expenditure efficiency at any level within FC, e.g. activity unit costs.

We conclude that the information systems employed by NGG and FC do not adequately monitor and manage the efficiency of connections expenditure and performance improvement. It is difficult to assess the degree of efficiency benefit from improved MI systems but, nonetheless, it is considered reasonable to set expectations at an achievable level. **Therefore it is recommended that a 3% adjustment be applied to costs and this adjustment has been incorporated in the detailed analyses.**

A3.4 MANAGEMENT FEE

The Management Fee (MF) is determined in accordance with the terms specified in the SPC and is subject to challenge and review by NGG. Approximately 60% of the MF reflects costs that are directly attributable to the GDNs. Other charges are apportioned to GDNs using drivers such as manpower, quotation volumes and workload. The MF includes a profit element and is substantially recovered via uplifts applied to customer quotations.

The terms of the 2004 SPC Performance Measurement Framework provide an incentive mechanism by adjustment of the MF taking into account performance against a range of KPIs, substantially based on Standards of Service, and 20% of direct personnel costs are at risk in this process. The current Performance Management Framework was introduced in January 2004. Prior to that date performance was assessed against an Efficiency Incentive Matrix that resulted in adjustments to FC Management Costs.

[REDACTED]:



It is presumed that the increase in the level of adjustment from 2003/04 reflects failure to achieve satisfactory Standards of Service performance.

The MF is allocated to activities by the GDNs pro rata to expenditure.

We conclude that the MF charges in accordance with the SPC have been effectively managed by NGG on behalf of the GDNs.

A3.5 PROFIT

Fulcrum profit uplifts are specified on the SPC and have been established with the intent to provide a reasonable overall level of profit at predicted levels of activity. The following table demonstrates the build-up based on costs for a typical GDN.



A3.6 CONNECTIONS NET CAPEX

Connections Net Capex comprises the effects of several factors that influence the recovery of gross expenditure via customer contributions. The effect of allowances is the primary influence, particularly the Domestic Load Connection Allowance (DLCA), but other factors also result in costs that are not recovered. The impact of these factors on Net Capex is considered in the following sub-sections.

A3.6.1 DOMESTIC LOAD CONNECTION ALLOWANCE

The Domestic Load Connection Allowance (DLCA) is subject to periodic review in conjunction with review of standard charges. The allowance is assessed as follows:

- i) Relevant contractor cost items are identified from the schedule of rates. (i.e. specific rate items from for connection and <= 10m pipelay in public highway).
- ii) Usage probability factors are derived from historical workload analysis.
- iii) Usage factors are applied to cost items to derive the weighted average contractor cost.
- iv) Overheads are applied.
- v) Materials items are included with the appropriate materials uplift applied.
- vi) Values are aggregated to GDN level from contractor level.

The DLCA was originally established as a national cost but was subsequently built up for each GDN as indicated above. Mains records are examined in the quotation process to determine eligibility and NGG analysis of quotations has indicated that 97% of new services to existing housing meet the criteria.

The value (£ nominal) of the DLCA by formula year has been confirmed by NGG as follows:



Note 1 - Allowance costs comprise contractor costs, materials and uplifts on a basis consistent with the standard charges. The formula year values are a straight average of the values for the two relevant price periods for each formula year. No assumption has been made re price changes in 2006/07

Note 2 - Changes to contractor pricing agreed when rates are reviewed may be focused on certain sub-sets of rates within the relevant contract schedules. Therefore, year-on-year changes to contract pricing overall will not match the changes for a particular sub-set such as that relating to domestic one-off connections.

A3.6.2 NON DOMESTIC CONNECTIONS ALLOWANCES

During the period up to October 2005, allowances were applied to non-domestic connections. However, the effect of these allowances carries over from that date, to some degree, due to the time lag between quotation and execution of the work.

NGG analysis of quotations has indicated the application of the allowances as follows:

- The proportion of non-domestic quotations attracting an allowance is 65%.
- The proportion of non-domestic quotations attracting the Standard Allowance (@ £89) is 57%.
- The proportion of non-domestic quotations attracting a Bespoke Allowance (average value [REDACTED]) is 8%

A3.6.3 SPECIFIC REINFORCEMENT

The cost of network reinforcement operations necessitated by a specific connection is subject to the Economic Test (ET) based on the demand specified by the customer.

It is understood that virtually all specific reinforcement workload/projects satisfy the Economic Test and do not result in a contribution.

Specific reinforcement workload and expenditure that has not been separately allocated to connections has been included in Mains Reinforcement and other <7 bar build by the GDNs. In these cases, assessment of the effect of specific reinforcement costs on connections Net Capex is not possible.

A3.6.4 EMPLOYER ORDERED WORKS

Employer ordered works (EOW) are essential works additional to the customer quotation scope of work (e.g. mains upsizing, costs resulting from inaccurate records) and are subject to authorisation by GDNs. Analysis by NGG indicates that EOW are associated with all categories of connections, i.e. new housing, existing housing and non-domestic.

EOW costs are not recovered from customers and therefore pass into Net Capex.

A3.6.5 TIME LAG

A significant proportion of Net Capex results from work in progress, i.e. work that was quoted before a price increase but executed after the price change. Connection charges are based on current costs at the time of quotation and, therefore, when costs are increasing under recovery occurs.

Actual direct costs are higher than quoted costs due to the time lag between quotation and construction. FC charges to the GDNs are based on prices current at the time construction work is completed and the cost associated with time lag passes through into activity net expenditure. NGG has indicated that a 1% increase in direct costs, e.g. as a result of an EPC rates review, results in a net expenditure increase of £0.25m.

There is no evidence of routine management information to monitor the costs of time lag and initiate timely action to reduce. NGG has provided a detailed assessment of the retained networks costs associated with time lag for the period 2002/03 to 2005/06. The total costs are as follows:

- i) [REDACTED]
- ii) [REDACTED]
- iii) [REDACTED]
- iv) [REDACTED]

The costs in the earlier years reflect the higher workload volumes.

During 2006/07 NGG intend to base quotations on anticipated costs and introduce changes to siteworks terms in order to minimise Net Capex due to time lag. Prior to 2006/07 no action has been taken in the quotation processes to mitigate the cost implications of time lag, although it is presumed that the issue has been apparent as the costs are significant.

A3.6.6 OVERHEADS ASSOCIATED WITH UNACCEPTED QUOTATIONS

NGG has indicated that the domestic quotations acceptance rate has reduced by 5% for the period Jan 04 to Mar 06 and requests are down by broadly the same proportion. Over the same period the I & C and new housing acceptance rate is down by 20% and requests for quotations are increasing. In 2006/07 NGG intend to introduce payment in advance charges for designs and quotations for competitive activities only, i.e. new housing and I & C activities, for the retained networks. This should discourage requests that are for comparison purposes only and will reduce Net Capex in future.

The charging principle is that the overheads associated with providing connections should be recovered from those customers accepting quotations. However, the consequence of consistently high quotation levels and a reducing acceptance rate is that a proportion of overhead is not recovered through charges against the decreasing workload. This cost passes through into Net Capex.

FC has indicated that 29% of the MF relates to the design and quote activity, and the cost of unaccepted quotations equates to 15% of the MF. NGG has provided an assessment of the overheads attributable to unaccepted quotations for the four retained networks and the years 2002/03 to 2005/06, as follows:

- i) [REDACTED]
- ii) [REDACTED]
- iii) [REDACTED]
- iv) [REDACTED]

A proportion of this sum is not recovered via overheads applied to charges.

A3.6.7 REMAINING NET CAPEX (UNDER RECOVERY)

The foregoing components of Net Capex do not account for the total and NGG has indicated that the balance is due to inherent under recovery of costs. NGG suggests that this under recovery results from a cautious/conservative approach to charging which has the effect of ensuring that customers are not overcharged. However, NGG does not indicate that this is a matter of policy and intent.

There is no evidence of routine management information to monitor and control the costs of under recovery. NGG has assessed the total retained networks cost of under recovery at [REDACTED] for the period 2002/03 to 2005/06. No action has been taken to mitigate this cost in the quotation process. It is acknowledged that the degree of any such action should take into account and offset the risk of over charging.

A3.6.8 SUMMARY

The net cost of connections activities incorporates the effects of the factors identified. NGG has provided a detailed analysis of the retained networks connections Net Capex for the period 2002/03 to 2005/06. These figures provided by NGG are combined totals for mains and services which give a reasonable indication of the proportional effect of the factors.

Having reviewed the information provided by NGG and taking account of representations made by GDNs, we have adjusted the proportions for time lag, unaccepted quotations and under recovery. Also, we have taken account of evidence presented which suggests that the balance between mains and services should be amended to reflect the impact of allowances more accurately. In adjusting the values we have ensured that, taking account of relative Net Capex for mains and services, the resulting effect is consistent with the original information provided by NGG.

	Combined %	Adjusted combined %	Estimated mains %	Estimated services %
Allowances	59.6%	59.6%	37.3%	74.0%
Time Lag	16.3%	15.0%	15.0%	15.0%
EOW	6.8%	6.8%	12.7%	3.0%
Unaccepted quotations	0.5%	7.0%	7.0%	7.0%
Underrecovery	16.8%	11.6%	28.0%	1.0%

Table 3A - 1**A3.6.9 CONCLUSIONS**

- i) Time lag - We conclude that action should have been taken with effect from 2002/03 to mitigate the cost consequences of time lag and the resultant expenditure is therefore inefficient. A 15% adjustment to mains and services Net Capex has been applied in the analysis process.
- ii) Under recovery - We conclude that action should have been taken with effect from 2002/03 to mitigate the consequences of under recovery of costs in the customer quotation process and the resultant expenditure is therefore inefficient. A 28.0% adjustment to mains Net Capex and a 1.0% adjustment to services Net Capex has been applied in the analysis process.

A3.7 PROCUREMENT – FC EPC ARRANGEMENTS

Separation of connections activities had a direct impact on FC's competitively tendered EPC arrangements and their ability to obtain the best market rates comparable to the rates for this work type prior to separation. Connections work is geographically spread, low volume and is driven by Standards of Service performance. These factors combine to inhibit operational flexibility in terms of forward planning and work scheduling, and hence reduce efficiency. It is to be expected that a premium will have to be paid in order to attract contractors to this work, particularly in periods when contractors are in demand to meet generally high workloads in other gas and utilities activities which would be more profitable.

FC's EPC rates are routinely reviewed yearly in July to take into account general issues, e.g. industry price rises as indicated by Baxter indices and other impacts on the cost of connections activities. Routine indexation is not incorporated into contract terms and conditions but is used as a benchmark in these review negotiations. Additional reviews may be triggered by specific changes in circumstances not foreseen at the routine review.

The cost effectiveness of EPC operations is highly sensitive to work mix, work volume and the demand for competent labour in the utilities contracting market. Any significant and ongoing change in these respects affects profitability and has generated requests for a review of rates to take account of the circumstances and to ensure that continuity of EPC services is not disrupted. The decision by the new owners of the sold networks to take connections activities back 'in house' will address these issues to some degree and should alleviate the upward pressure on costs in due course. In the interim however, the transition is highly disruptive to FC's EPC arrangements as evidenced by rate reviews in July 2005, ranging from [REDACTED] for the networks retained by NGG, triggered by the changed circumstances.

These consequences of the separation of connections activities on the associated EPC rates were not foreseen when the allowances were set and contribute to the increases reflected in unit costs and the overall variances.

We conclude that separation of connections activities and the establishment of 'stand alone' EPC arrangements has had the effect of increasing costs to a degree not anticipated when the allowances were set.

A3.8 FC CLIENT BASE

In 2002 FC established a subsidiary business, Fulcrum Connections Direct (FCD), on a trial basis to undertake connections work for clients other than NGG, substantially independent Gas Transporters. FCD business activities were separated from and not cross-subsidised from NGG connections activities. The trial was eventually abandoned. Costs incurred by FCD in 2002/03 and 2003/04 were £63k and £83k respectively.

FC's only client to date has been NGG with the exception that FC provided services to the new owners of the sold networks between the sale in 2005 and the transfer of these services in-house by the respective network owners.

A3.9 NGG COSTS

NGG evaluates the cost of NGG employees involved in managing the connections process at less than £0.5m p.a. This cost is not capitalised and is not recovered via connections charges.

A3.10 FC RE-STRUCTURING COSTS

NGG has confirmed that all costs associated with restructuring within FC are charged against FC profit and are not passed to NGG in any way. In the year 2002/03, exceptional costs of £11.7m were incurred by FC wholly related to a reorganisation undertaken by the company. These costs were charged against FC profit in that year.

APPENDIX 4 SYSTEM OPERATIONS EXPENDITURE

A4.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to provide information regarding NGG Capex expenditure on System Operation between January 2001 and March 2005. During this period all eight GDNs were in the ownership of what was then Transco. During this period the majority of System Operation Capex expenditure within Transco was associated with the Ulysses Project

This appendix also considers the main elements of the forecast Capex April 2005 to March 2013. During this period the main elements are the replacement of the GTMS and the exit of the SOMSA contract for the sold networks.

A4.2 CONTEXT

This appendix has been written specifically for the purpose of being included as a standard appendix supporting each GDN report. It therefore considers the expenditure across all networks on the Ulysses, GTMS replacement & SOMSA Exit projects. If there are specific points to be made for individual GDNs these points are made in the main body of that Network report in section 7.

As expenditure of the Ulysses project covered both Transmission and Distribution we have liaised with TPA Solutions, the consultants acting on the Transmission Price Control Review. Our conclusions present the views of PB Power and are still subject to review by Ofgem.

A4.3 CAPITALISATION POLICY

All of the GDNs are working on the basis that the full project costs will normally be capitalised into the replacement asset. For System Operation these assets are telemetry outstations, communications and control system. Specific comments which apply to these general capitalisation principles are addressed in the main body of the Network reports.

A4.4 SYSTEM OPERATION CAPEX

The table below gives the total reported expenditure on System Operation Capex for all 8 GDNs.

System Operation (All GDNs) All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	3 year Total	forecast values		
					2005/06	2006/07	5 year Total
Total Actual	5.3	9.8	8.5	23.6	1.2	6.0	30.8
Allowance	5.7	1.0	2.2	8.9	6.4	5.7	21.0
Variance	-0.4	8.8	6.2	14.7	-5.2	0.3	9.8

Table A4 - 1

When reviewing the total reported expenditure on System Operation Capex it can be seen that over the five year period there has been an overspend of £9.8m (43%). This must be viewed in the context that a distribution control system has not been provided by the Ulysses project which was intended under the original project when the allowances were set. The issues impacting this overspend are considered below in relation to the Ulysses project.

A4.5 ULYSSES PROJECT

The Ulysses project was approved in 1999 as a turnkey project to undertake the complete replacement of Transco's System Operation's systems support suite. This included:

- vi) Telemetry Outstations
- vii) Communications Network (for telemetry purposes)
- viii) Control Systems (Both Transmission & Distribution)
- ix) Decision Support Tools
- x) Management Information

The total approved sum for the project was £70.4m, all Capex expenditure.

At the time of the last price review the Ulysses project was experiencing contractual difficulties between Transco and the main supplier [REDACTED] and it was clear in 2001 that the project would not deliver all of the components as originally specified in the approval.

A4.5.1 RE-SANCTION JULY 2001

In July 2001, following a review of the project and the termination of the original supply contract a re-sanction was approved by the Transco Executive Committee.

The key features of this re-sanction were that the project would be split into two main components, the telemetry outstations/ associated communications and the control systems.

The telemetry/communications elements were awarded via a new contract to [REDACTED], whilst the control systems would be delivered by a combination of in-house project management of software development provided by [REDACTED] (offshore development contract).

At this stage the scope of the project remained un-changed although the focus of the control system elements of the project was on the delivery of a replacement control system for Transmission.

The re-sanction approved additional costs of £10m. These revised costs are shown in the table below.

Ulysses Capex Forecast (July 2001) All Figures £m (nominal prices)	2000	2001	2002	2003	Total
[REDACTED] Telemetry	9.4	10.9	8.8	0.0	29.0
Transco Telemetry	0.1	0.8	4.1	0.0	4.9
[REDACTED] non-Telemetry	14.4	1.2	0.0	0.0	15.6
[REDACTED] rebate	0.0	-3.7	-5.3	0.0	-9.0
Control Systems	0.1	1.3	15.3	23.2	40.0
Totals	23.9	10.4	22.8	23.2	80.4

Table A4 - 2

The re-sanction also included a sum of £8.4m for capitalised overheads, which is additional to the sums shown in the table above.

We have not been able to investigate the full details of contractual dispute between Transco and [REDACTED]. However, it must be assumed that a level of inefficiency of expenditure was

associated with the need to cancel the first contract and re-organise the structure/contracts of the project.

A4.5.2 TELEMETRY PROJECT RE-SANCTION MARCH 2003

By March 2003, due to delays from [REDACTED], poor project management and unforeseeable site specific technical issues, the costs for the telemetry elements of Ulysses had increased by £12.4m (excluding overheads) from £39.0m to £51.4m.

It must therefore be assumed that an element of these cost increases should be attributable to inefficient project management. In the re-sanction £5.9m has been attributed to “cost increases”.

A4.5.3 CONTROL SYSTEM RE-SANCTION MAY 2003

In May 2003 it was necessary to obtain approval for a further sum of money in order to complete the control system element of Ulysses. The Re-sanction paper requests an additional £20.9m taking the total to £70.4m.

At this time the plan would still seem to deliver the full scope of the original system control elements which included a GTMS replacement. However, £3.1m cost of work on the Simulator was written off, and this element of the project was de-scoped.

A4.5.4 CONTROL SYSTEM RE-SANCTION JANUARY 2005

This re-sanction reduces the scope of the delivery of the project to only the transmission control system and a reduced scope of the SC95. Although the complication of the network sales process is quoted as a reason for removing the Area GTMS from scope, it is clear the fundamental design of certain elements of the proposed system would not scale without risk to the requirements of a distribution control system. The effect of the re-sanction approval is to reduce the total approved sum to £69.0m (which included an element of £22.7m associated with the abortive work to replace the distribution control system) thus leaving a net Transmission Control System cost of £43.9m(Capex), £1.0m start-up provision for GTMS replacement and £1.4m Opex costs.

A4.5.5 TOTAL PROJECT OUTTURN COSTS

We have had difficulty obtaining a definitive statement from NGG of the total project costs phased between January 2000 and March 2006. Together with TPA solutions we have used the costs outlined in the tables below as the basis for our review.

Ulysses Project Costs All Figures £m 2005/06 Prices		2000	2001	2002 Qtr1	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	Total
Telemetry	Distribution	9.2	10.1	2.6	14.1	8.8	7.2	0.6	0.0	52.5
	Transmission	2.3	3.6	0.7	1.1	1.9	2.9	0.8	0.0	13.3
	Project Total	11.5	13.7	3.2	15.1	10.7	10.1	1.4	0.0	65.8
Control System	Distribution	14.8	3.8	1.9	4.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	25.1
	Transmission	3.1	3.3	1.6	13.9	8.3	11.1	9.3	3.7	54.3
	Project Total	17.9	7.1	3.5	18.0	8.6	11.3	9.4	3.7	79.3
Project Total		29.4	20.8	6.7	33.1	19.3	21.4	10.8	3.7	145.1

Table A4 - 3

A4.5.6 PROJECT INEFFICIENT COSTS

We have analysed the various project approvals and re-sanctions in order to assess the performance of the project. We conclude that the original Ulysses project was not sufficiently well scoped and understood at the outset. This lack of clarity continued into the [REDACTED] contract and this led to significant inefficiency in their early work and contributed to the difficulties in the relationship with [REDACTED]. The delivery of the distribution control system elements were finally removed from scope. The replacement of the telemetry communications infrastructure appears to have been successful.

From the documentation we have reviewed we have formed opinions about elements of inefficient spending which occurred within the project. Our conclusions are tabulated below.

Inefficiency	Commentary	Range £m Nominal Prices
[REDACTED] Assets & Documentation	As part of the agreement with [REDACTED] to terminate the original Ulysses contract NGG effectively agreed to purchase from [REDACTED] a number of hardware items, documentation and licences at a total cost of £6.4m. We have concluded that this purchase did not provide value for money for these items, further we do not believe they have been effectively put to use in delivering the subsequent project.	6.4
[REDACTED] Contract Closure	NGG state in the re-sanction paper of 2001 that there was a further £100,000 cost to obtaining the contract closure agreement.	0.1
Telemetry Outstation Design, Documentation & Approval	The March 2003 re-sanction paper for the telemetry elements of the project states that due to incomplete and inaccurate site survey data a major exercise was required to gather further information from telemetry sites. We believe this exercise was required very quickly and thus these additional costs were incurred at a further premium to a timely and accurate once off gathering of the appropriate data and designs. The paper states that the total cost for this additional work was £2.7m. We have assessed the inefficiency as a range and used the mid value in our conclusions	0.5 – 2.7
Inefficient Project Management	We believe the chain of re-sanctions (4) associated with this project and associated increasing costs demonstrates poor project management. We believe this is largely due to the complex nature of the project which attempted at the outset to be too wide ranging given the large number of aspirational objectives which were not fully scoped and documented prior to the award of contract.	2.5 – 5.0

Table A4 - 4

We note that the whole of the expenditure (£22.4 nominal) by distribution on the iGMS system must be considered inefficient as the project did not deliver a control system for distribution. We also conclude that a proportion (40% - £1.5m nominal) the inefficient project management costs together with a proportion (80% - £1.3m nominal) of the inefficient telemetry are associated with distribution activities. Taking all three elements together makes a total of £25.2m (£27.6 at 2005/06 prices).

In the table below we have documented our conclusions for the project using the mid-range value of our figures where appropriate. All figures in this table have been inflated to 2005/06 prices.

Efficient / Inefficient Ulysses Expenditure	£ m 2005/06 Prices
Distribution – Efficient Expenditure	50.0
Procurement & Installation of Telemetry Outstations & Communications Systems	50.0
Distribution – Inefficient Expenditure	27.6
Terminated work to deliver distribution control system	24.6
Inefficient telemetry design & site preparations, & associated project management	3.0
Total Distribution - Expenditure	77.6
Total NTS –Expenditure	67.5
Total Project Expenditure	145.1

Table A4 - 5

We have no way of accurately apportioning the inefficient expenditure across the years. We have therefore concluded that the most appropriate way is to phase this expenditure in line with project expenditure in each year see table A4-6.

Allocation of Ulysses (Distribution) Inefficient Expenditure £ m 2005/06 Prices	Pre 2001	2001	2002Q1	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	Total
Network									
WW				0.9	0.5	0.4	0.0		1.8
No				0.7	0.4	0.3	0.0		1.4
Sc				0.6	0.3	0.3	0.0		1.2
So				1.1	0.5	0.4	0.0		2.1
EoE				1.2	0.6	0.5	0.1		2.3
Lon				0.6	0.3	0.3	0.1		1.3
NW				0.7	0.4	0.3	0.1		1.4
WM				0.5	0.2	0.2	0.0		1.0
UKD	8.5	4.9	1.6						15.0
Total	8.5	4.9	1.6	6.5	3.2	2.6	0.2		27.6

Table A4 - 6

A4.6 GTMS REPLACEMENT PROJECT

The GTMS replacement project is currently proposed to be a centrally co-ordinated project by NGG on behalf of all GDNs. This proposed project arrangement is covered by a memorandum of understanding between the Network owners and is dependent on the successful tendering of a suitable replacement system acceptable to all parties. Tenders are due back towards the end of June 2006 and these replies together with discussions with the potential suppliers will firm up the nature and cost of the replacement project.

This project is required because the current systems work on obsolete technology with software that was modified to meet the original Transco requirement and has since been modified to meet further requirements. We endorse the view that the system is due for replacement.

The principle currently being adopted given the complex arrangements with the 4 GDN owners is to procure a “like for like” system to match the currently functionality of GTMS using current technology.

Given the previous history of the Ulysses project and other replacement control systems in the former British Gas Corporation/British Gas plc it is clear that such projects can encounter difficulties, particularly when they have to meet the requirements of a number of separate customers.

We believe that the approach of the project to replicating the current functionality will be a good risk management strategy. However, we have concerns that the current collaborative venture whilst potentially minimizing the development costs will certainly increase the project management costs and could increase the delivery risks.

A4.6.1 FORECAST COSTS

The table below shows the total cost forecast for the 8 GDNs for the replacement of the GTMS replacement project. We do not consider the total cost of £16.8m unreasonable for a project of this size. We note that such estimates will be reviewed following the receipt of the tenders currently being prepared by potential contractors.

GTMS Replacement Forecast All Figures £m	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	Total
Opex Ongoing Costs	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	11.0
Opex One Off Costs	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
Capex Costs	1.2	7.6	7.7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.8

Table A4 - 7

A4.7 SOMSA EXIT PROJECT

A4.7.1 FORECAST COSTS

We have not had the opportunity within the timescales of this review to investigate fully the plans for SOMSA exit.

We were concerned that the NGG decision to centralise the distribution control operations in the Midlands may have increased costs and risks when the sold networks exit from the SOMSA agreement. We have therefore requested information from NGG regarding the timing of the decision. Having reviewed the reply, we take issue with some aspects of the information presented. Namely NGG claim that the locations of the previous control rooms were not aligned to the geographic areas associated with the sold networks. We believe this argument is not totally valid as the key skills and knowledge of control room staff could more easily be transferred to cover another geographical area than could new recruits in the market place. On balance, however, we do not believe there is evidence that NGG deliberately took the decision to relocate the control rooms knowing the present likely outcome of the SOMSA exit arrangement. We do believe therefore that NGG took these decisions in good faith and took reasonable steps to attempt to minimise the future costs to the gas consumer.

We are of the opinion that the costs of exiting the managed service agreement with NGG are directly related to the sales process and therefore these costs should be considered unnecessary in relation to the price control review. We have therefore adjusted the forecasts to exclude these SOMSA exit costs.

Table A4 - 8

A4.8 RECONCILIATION OF BPQ AND OTHER SUPPLIED FIGURES

We have attempted to reconcile the Capex figures given in the BPQ with the answers given to various supplementary questions. Table A4-9 attempts to show this reconciliation. However as can be seen we have not made a good match in most years.

System Ops All Figures £m Nominal prices	2001	2001 Q1	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13
BPQ Total	?	?	5.3	9.8	8.5	1.2	6.0	22.3	15.6	5.9	2.4	1.5	3.8
Ulysses Telemetry	8.1	9.1	2.3	12.9	8.3	7.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ulysses Control System	13.1	3.4	1.7	3.8	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
GTMS Replacement Project	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	7.6	7.7	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SOMSA Exit	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	13.2	9.2	2.4	0.2	0.2	0.2
Other Systems	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Balance	?	?	-1.3	6.9	0.1	7.2	5.7	-1.3	-6.0	-3.4	-2.1	-1.2	-3.5

Table A4 - 9

APPENDIX 5 IS CAPEX (JAN 2001 – MARCH 2005)

A5.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to provide information regarding NGG expenditure on IS between January 2001 and March 2005. During this period all eight GDNs were in the ownership of what was then Transco. During this period the majority of IS expenditure within Transco was associated with the central development of software applications and infrastructure.

A5.2 CONTEXT

This appendix has been written specifically for the purpose of being included as a standard appendix supporting each GDN report. It therefore considers the expenditure across all networks on IS systems. If there are specific points to be made for individual Networks these points are made in the main body of that Network report in section 7

A5.3 CAPITALISATION POLICY

Following the merger with National Grid, Transco changed its capitalisation policy to capitalise software development costs.

“Following the Merger with National Grid in October 2003, NGG changed its capitalisation policy in respect of software development costs to capitalise all major projects of this type.

Prior to harmonisation of accounting policies of the former National Grid and Transco businesses, it was policy to capitalise the cost of hardware and associated operating software but not the cost of internal application software development or any purchased software licences, which were treated as operating expenditure. The exception to this was any instance where a ‘turnkey’ solution was provided by a third party supplier”.

This change makes the trending of IS expenditure in the period Jan 2001 to Mar 2005 difficult. Figures are reported in this appendix as declared in the BPQ. Where comments can be made on the impact of this change of capitalisation such comments will be made on particular projects concerned.

A5.4 IS EXPENDITURE

The table below gives the total expenditure on IS for all 8 GDNs. It has not been possible to obtain from NGG a full breakdown of the expenditure for 2001 and 2002Q1 into projects charged to Distribution. We have therefore used the full project costs to provide an estimate of this project breakdown. The totals sum to the full value for these periods as declared by NGG.

IS Capex All Figures £m	PB Power Estimates				2004/05 forecast values	Total
	2001	2002 Qtr1	2002/03	2003/04		
Systems Projects	3.3	4.5	8.3	22.2	13.9	52.3
Infrastructure Projects	26.8	4.8	8.1	8.8	9.2	57.7
Balancing Item BPQs to NGG Data	0.0	0.0	2.0	-1.1	3.2	4.1
Totals	30.1	9.3	18.4	29.9	26.3	114.1

Table A5 - 1

A5.4.1 SYSTEMS PROJECTS

The table below gives the IS systems projects expenditure for all 8 GDNs. It has not been possible to obtain from NGG a full breakdown of the expenditure for 2001 and 2002Q1 into projects charged to Distribution. We have therefore used the full project costs to provide an estimate of this project breakdown. The totals sum to the full value for these periods as declared by NGG.

The main item of expenditure in this category is the expenditure on the Quarterback Programme (QB). QB is considered in more detail in section A5.6.

However is worth noting at this stage that QB costs have been reported in both the Opex and Capex regulatory accounts. A total £51.3 million of software development costs for QB was classed as Opex in the regulatory accounts but has been reclassified as Capex for the purposes of the RAV roll forwards tables in the BPQ submission. We have concluded that in outturn prices the project in total spent £76.8m (£81.7m at 2005/06 prices), comprising £51.3m Opex and £25.5m Capex (those figures charged to Distribution at outturn prices). In reviewing the project we have taken the total project costs into account. However, as this additional "Capex" has not been included in the non-operational Capex tables in the BPQ it does not form part of PB Power's adjustments to costs.

Within the time available it has not possible to explore fully the expenditure for the Gemini Project or Transformation Programme.

We have noted, however, that GEMINI costs are not intended to be charged to the Distribution control. NGG state that this is due to the original Transco transaction model and adjustments are required to the RAV roll forward. We recommend that this issue is investigated further.

The table below shows the IS expenditure reported by NGG that has been charged to the Capex regulatory accounts

IS Systems Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	PB Power Estimates				2004/05 forecast values	Total
	2001	2002 Qtr1	2002/03	2003/04		
GEMINI	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.9	7.0	11.8
JIS Upgrade	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8
QB (Capex Only)	2.8	4.5	5.9	14.3	0.0	27.5
PMR	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.4	0.0	2.2
DRS Replacement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5
Total Other less than £500k	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.7	1.1	2.5
MINE	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
Transformation Programme	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	5.0	6.4
Totals	3.3	4.5	8.3	22.2	13.9	52.3

Table A5 - 2

A5.4.2 INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

The table below gives the IS infrastructure projects expenditure for all 8 GDNs. It has not been possible to obtain from NGG a full breakdown of the expenditure for 2001 and 2002Q1 into projects charged to Distribution. We have therefore used the full project costs to provide an estimate of this project breakdown. The totals sum to the full value for these periods as declared by NGG.

We are aware that Ofgem have commissioned a review of National Grid's IT expenditure by Compass. We are of the opinion that this review and its conclusions will provide the best statement of NGG's efficiency for expenditure on infrastructure items. At the time of writing we do not have access to the final report from Compass and therefore have not reached a final position on the efficiency of this area of expenditure.

We do note that during the separation of Transco from the gas supply & servicing businesses in BG plc between 1994 and 1996, Transco put in place new desktop and server installations. The large expenditure to replace this infrastructure during 2001 would appear to reflect a reasonable life for this equipment. We should therefore expect a cycle of replacement costs for this equipment again in the period 2006/08.

IS Infrastructure Capex All figures £m 2005/06 Prices	PB Power Estimates				2004/05 forecast values	Total
	2001	2002 Qtr1	2002/03	2003/04		
Servers	6.9	2.3	2.3	2.4	0.8	14.7
Desktop	10.6	0.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	15.8
Data Centre Storage	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1
Telecoms	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Office Equipment	2.3	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2
Network	0.0	0.0	2.3	2.4	4.0	8.7
Email Upgrades	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7
SAP	1.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
Other	0.0	0.3	2.1	2.4	2.9	7.7
Totals	26.8	4.8	8.1	8.8	9.2	57.7

Table A5 - 3

A5.5 IS PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

A5.5.1 GENERAL SUMMARY

We have formed our views on NGG's project management systems from the following sources.

- xi) The BPQ Submission
- xii) Supplementary Question Replies
- xiii) Presentation to Ofgem/PB Power
- xiv) Compass IS Review

In general NGG has in place robust project management controls primarily based on industry standard PRINCE2 methodology. These general project management principles were in place throughout the period being considered. They had a re-launch in 2003 by a new programme called Delivery Excellence (DE). The use of such controls means that in no way can NGG's IS projects be considered 'out of control'. However we are concerned that after reviewing the documentation provided by NGG, there are elements of the control process which are being followed by rote rather than informed use of the methodology techniques: examples of this are given later in this section.

We have found examples, particularly in QB, that issues have caused a change scope/cost for the project. Whilst the formal documentation has been provided for these changes to the appropriate authorising body, there is such a delay to these being processed that a decision to stop or modify the project becomes impossible because expenditure has continued for months before the formal re-sanction has been obtained.

During the presentation by NGG it was explained that formal post investment appraisals (PIA) are no longer normally carried out. Only in exceptional cases would the authorising body request a PIA. It was explained that any Opex savings would be factored into appropriate department's budget forecasts and the accountable manager would be expected to manage within the new forecasts. We consider this practice unsound in that there is no closure of the cause/effect of productivity improvements as part of the regular review process. We are also concerned that the measurement of the performance of a project is tracked against the last

re-sanction, rather than the original approval. Such practices do not impress on the organisation the need to invest in the preparation of the initial business case. Examples we have been given of the Project Exit Reports do not allay our concerns.

The papers provided by NGG are either sanction papers or exit reports and there is nothing in between. It is difficult to say if projects were managed efficiently, however, conclusion can be drawn that NGG do follow a tried and test methodology but that the application of the methodology and principles could be improved. No actual evidence was provided on how they managed success against the original scope, objectives and deliverables and the only evidence on sanction was that they were going back for more money on a regular basis, this suggests that the scoping at the outset was not well founded, due to a continually changing business environment or inefficient project management.

A5.5.2 PROJECT EXIT REPORT (NEXUS SPECIALIST INFRASTRUCTURE)

The Nexus project scope was to move certain core distribution support activities to a new site in Northampton. Included in these activities is a call centre and associated equipment. We were given the exit report for this project as a sample of the documentation they complete at the end of a project.

We have summarised our views on this document below. However, a general comment is that the bulk of the document is based on documentation prepared earlier in the project and cut/pasted into this document with very little added value.

- i) Project deliverables are listed, and stated delivered to the required quality but there was no evidence of what the quality was and how it was measured and who accepted the results.
- ii) Milestone Acceptance Forms used to sign-off milestones contained no view of the expected versus the actual.
- iii) Independent Quality assurance – we would expect to see input from that team.
- iv) Terms of References included the roles and responsibilities of project members but are not considered relevant for this document.
- v) The scoping sections state what had to be done and the and how it was done, but contained nothing about results, i.e. how many people were trained, training material, how it was tested as a success.
- vi) Analysis of team performance is a subjective view, no metrics and no negative comments were present.
- vii) Detailed lessons learnt are statements of what happened, not what went well, what didn't go so well to inform the next set of projects.
- viii) There were no details of any lessons learnt from previous projects and how they were implemented and if they worked.
- ix) Cost benefit analyses only breaks down the cost at the total project level, and that was delivered under a total budget, a further breakdown for cost areas would be required (Capex v Opex performance against the original budget).
- x) Benefits are stated to be being tracked as part of a larger project. However this project has still claimed the benefits with no formal checks that they have been delivered.
- xi) QA commentary is the best part of the document but could go into more detail about the quality reviews and evidence of the different documents used
- xii) Copies of the baseline plan and the end delivered plan should be included in appendices.

- xiii) The exit report doesn't refer back to a sanctioning paper. The only paper we have been provided covers all of project Nexus whereas the exit report cover one element, we find it difficult therefore to fully review the exit report.

The sanctioning paper states a key lesson learnt is that these types of projects go through lots of changes which eventually lead to an overspend of 15% due to the business requested changes against assumptions. The answer has been to add a 15% contingency to the project submission rather than investigating how the project budgeting/scoping processes can be improved.

Overall the majority of the Project Exit Report is a statement of what was required and how the project team went about it, not how the project performed against the baseline with the relevant evidence.

A5.5.3 PROJECT EXIT REPORT (JIS PROJECT)

The JIS project scope was to replace the hardware of the systems which receive and hold the emergency job records prior to the job being closed when the emergency has been "made safe". We were passed the exit report for this project as a further sample of the documentation they complete at the end of a project.

The JIS exit report follows same pattern and most of the comments made above are valid. This suggests that NGG are following a set template for this document and a set process of generating this documentation with very little attention to the purpose or benefit.

A5.6 QB (PROGRAMME)

QB is a software application suite which manages the issue and return of work between the office and the field. The project has a number of benefits;

- i) Passing accurate and up to date information to the field
- ii) Managing the work and field teams effectively
- iii) Capturing work records at source, saving clerical effort improving accuracy and reducing the time taken for updates to return

We support the general principles which the project aims to address and believe that a well structured and efficient project of this nature can increase the efficiency of the organisation and provide enhanced service to customers. We have not been given an exit report or PIA for this project and therefore cannot comment on the final outcome. However the analysis given below will show that we believe the project may well not have been completely efficient and not all of the benefits may yet have been realised.

QB analysis is made difficult because whilst QB is really a programme of projects, the reporting has been summarised at the programme level. We have not been given split expenditure statements for the individual projects within the programme.

The following statement was provided by NGG in their BPQ submission.

“The software development costs associated with QB field system incurred early in the current price control period were not charged to Capex in the regulatory accounts. However, as this expenditure lead to creation of an asset that facilitates a core regulated service and was a direct substitute for the replacement Private Mobile Radio (PMR) system for which £68m was included in the Final Proposals Capex allowances, this expenditure has been included in our RAV roll forward calculation in the BPQ. The table below quantifies the differences between the regulatory accounts and BPQ RAV roll-forward tables A7.1 and A7.2. (positive values indicate higher values in BPQ RAV tables).”

As Stated by NGG All Figures £m Nominal	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05 forecast values	Total
QB field system	14.3	23.8	13.2	57.7

Table A5 - 4

We understand that the above costs relate to Opex expenditure incurred on QB which NGG now wish to capitalise. We cannot support the statement by NGG

“QB is a direct substitute for the replacement Private Mobile Radio (PMR) system.”

The mobile radio system replacement project essentially provided the communication path for both voice and data transmission between the office and the field. This communication path would be privately provided and would be independent of normal public mobile communications systems. QB is essentially an IS system project which provides systems support to field based staff. In order to work, QB system uses public mobile communications services to pass data between the office and the field. Voice communications are provided again by public services.

A key aspect of a PMR system is the separation from public telephone services. The importance of this separation is that at times of major incident public telephone services can become congested or suspended. At such times it is essential that emergency gas staffs are able to effectively communicate as they may have a part to play in dealing with the incident. NGG have provided a management paper which outlines its decision not to proceed with a scheme independent of the public systems. This paper states that the government has put in place a new national system to provide the emergency services (fire, police, ambulance) with an emergency mobile communications system (Airwave) based on a new form of PMR technology. The government also, after representations were made, allowed certain non emergency organisations to make use of the Airwave system. Transco made a case to government setting out the special needs of the gas emergency service and obtained government approval for Transco to use the Airwave system.

The management paper does not set out the reasons why it was important for the gas emergency service to have access to the Airwave system or the implications of not having such access. It merely states that commercial difficulties prevented Transco reaching agreement with Airwave and that experiences using the public services were good. The management forum or date of such forum receiving the executive report is not known.

The following extract from the 7 July 2005 Report from the London Assembly is a timely reminder of the importance of independent mobile communications.

“It ought to have been predictable that in the event of a major incident in London, mobile telephone networks would become congested and it would become difficult to make or receive telephone calls. It happens every year on New Year’s Eve. It happened on a larger scale after the 11 September attacks in New York. London’s emergency services nevertheless relied to varying extents on mobile phones to communicate internally among their senior officers. This led to some major communications problems on 7 July.”

A5.7 QB (NETWORKS)

QB (Networks) is aimed at distribution teams carrying out both planned and unplanned (emergency) work. The scope of the project includes job details and plans timesheets and work records.

A5.7.1 ORIGINAL APPROVAL JULY 2002

We have not been provided with the original approval and cannot therefore confirm the scope of this approval. We do know from subsequent approvals that the original approved sum was £20.4m. We note from the additional information that by March 2002 (4 months prior to the project approval) £6.7m had already been charged to the Capex account for this project.

Original Case All Figures £m Nominal		One Off Costs
Consultancy		3.9
Contractors		3.0
Transco Business		1.9
Transco IS		1.1
IS Non Specific (including Managed Services)		1.2
Overheads		1.5
Licences		4.6
Capex		3.4
Total One-off Costs		20.6

Table A5 - 5

Whilst the title of this project is “Project QB” we believe that the project scope/costs only relate to the implementation of the systems to support the network distribution teams. Later in the project lifecycle this element of QB is annotated ‘QB (Networks)’.

A5.7.2 RE-SANCTION JANUARY 2003

Although the Lattice Executive Committee approved the original request in July 2002, Transco Executive approved a change of scope to the revised strategic solution in August and September 2002. This revised scope was due to the tactical solution not proving workable. This followed a trial of field systems carried out in July (the same month at the main approval). The trial proved the basic concept, although it didn’t meet wider business strategic requirements. At the same time, consultants (PwC Consulting) concluded that the tactical solution wouldn’t work, so a move to the strategic option was required.

Whilst the Transco Executive (we haven’t been provided with the approval paper) approved a change of scope in August/September 2002 this re-sanction paper was not formally approved until January 2003, therefore project expenditure was continuing from August until January

on the basis of the revised scope, making it far more difficult for the Executive to cancel the project as more expenditure had been committed. It can only be assumed that Executive approval was almost a process step rather than the true decision making step.

At the time of the January paper it was claimed that to stop project would cost £17.6m. The paper makes no mention of the costs incurred in 2001 (£2.8m) and states that the project will spend £2m Capex in 2002 whereas the NGG information is that £4.5m was spent in 2002Q1. Given that the System design would still not be finalised until March 2003 and the first implementation would not start until August 2003 it is our opinion that these levels of expenditure are above the levels of an efficient project.

The revised costs are shown in Table A5 - 6. These show that the total costs have risen to £38m although revised benefit forecasts claim that conservative estimates will deliver an increased NPV of £20.2m.

The strategic impact refers to UMS, Network Services and EMS but doesn't then follow through in costs and benefits. The costs do not include the above and it states they would be subject to separate paper.

The options presented in the paper are not considered to give the Executive a real option

- i) Continue with the increased costs and benefits
- ii) Cancel/ write-off £17.6m
- iii) De-scope - wouldn't reduce costs, lose benefits – not costed

Benefits were to be tracked by putting them into performance contracts. No benefits tracking of loss of FTEs or the benefits was delivered as part of the business improvements.

Original Case All Figures £m Nominal	Original One Off Costs	
	Original One Off Costs	Revised One Off Costs
Consultancy	3.9	5.7
Contractors	3.0	7.3
Transco Business	1.9	1.2
Transco IS	1.1	1.9
IS Non Specific (including Managed Services)	1.2	3.6
Overheads	1.5	3.3
Licences	4.6	6.9
Further Provision (Opex)		0.5
Capex	3.4	7.5
Further Provision (Capex)		0.2
Total One-off Costs	20.6	38.0

Table A5 - 6

A5.7.3 RE-SANCTION APRIL 2004

We note that yet again the main elements of this re-sanction have been presented to DISSG 6 months before the formal re-sanctioning paper has been presented for approval.

This submission asks for an extra £1.9m and to extend the delivery from January to August 2004 and notes that the delivery of the revised maps software would follow after the delivery of the last software release planned in August 2004. This additional maps software would be delivered as a separate IS project in September. It is not clear if this maps software has been implemented. This suggests that planning was not carried out using forward planning and that dependency on other parts of the business and suppliers were not built into the planning process.

Much of the text of the paper is written in the future tense but should be in the past. The paper talks about having a planned end date of November 2003 when the paper was presented in April 2004. This suggests the text was taken from the paper the DISSG in October 2003 and not put into context. This could mean that most of the money (£1.9m) requested over and above the original sanction would have been spent before approval was given.

A5.7.4 SUMMARY

The project will appear to come in on budget and plan because it was measured against the last sanctioned approved spend and delivery as opposed to the first. Reference was made to original business case but only in terms of being a positive NPV, and doesn't review or say what impact the changes actually have. This is a culture of re-baselining.

Formal decisions to approve a re-sanction based on a change of scope or monies are taken months prior to the paper being submitted to the approval body, by which time it can be assumed that the majority of the request has already been spent and the approval body can only approve the latest paper or stop the projects. Only in extreme circumstances could a close down decision be taken.

Documents provided show that a programme/project methodology is being followed and that all of the documentation is being controlled in a change control framework and has a process for approval; however, the documents provided have some flaws.

A number of re-sanctions together with upward spiralling of costs, suggest that the scope control is weak or the original scoping and design was not sufficient to meet the business requirements or that the business requirements were developing during the project. Whichever the case, the project development cycle seems to be inefficient.

Only two options were put forward as part of the re-sanction, which are either 'do nothing' or 'do the recommended option'. The costs associated with doing nothing are not explained in any of the papers submitted.

A5.8 QB (MARS)

QB (MARS) project is aimed at maintenance staff carrying out both planned and unplanned work. The scope of the project includes job details and work records. The system interfaces with the maintenance records and job scheduling system (MIMS).

A5.8.1 APPROVAL FEBRUARY 2003

The paper was submitted in February 2003 and combines 3 previous papers, although it doesn't say what these papers were or what they requested. References to changes in delivery of scope by combining elements together suggest that not enough effort was employed up front to identify and develop the right strategic solution.

The reasons for scope change are tenuous, and use phrases such as “*delivering an ‘out of the box solution’*” which do not communicate in plain language to the approving body. A fundamental requirement was recognised during the design phase ‘*Scope now includes maps and site drawings (‘redlining’, a critical safety requirement)*’. We are surprised that this fundamental requirement was not identified at a very early stage. There is no mention that a change of HSE or legislative requirement had forced this change in requirement.

(There was a combined implementation approach which reduces costs but was not shown in the financial analysis.)

We would have expected further options to have been offered in order to deliver the business benefits. This would have demonstrated better that the recommended option using the strategic QB solution provided the best value. The only options considered in the paper were based around versions of the same technology or the timing of the implementation, more wide ranging options do not seem to have been considered

The sanctioning committee was asked to approve the full £16.6m against the £13.1m previously approved. We have not been given the original approval.

The lessons learned listed in the re-sanction are a combination of assumptions, statements of intent, and lessons learned. Where the latter have been identified, the paper does not state how these lessons will be incorporated into the project.

A5.8.2 MARS APPROVAL 2

This re-sanction requests approval for an increase £4.5m up to £23.1m.

The reasons for the additional expenditure are:

- i) An FDCS (definition not known) scope for results and reading
- ii) Compliance with Blackwater

We consider that this rework, particularly for the ‘Results and Reading’ functionality may well result from a lack of detailed understanding of the requirements at the project initiation stage which delayed the project and hence caused a review of the scope due to the network sales process.

We believe the correct decision was to continue with the project at this stage as to stop the project at this point would have involved a considerable write-off of the expenditure to date.

The need to go back for more money of which £1.9m is programme management and system integration, suggests that the project was probably not be managed efficiently. We believe that not sufficient thought had been given as to how the systems would need to be integrated.

A5.9 PROJECT INEFFICIENT COSTS

We have analysed the various project approvals and re-sanctions in order to assess the performance of the project. We conclude that the original project spent a considerably sum of money investigating the project, however, this seems to have led to an initial widening of scope rather than producing a clear set of deliverables for early implementation.

From the documentation we have reviewed we have formed opinions about elements of inefficient spending which occurred within the project. Our conclusions are tabulated below.

Additionally we have analysed all of the project approvals we have been given to reconcile with the reported expenditure amount. Our reconciliation leaves £8.3m unaccounted. We can not determine if this is wholly efficient or inefficient. We have therefore recorded this expenditure as being inefficient within the range £0m - £8.3m.

Inefficiency	Commentary	Range £m Nominal Prices
Initial Investigations	We conclude that the expenditure incurred during this period was the initial investigations for the financial approval presented to the Lattice Executive in July 2002. We find the level of this expenditure excessive for this element of work	3.5 – 5.5
QB Networks Preparations/Approval/Design	We are unable to account for the expenditure during this period which seems to be further project definition/approval and a small trial in the West Midlands	4 - 12
QB Mars Design Changes	Increased spending due to changes to the scope and design of the proposed QB MARS system	4 – 6
QB Undefined	We have not been able to reconcile the reported expenditure against the project approval sums provided. We are therefore unable to confirm if this expenditure is efficient or inefficient. We have therefore used a mid-point value for this expenditure	0 - 8.3

Table A5 - 7

In the table below we have documented our conclusions for the project using the mid-range value of our figures where appropriate. All figures in this table have been inflated to 2005/06 prices.

QB Efficient/Inefficient Expenditure (Distribution)	£ m 2005/06 Prices
Efficient Expenditure	58.9
QB Networks	40.0
QB MARS	14.8
QB Undefined	4.1
Inefficient Expenditure	22.8
Total Project Expenditure	81.7

Table A5 - 8

The total QB inefficiency has then been pro-rata applied for the Capex elements to a total of £7.9m. For the period April 2002 to March 2005 these figures have been applied to the GDN reported expenditure as a percentage of there total IS expenditure.

Allocation of QB (Capex) Inefficient Expenditure £ m 2005/06 Prices	2001	2002Q1	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	Total
Network						
EoE			0.2	0.3	0.1	0.6
Lon			0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
NGN			0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4
NW			0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4
Scot			0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
South			0.2	0.3	0.1	0.6
WM			0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
WWU			0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4
UKD	1.7	2.8				4.5
Total	1.7	2.8	0.9	1.7	0.7	7.9

Table A5 - 9

APPENDIX 6 XOSERVE

A6.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to provide information regarding the funding by the GDNs of the xoserve one-off expenditure. The majority of this expenditure is required for changes to the IS systems run by xoserve.

A6.2 CONTEXT

This appendix has been written specifically for the purpose of being included as a standard appendix supporting each GDN report. It therefore considers the expenditure across all networks on the xoserve systems.

The company xoserve provides transactional services, information system (IS) support and change management on behalf of the GDNs and the NTS. The primary recipients of xoserve's services are the Networks' customers, the gas shippers. The core services provided by xoserve are delivered mainly through a suite of integrated information systems collectively known as UK Link.

The shareholders in xoserve are a combination of the gas transporters for which xoserve delivers services. The percentage shareholdings were determined by assigning National Grid Transmission an 11% shareholding and then dividing the remaining shareholding amongst GDNs by reference to the share of the total supply points in each network.

The current holdings are given in the table below.

xoserve Shareholders	Holding
National Grid	56.57%
Scotia Gas Networks	17.02%
Northern Gas Networks	10.38%
Wales & West Utilities	10.03%

Table A6 - 1

A6.3 CAPITALISATION POLICY

xoserve has submitted its own BPQ on the basis that all IS system expenditure is an Opex charge in the year in which the expenditure is incurred.

We note that most of the GDNs who are funding these changes are capitalising the charges. Some GDNs have not returned costs within their BPQs which relate to xoserve. We conclude that these GDNs are treating the expenditure other than Capex.




Figure A6 - 1

We conclude that the gap between the xoserve funding requirement and the assumed total Network contributions relates to the project to refresh the GEMINI technology for which NTS would make a sizable contribution.

We would suggest that there should be a more transparent reporting of the linkage between xoserve's funding requirements and the provisions made in the GDNs Capex forecasts.

A6.6 CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that xoserve's plans for the technical system refreshes are well made and appropriate. We believe the forecasts are still subject to more detailed financial estimation, which may change these initial forecasts. We are not in a position to provide any more accurate assessment of these forecasts.

We believe that xoserve's plans for the rewrite of the UK Link systems and other major industry changes (such as GDN interruptions and NTS exit reform) should have particular attention during the main 5 year control review.

APPENDIX 7 LTS PROJECT REVIEW - COWPEN BEWLEY TO WARDEN LAW PIPELINE

A7.1 SUMMARY OF PROJECT

Construction of 30.3km of 300mm high-pressure steel pipeline between Cowpen Bewley and Warden Law and the upgrading of the Warden Law PRI to reinforce supplies to South Wearside.

This project was selected because the actual costs were 32% higher than the original approved sum.

A7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Having examined the data provided for this project, we can confirm that it was sufficient to determine the appropriateness of the expenditure, thereby permitting a determination of the treatment of costs for the RAV.

The network analysis data provided clearly demonstrated that this reinforcement was required for Winter 2003 to avoid a failure to supply statutory loads in South Wearside.

The project justification paper reviewed alternative solutions and we are content that all reasonable alternatives were included. The solution chosen was the best available.

We have not examined the procurement processes for the major materials. The line pipe was obtained through the Transco Procurement and Logistics processes.

We have examined the procurement processes for the construction works are content that these were appropriate and efficient.

The project was overspent by 32% of the original approval, which we have determined was justified as the causes were unforeseeable and unavoidable.

A7.3 PROJECT REVIEW

A7.3.1 PLANNING AND NETWORK DESIGN

We have reviewed the planning criteria for this project and have concluded that the network analysis data fully supports the need to undertake this project in this year. It is clear that without this project there would have been a failure to supply to South Wearside in peak conditions. Though this was not the lowest cost solution it had the additional benefit of providing additional diurnal storage in the LTS by providing pipeline capacity from the Seal Sands salt cavities at an economic cost.

A7.3.2 PROCUREMENT

i) Materials

We have not examined the procurement processes for the major materials. The line pipe was obtained through Transco Procurement and Logistics.

ii) Contracts

Seven contractors were invited to bid and six submitted prices. The spread of prices was . . . of the lowest cost bid. Following the due process of post-tender clarification and normalising, the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder. In our view this overall process resulted in the correct appointment.

However, the actual costs for the contract work overspent the tendered sum by 29.7%, which is more than would be expected. This overspend was over the original approved sum for this project by £1.6 m. We have examined the reasons for the overspend and we are content they were necessarily incurred. The overspend is directly attributable to difficulty in negotiating wayleaves leading to a compressed construction period.

iii) Contract Management

This project was initially managed by North of England Network and transferred to Network Strategy in February 2002. There is no evidence to deduce that this was not conducted efficiently or caused unnecessary additional costs or delay.

A7.3.3 SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT

On this project the Environmental Statement had identified that SSSIs (with Great Crested Newts) would present a problem and this issue was incorporated into the contract documents and was undertaken efficiently.

A7.3.4 FINANCIAL CONTROLS

All the due planning processes for this project were undertaken correctly. The original proposed project delivery timescale had to be revised due to the Foot and Mouth epidemic in 2001, which delayed access to the land to conduct preparatory surveys and routing. This resulted in the archaeological and geological problems and the extreme extent of landowner resistance not being identified until late in the project process.

To meet the demand forecast it was essential that the project be delivered for winter 2003/04 in order to meet Transco's statutory obligations. The reduced timescale indicated a potential risk to the land acquisition process but was not considered to be insurmountable and the completion date of October 2003 was still the target completion date. The main works contract was amended to "target cost" contract to minimise cost impact.

Obtaining DTi consent to construct the pipeline under the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations was seen as high risk. However a risk mitigation plan was put in place which was successful in meeting the delivery timescale. The resistance of a Land Issues Pressure Group was identified in January 2003 and this severely protracted negotiations resulting in the start being delayed by 8 weeks. However, the pipeline was successfully commissioned in October 2003, on time. In our view this has resulted in a higher price than necessary for the project. The project overspend was identified early and financial approval obtained prior to letting the revised contract. This was justifiable in order to meet the required completion date.

A briefing note was produced for the Distribution Project Sanctioning Committee in August 2003 for this project. In our views the briefing note did properly identify the true causes for the overspend of this project and we agree with the findings that this overspend was justified.

A7.4 CONCLUSION

Taking into account all the above we consider that the only way to have brought the project back to an efficient expenditure level would have been to defer it until 2004. But this would have jeopardised security of supply.

We accept that the factors causing the compression of the construction period and hence the increased costs were unforeseeable and unavoidable and are therefore allowable.

APPENDIX 8 LTS PROJECT REVIEW - WEST HULL REINFORCEMENT

A8.1 SUMMARY OF PROJECT

Pressure uprating of the existing 18" (450mm) pipeline between Ganstead and Wawne from 17 bar to 38 bar, the modification of the existing regulator streams at the NTS Ganstead AGI, the modification of the existing pipework arrangement within the existing Wawne AGI, the construction of a new 38bar to 17 bar pressure reduction installation at the Wawne AGI, the construction of a 42" (1050mm) 38 bar pipeline between Wawne AGI and Elloughton, the construction of a new 38 bar to 7 bar pressure reduction station at Elloughton, the construction of 2.2 km of 12" (300mm) 7 bar outlet at Elloughton and a 7bar to 2 bar governor to feed the existing MP network. This project reinforces supplies to Hull and provides additional LTS diurnal storage.

This project was selected because the actual costs were 30% over the approved sum and it was completed 18 months later than planned in 2002.

A8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Having examined the data provided for this project, we can confirm that it was sufficient to determine the appropriateness of the expenditure, thereby permitting a determination of the treatment of costs for the RAV.

The network analysis data provided clearly demonstrated that this reinforcement was required for 2001 to avoid a failure to supply statutory loads in West Hull in peak winter conditions.

The project justification paper reviewed alternative solutions and we are content that all reasonable alternatives were included. The solution chosen was the best available.

We have not examined the procurement processes for the major materials. The line pipe was obtained through the Transco Procurement and Logistics processes.

We have examined the procurement processes for the construction works and are content that these were appropriate and efficient.

The project was overspent by 30% part of which we have determined was necessary but also inefficient in part, due to a significant welding claim which in our opinion was paid unnecessarily.

A8.3 PROJECT REVIEW

A8.3.1 PLANNING AND NETWORK DESIGN

We have reviewed the planning criteria for this project and have concluded that the network analysis data fully supports the need to undertake this project in this year. It is clear that without this project there would have been a failure to supply statutory loads in peak conditions.

A8.3.2 PROCUREMENT

i) Materials

We have not examined the procurement processes for the major materials. The line pipe was obtained through Transco Procurement and Logistics.

ii) Contracts

Seven contractors were invited to bid and all submitted prices. The spread of prices was [REDACTED]. Following the due process of post-tender clarification and normalising, the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder. In our view this overall process was sound and resulted in the correct appointment.

However, the costs for the contract work overspent the tendered sum by 56% which is far more than would be expected. This overspend was £4.7 m. We have examined the reasons for the overspend and we are content they were necessarily incurred but inefficiently undertaken in part.

iii) Contract Management

This project was managed by in house staff. There is no evidence to deduce that this was not conducted efficiently.

A8.3.3 SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT

On this project the Environmental Impact Analysis failed to identify the issues associated with the crossing of the Dunswell Aquifer and the need for environmental and archaeological support which caused an overspend of £22k. In our view, this issue could have been reasonably foreseen and therefore this represents an inefficient expenditure of £22k, but this was within the approved sum.

A8.3.4 FINANCIAL CONTROLS

All the due processes for this project were undertaken correctly.

A formal Post Investment Appraisal was not carried out for this project. However a report presented to the Head of Network explains that the project was delayed by 18 months because the foot and mouth outbreak occurred between tender invitation and award of the contract. This resulted in an increase in the tendered price of £2.5m. A dispute over the additional costs due to welding difficulties was settled at a senior level of NGT with a payment of £2.2 m, which we deem to have not been fully explained or substantiated.

A8.4 CONCLUSION

Taking into account all the above we consider that the overall project was necessary. However, we are concerned that there was no detailed supporting evidence for the reasoning behind the £2.2million settlement of a [REDACTED] claim for increased costs due to welding difficulties. It was “settled at a senior level of NGT”. In the absence of better information we therefore deem this to have been inefficient expenditure.

APPENDIX 9 REPEX PROJECT REVIEW – FABIAN RD, MIDDLESBOROUGH, CLEVELAND.

A9.1 SUMMARY OF PROJECT

The construction of 3681M of PE pipe ranging in size from 40mm to 315mm, as replacement for 3717M of SI/CI/ST pipe ranging in size from 2" (ST) to 12". The estimated cost assumed the work would be done principally by 'dead' insertion. Additionally, included within the scope of the Project were 28 mains Connections, 220 service relays and 22 service transfers.

The total estimated cost of the Project was £344,235.

A9.2 DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED FOR AUDIT

The following documentation was provided and reviewed for the completion of this audit:

- Response to Supplementary Question No: NGN022

- Network Analysis Report – Mains Replacement

- Email correspondence seeking a variation to proposed sizing for one section of pipe

- Completed Form T002 including Project estimates, estimated costs breakdown, and authorisation signatures.

- Project plans indicating the initial design and the subsequent variation (Version 2)

A9.3 PLANNING AND NETWORK DESIGN

We have not been able to review the planning criteria for the Project, however, we have been told that the seed pipe was identified as 'Dynamic Growth', and the project developed from that in accordance with REP/2.

The proposed pipework design has been supplied, and the Form T002, signed by the Network Planning Manager, indicating that the plans met the planning criteria which applied in March 2004.

We believe that the pipe design has made good use of the opportunities for insertion, thus minimising costs and surface disruption. From the information supplied, it is unclear why some roads within the Project area, were not included, in particular Whitby Road and Hexham Avenue, which are bounded on 3 sides by relayed pipes, and is a similar material, presumably of similar age and risk score as those surrounding it.

A further pipework design was produced in 2005 following the discovery of a 6" pipe where an 8" pipe was expected. See next item.

A9.4 PROJECT COMPLETION

No details were provided regarding a post investment appraisal, or post completion report.

During the work, the existing main running outside Nos: 195-235 Fabian Road was found to be 6" SI, not 8" SI as indicated on plans. An enquiry was made to the Network Analysis section, to ask if the proposed pipe could be downsized from 180mmPE, to 140mmPE to facilitate insertion. It was confirmed to be acceptable, between 195 and 221, with clearly stated decision that it could not be reduced below 180mmPE, between Nos: 221, and 235. A revised plan, version 2, was prepared and has been supplied.

A9.5 CONCLUSION

From the information supplied we can confirm the acceptability of the project planning and design. The project was authorised under the delegated authority of the Head of Network.

The evidence that Field Staff requested guidance from Network Analysis on the possible solutions to the replacement of the 6" main in Fabian Road is indicative of good communications and working relationships between those groups within the NGN.

APPENDIX 10 HSE TARGETS - NGN

A10.1 INTRODUCTION

The rationale is given for the inclusion of each indicator. The acceptability of the response is indicated, or a commentary is added, if it is unacceptable.

A10.2 INDICATORS

i) C18.1 Indicator - Mains Fractures and Corrosion Failures - **Acceptable**

The impact of the replacement programme should result in a reduction of risk to persons and property, from the occurrences of sudden releases of gas caused by mains failures. Thus a reduction of this indicator with time is the desired outcome.

ii) C18.2 Indicator – Gas in Buildings - **Acceptable**

The mains replacement programme should result in a reduction in the recorded instances.

iii) C18.3 Indicator – Public Reported Escapes – **Not acceptable**

The mains replacement programme should remove a number of the potential leakage sources, and thus reduce the number of PREs.

Response - The number of PREs is not shown to be decreasing over the forecast period, and given the modest increase in average system pressures (C18.5), it is surprising that the replacement workload on mains and services is not expected to contribute to a reduction in PREs. The rationale behind this forecast should be reviewed. The forecast level of PREs if over estimated, will have the effect of maintaining OPEX at an unwarranted high level.

iv) C18.4 Indicator – Actioned Repairs – **Not acceptable**

Actioned repairs to mains and services will normally result from attending a PRE, where an uncontrolled escape of gas has been detected. The replacement programme will have negligible impact on `damage` repairs, but the overall figure should reduce as the number of PREs due to `condition` reduces.

Response - The reduction in actioned mains repairs due to condition reflects the reductions in the level of PREs, due to the impact of the mains replacement programme. However, the forecast indicates an expected increase in service repairs of nearly 5%, between 2004/05 and 2012/3. This is surprising since the current rate of replacement of services in association with mains replacement is 26784 per annum, which will remove many potential sources of service leakage. The forecast increase of service leakage will increase OPEX spend on services.

v) C18.5 Indicator – Average System Pressures - **Acceptable**

Leakage is proportional to pressure. Higher pressures result in proportionally increased leakage and a rise in the number of PRE.

vi) C18.6 Indicator– Leakage - **Acceptable**

The awareness has grown, that leakage of gas from pipes, as well as being potentially dangerous and costly, has the potential to harm the environment through the release of methane, a `greenhouse` gas. The replacement programme should reduce leakage.

vii) C18.7 Indicator – Total Risk (from model) – **Not acceptable**

The reduction of risk is the main driver for the replacement programme, and it is important that the overall risk score is forecast to be reducing.

Response - The risk score has only been entered for the year 2005/06, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the forecast diminution or otherwise, of risk, as the replacement programme proceeds.