Use of network capacity prior to compliance with security standards

Alternative access arrangements

ARODG
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Scope

- To provide rights to Users that have a local connection but are awaiting completion of the wider reinforcements needed for the network to be compliant with the security standards
 - i.e. Stage 2 in the ARODG access framework
- Not envisaged to be the basis for enduring rights following completion of the wider system reinforcements



Firmness of rights

Firm right

- Compensation agreed if rights are withdrawn:
 - defined in BCA
- Allocated (usually) once network is compliant
- But <u>limited</u> firm access has been provided e.g.
 STTEC and LDTEC

Non-firm right

- No compensation if rights are withdrawn
- Not defined



A less-firm right does not exist, just different compensation if a firm right is withdrawn

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Implications of a non-firm right

Depends on when right is withdrawn

Prior to gate closure

- Lose opportunity to generate
- Opportunity to re-contract and hence avoid imbalance

After gate closure

- Lose opportunity to generate and exposed to imbalance
- Consequential balancing costs



Availability of spare capacity

Planning Standards

- Assessed against Planning Standards
- Capacity only available on completion of reinforcements

Operational Standards

- Assessed in operational timescales up to a year
 - network topography
 - generation & demand information
- Locational variations
- Temporal variations time of day / year (outages)
- Limited predictability beyond year (c.f. LDTEC is <1yr)



Limited and potentially diminishing

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Existing short-term firm products

	STTEC	LDTEC
Maximum duration of rights	4, 5, or 6 weeks	45 weeks
Notice of firmness	1 or 2 weeks	7 – 45 weeks
Volume provided	Maximum MW	Profiled MW
Long-term rights (>1 year)	None	None
Compensation if withdrawn	Yes	Yes

- Limited duration, capacity and notice of availability
- Allocated on f-c-f-s bases, assuming that:
 - no increase operational costs
 - does not fetter ability to take outages for maintenance / construction



Alternative access arrangements

- Illustrations of ideas to aid discussion
- Significant design issues to be resolved:
 - timescales for allocation / withdrawal of rights
 - allocation methodology
- Funding and incentives
 - illustrations assume cost neutrality



If there is spare capacity...

Scope for alternative STTEC / LDTEC type products

Restrict volume / capacity

- Limit capacity to certain times e.g. off-peak defined notice
- ◆ Limit to agreed volume e.g. x MWh in year → of availability

Restrict price (if need to buy-back)

- Price relates to an agreed volume agreed buyback
 Price relates to capacity
 - if zero compensation, effectively a non-firm right
- Combinations of volume and price could be considered



Illustration 1: Limit Capacity Offered


Access at pre-determined times and/or locations

- For example, limited firm access offered off-peak:
 - Monday to Friday, 19:00 to 07:00
 - Saturday and Sunday
- Defined capacity made available at year ahead / application
 - zonal / nodal / if requested ?
- Allocated to
 - highest bidders in an auction;
 - first come first served; or
 - to parties that have met agreed qualification requirements



Illustration 2: Limited Volume & Price

- Following an application, limited firm access offered on the basis of an accepted volume and buy-back price (£ + MWh)
- x MW cap and y MWh access with pre-agreed buy-back cost and allocated on the basis on lowest cost to SO





When there is no spare capacity...

 Need to consider means by which access rights can be bought from the existing holders. Two classes of model:

Users purchase rights

 Parties make bilateral arrangements to acquire rights from existing holders on short-term basis

GBSO purchases rights

 Parties pay the short-run costs of the GBSO to buy access rights on their behalf (e.g. congestion costs)



Illustration 3: Users purchase rights

Bilateral arrangements between Users

- Short-term trading between two nominated parties
- Exchange rates calculated prior to trade taking place in operational timescales
 - non-trivial
 - generation / demand
 - network topography

Multiple Users share capacity in defined groups

- New and existing generators agree that aggregate generation will not exceed existing capacity
- Exchange rate issues again
- Notifications to GBSO?
- Treatment of overruns?



Illustration 4: GBSO purchases rights

GBSO Risk Trading

- GBSO trades-off the costs associated with releasing additional access with the revenue received from release
- Need to consider:
 - treatment of revenue from additional access
 - development of incentives

GBSO as Agent / Facilitator

- GBSO incurs costs to buy rights from existing parties to provide these to new parties
- Costs passed through to beneficiaries of transferred rights
 - which costs?
 - accuracy of cost capture?
 - how to pass through?



Conclusions

 Alternative access arrangements could facilitate access between provision of a local connection and completion of wider reinforcement

- Short-term rights:
 - if there is spare capacity, alternative products like LDTEC but expect limitations to availability, duration, and notice of availability
 - when there is no spare capacity, access rights will need to be purchased from existing capacity holders

