

# Use of network capacity prior to compliance with security standards

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## *Alternative access arrangements*

ARODG

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# Scope

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- ◆ To provide rights to Users that have a local connection but are awaiting completion of the wider reinforcements needed for the network to be compliant with the security standards  
i.e. Stage 2 in the ARODG access framework
- ◆ Not envisaged to be the basis for enduring rights following completion of the wider system reinforcements

# Firmness of rights

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## Firm right

- ◆ Compensation agreed if rights are withdrawn:
  - ◆ defined in BCA
- ◆ Allocated (usually) once network is compliant
- ◆ But limited firm access has been provided e.g. STTEC and LDTEC

## Non-firm right

- ◆ No compensation if rights are withdrawn
- ◆ Not defined



A **less-firm right** does not exist, just different compensation if a **firm right** is withdrawn

# Implications of a non-firm right

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- ◆ Depends on when right is withdrawn

## **Prior to gate closure**

- ◆ Lose opportunity to generate
- ◆ Opportunity to re-contract and hence avoid imbalance

## **After gate closure**

- ◆ Lose opportunity to generate and exposed to imbalance
- ◆ Consequential balancing costs

# Availability of spare capacity

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## Planning Standards

- ◆ Assessed against Planning Standards
- ◆ Capacity only available on completion of reinforcements

## Operational Standards

- ◆ Assessed in operational timescales up to a year
  - ◆ network topography
  - ◆ generation & demand information
- ◆ Locational variations
- ◆ Temporal variations – time of day / year (outages)
- ◆ Limited predictability beyond year (c.f. LDTEC is <1yr)



Limited and potentially diminishing

**nationalgrid**

# Existing short-term firm products

	STTEC	LDTEC
Maximum duration of rights	4, 5, or 6 weeks	45 weeks
Notice of firmness	1 or 2 weeks	7 – 45 weeks
Volume provided	Maximum MW	Profiled MW
Long-term rights (>1 year)	None	None
Compensation if withdrawn	Yes	Yes

- ◆ Limited duration, capacity and notice of availability
- ◆ Allocated on f-c-f-s bases, assuming that:
  - ◆ no increase operational costs
  - ◆ does not fetter ability to take outages for maintenance / construction

# Alternative access arrangements

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- ◆ Illustrations of ideas to aid discussion
- ◆ Significant design issues to be resolved:
  - ◆ timescales for allocation / withdrawal of rights
  - ◆ allocation methodology
- ◆ Funding and incentives
  - ◆ illustrations assume cost neutrality



# If there is spare capacity...

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- ◆ Scope for alternative STTEC / LDTEC type products

## **Restrict volume / capacity**

- ◆ Limit capacity to certain times e.g. off-peak
  - ◆ Limit to agreed volume e.g. x MWh in year
- } defined notice of availability

## **Restrict price** (if need to buy-back)

- ◆ Price relates to an agreed volume
  - ◆ Price relates to capacity
- } agreed buyback price
- ◆ if zero compensation, effectively a non-firm right
- ◆ Combinations of volume and price could be considered

# Illustration 1: *Limit Capacity Offered*

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## Access at pre-determined times and/or locations

- ◆ For example, limited firm access offered off-peak:
  - ◆ Monday to Friday, 19:00 to 07:00
  - ◆ Saturday and Sunday
- ◆ Defined capacity made available at year ahead / application
  - ◆ zonal / nodal / if requested ?
- ◆ Allocated to
  - ◆ highest bidders in an auction;
  - ◆ first come first served; or
  - ◆ to parties that have met agreed qualification requirements

## Illustration 2: *Limited Volume & Price*

- ◆ Following an application, limited firm access offered on the basis of an accepted volume and buy-back price (£ + MWh)
- ◆ x MW cap and y MWh access with pre-agreed buy-back cost and allocated on the basis on lowest cost to SO



# When there is no spare capacity...

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- ◆ Need to consider means by which access rights can be bought from the existing holders. Two classes of model:

## **Users purchase rights**

- ◆ Parties make bilateral arrangements to acquire rights from existing holders on short-term basis

## **GBSO purchases rights**

- ◆ Parties pay the short-run costs of the GBSO to buy access rights on their behalf (e.g. congestion costs)

# Illustration 3: *Users purchase rights*

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## **Bilateral arrangements between Users**

- ◆ Short-term trading between two nominated parties
- ◆ Exchange rates calculated prior to trade taking place in operational timescales
  - ◆ non-trivial
  - ◆ generation / demand
  - ◆ network topography

## **Multiple Users share capacity in defined groups**

- ◆ New and existing generators agree that aggregate generation will not exceed existing capacity
- ◆ Exchange rate issues again
- ◆ Notifications to GBSO?
- ◆ Treatment of overruns?

# Illustration 4: *GBSO purchases rights*

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## GBSO Risk Trading

- ◆ GBSO trades-off the costs associated with releasing additional access with the revenue received from release
- ◆ Need to consider:
  - ◆ treatment of revenue from additional access
  - ◆ development of incentives

## GBSO as Agent / Facilitator

- ◆ GBSO incurs costs to buy rights from existing parties to provide these to new parties
- ◆ Costs passed through to beneficiaries of transferred rights
  - ◆ which costs?
  - ◆ accuracy of cost capture?
  - ◆ how to pass through?

# Conclusions

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- ◆ Alternative access arrangements could facilitate access between provision of a local connection and completion of wider reinforcement
- ◆ Short-term rights:
  - ◆ **if there is spare capacity**, alternative products like LDTEC but expect limitations to availability, duration, and notice of availability
  - ◆ **when there is no spare capacity**, access rights will need to be purchased from existing capacity holders