

Assessment of the Electricity Distribution Price Control Review Process

March 2005 91/05

Summary

The electricity Distribution Price Control Review (DPCR) involves setting allowed revenues for the fourteen Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) within England, Scotland and Wales. The project to set the new price controls – which will cover the period 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2010 – concluded recently, and has resulted in total revenue allowances for DNOs in excess of £3 billion per year over the five year period.

Ofgem's principle objective is to protect the interests of present and future consumers. Given the magnitude of the monetary sums involved in the DPCR, it is essential that the process for establishing the allowed revenues of DNOs is robust and consistent with this principle duty.

Accordingly, Ofgem is undertaking an assessment of the electricity DPCR process, to determine what lessons might be learnt to inform the process to be followed in future reviews. This document presents a brief overview of the process as conducted in establishing the current DPCR and highlights a number of related issues as identified by interested parties (primarily DNOs). Ofgem would welcome the views of all interested parties on these issues, and would also appreciate any different perspectives on either the issues raised or other issues not considered in this document.

Ofgem intends to hold a public workshop in May 2005 to gain further insight on any issues raised by consultees. This will be followed by a conclusions document in July 2005.

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1. Introduction

Background

- 1.1. Ofgem's principle objective is to protect the interests of consumers (present and future), wherever appropriate by promoting effective competition.
- 1.2. Electricity Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) distribute electricity to consumers through networks of wires and underground cables. DNOs retain an effective monopoly in the core services that they provide to consumers, because it is not possible or appropriate to introduce competition. In these circumstances, Ofgem seeks to protect the interests of consumers through a variety of regulatory tools, such as price controls and standards of performance.
- 1.3. The current electricity Distribution Price Control Review (DPCR), which relates to the period 1 April 2005 – 31 March 2010, has resulted in total revenue allowances for DNOs in excess of £3 billion per year over the five year period. These revenues are recouped from consumers through Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charges levied by DNOs. Given the magnitude of the monetary sums involved in the DPCR, it is essential that the process for establishing the allowed revenues of DNOs is robust and consistent with Ofgem's principle duty.
- 1.4. In light of this, Ofgem considers that it is appropriate to assess the processes that it used during the DPCR, particularly with regards to consultation and decision making. The purpose of this document is to elicit responses from interested parties on how Ofgem conducted the DPCR, with a view to understanding what elements of the review were perceived to have been conducted well, what could be improved and what should be done differently in future reviews.

Structure of this document

- 1.5. The structure of the remainder of this document is as follows:
 - ◆ overview of the DPCR process (Chapter 2) - this Chapter gives a brief account of the various activities undertaken by Ofgem during the course of the review; and

- ◆ issues for consideration (Chapter 3) – this Chapter outlines the key issues against which Ofgem considers the DPCR process should be assessed. This list has been informed by a workshop that was held with DNOs on 10 March 2005. Brief minutes from this workshop are given in Appendix 1.

Responding to this document

- 1.6. Ofgem would like to hear the views of all those with an interest in the development of price controls, including consumers and their representatives, investors and city analysts, environmental groups, generators, suppliers and regulated entities.
- 1.7. Responses to this document should be received by 20 May 2005. They should be sent to :

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- 1.8. Unless marked as confidential, all responses will be published by placing them on the Ofgem website. It would be helpful if responses could be submitted both electronically and in writing. Any questions on this document should be directed to Paul O'Donovan in the first instance.

2. Overview of the DPCR process

Background

2.1. Work on the electricity DPCR began in August 2002, under the remit of the network monopoly price controls project¹. One of the main objectives of this project was "...to identify the objectives, processes, key issues and principles that will be used in setting the price controls". Subsequently, the Initial conclusions document² set out the main objectives of the review as being to:

- ◆ provide appropriate incentives to DNOs to develop and operate their networks in an economic, efficient and co-ordinated manner;
- ◆ provide clear and consistent incentives to DNOs to help ensure they provide an appropriate quality of service to consumers – including incentives for timely and efficient investment in the network;
- ◆ seek to ensure that the DNOs can finance their licensed activities commensurate with an efficient level of expenditure;
- ◆ provide DNOs with appropriate incentives to connect and utilise distributed generation;
- ◆ provide appropriate incentives to help to ensure that longer term security of supply is maintained;
- ◆ reflect Ofgem's responsibilities with regard to environmental and social issues; and
- ◆ ensure that competition is promoted in the provision of supply, connection and metering services and in generation.

2.2. That project also identified the following process related objectives:

¹ Developing network monopoly price controls – Initial consultation, August 2002, Ofgem ref 51/02

² Developing network monopoly price controls – Initial conclusions, June 2003, Ofgem ref 54/03
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- ◆ where possible Ofgem should try to resolve key policy issues at an early stage so that regulated companies have more certainty about the price control; and
- ◆ Ofgem should ensure that the consultation process is open and transparent and that all interested parties have an opportunity to contribute to the review process.

2.3. Finally, the key issues for the price control were determined to be:

- ◆ developing the regulatory framework to deal with the increased levels of distributed generation;
- ◆ the design of an appropriate overall incentive framework for the DNOs; and
- ◆ dealing with uncertainty.

2.4. The treatment of pension costs was also singled out as an area of significant interest.

Timeline of DPCR activities

2.5. The first formal consultation document on the DPCR was issued in July 2003. Final Proposals were issued in November 2004. In all, Ofgem issued seven main documents during this 17 month period, along with many appendices to these documents and several detailed information requests. A consultation on the licence modifications necessary to bring effect to the Final Proposals was issued in February 2005.

2.6. Ofgem had a number of ongoing joint working groups with DNOs throughout the process, and it held two public workshops in order to elicit as wide an input as possible to the process. In addition, Ofgem staff and members of the Authority held meetings with various interest groups and the DNOs at key stages in the process.

2.7. A timeline of the key activities and related publications for the DPCR is given in Appendix 2. The following sections summarise the activities conducted during the DPCR, categorised by workstream.

Developing network monopoly price controls

- 2.8. This project effectively began with a workshop in May 2002, where representatives from a number of regulated transmission and distribution companies met with Ofgem to discuss the key issues regarding the regulation of monopoly providers of services. Following an initial consultation in August 2002, a workshop was held in February 2003 and an update paper published³. In March 2003, two reports commissioned from Frontier Economics were published⁴, as was an open letter setting out the timetable for the DPCR. The project's Initial conclusions document set out the objectives for the DPCR and identified the key issues that still required resolution during the DPCR.
- 2.9. This project also initiated a number of the Ofgem – DNO joint working groups which continued throughout the life of the DPCR.

Policy development

- 2.10. There was a significant overlap between the work on developing network monopoly price controls and policy development for the DPCR. The main forum for discussion of policy development was the Incentives Working Group, which was a joint Ofgem/DNO working group established during the earlier project.
- 2.11. Ofgem committed to resolving policy on issues as early as possible, so that dependent areas of work would not be delayed. It published a Policy paper in March 2004⁵ which laid out policy on a number of issues, though detailed implementation some issues continued to be refined up to the Final Proposals being issued.

Quality of service

- 2.12. Quality of service (QoS) activities followed on from the Information and Incentives Project (IIP), which established robust data and survey methodologies for the comparative assessment of the quality of service being experienced by

³ Developing network monopoly price controls – Update document, February 2003, Ofgem ref 05/03

⁴ "Regulatory mechanisms for dealing with uncertainty" and "Balancing incentives", March 2003, Frontier Economics Limited

consumers. Ofgem commissioned two surveys which assessed consumers' willingness to pay for QoS improvements. This data contributed to the incentives for QoS in the Final Proposals. As with the policy development, much of the work was discussed in joint Ofgem/DNO working groups.

Metering

- 2.13. The metering price control was originally progressed with its own initial consultation document⁶, but subsequently work was integrated within the main price control documentation. Initial proposals for Meter Asset Provision (MAP) were published as part of the overall DPCR Initial Proposals, while initial proposals for Meter Operation service (MOp) were released in the September 2004 Update document. Final Proposals for both MAP and MOp were contained in the DPCR Final Proposals document.

Distributed generation

- 2.14. Ofgem issued an open letter to DNOs regarding Distributed Generation (DG) in January 2003, which set out Ofgem's approach to the issues involved. This was followed by a DG business plan questionnaire in June 2003 and a discussion paper on the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) and Registered power Zones (RPZs). Concurrently, Ofgem commissioned Mott MacDonald/British Power International (Mott/BPI) to assess the submissions of DNOs regarding forecast costs and uptake of DG. The incentives mechanism for DG was finalised in March 2004 and published along with the impact assessment for IFI/RPZs and Mott/BPI's concluding report.

Cost assessment

- 2.15. Cost assessment work began with the formation of a joint Ofgem/DNO working group in April 2003. Ofgem issued a historic business plan questionnaire information request in June 2003, followed by a forecast business plan questionnaire in October 2003. In both cases, drafts of the questionnaires were subject to consultation and discussion with the DNOs. Ofgem staff visited the

⁵ Electricity Distribution Price Control Review – Policy document, March 2004, Ofgem reference 62/04

⁶ Electricity distribution price control review – metering issues: Initial consultation, July 2003, Ofgem ref 67/03

DNOs to gain further insights and clarification of their business cost structures during the latter part of 2003 and again in the early part of 2004.

- 2.16. Ofgem also employed consultants to inform work on benchmarking and productivity analysis (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd.), cost efficiency and tax (Ernst & Young), pensions (Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche) and capex modelling/assessment (PB Power). Ofgem engaged a senior business advisor (Duncan Whyte) to advise across the cost assessment work.
- 2.17. As with other work streams, there were a range of monthly working group meetings between the April 2003 – September 2004 period, which were used to discuss issues arising with DNOs and keep them informed of Ofgem’s analysis on both opex and capex.

Financial issues

- 2.18. Ofgem outlined its guiding principles for dealing with the issue of pension deficits in June 2003. Many of the other financial issues (eg, network rates, cost of capital and the release of the financial model) could only be determined late in the process due to the nature of the information involved and their reliance on other related issues. However, DNOs were kept informed of Ofgem’s position on key issues through the cost assessment working group and ad hoc meetings on specific financial issues.

Licence modifications

- 2.19. Following publication of the Initial Proposals, Ofgem convened a joint Ofgem/DNO working group to discuss the necessary modifications to the licences to bring into effect the content of those Proposals. The group met on a regular basis until February 2005, when the Section 11 and 11A notices were issued. There were public consultations on the draft licence conditions in June and December 2004 in order to obtain input from other interested parties.

Structure of charges

- 2.20. Although this work was not formally part of the DPCR, Ofgem progressed it concurrently and within the same reporting line so that inter-related issues could be addressed in a consistent manner.

Miscellaneous

- 2.21. Ofgem held two public workshops during the review; one in November 2003 and the other in April 2004. Both of these attracted a large number of participants other than DNOs, such as city analysts and consumer representatives.
- 2.22. On the day of publication of each of the Proposals papers (in June, September and November 2004), Ofgem conducted conference call presentations for financial analysts.
- 2.23. Throughout the process, Ofgem staff met with interest groups to consider their representations. In addition, a committee comprised of Authority members held bilateral meetings with senior management teams from each of the DNOs on three separate occasions, so that those companies would have the opportunity to voice their concerns and issues directly to the decision-making body of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority.

Outstanding issues

- 2.24. There are a number of issues being considered outside of the DPCR, but which have arisen as a direct consequence of the DPCR. The main one is cost reporting – Ofgem and DNOs are currently involved in determining the format of a Regulatory Reporting Pack, which will collect cost information on a consistent basis each year to allow regular publication of cost data and the Regulatory Asset Value. In addition, Ofgem is working on a range of other issues relating to the implementation of DPCR4 (eg, information provision to customers suffering power cuts as a result of major storms, other aspects of quality of service) or future costs (eg, network resilience, expenditure on fluid filled cables, etc.). Further, Ofgem and Ofwat are each leading projects considering financial issues relating to price controls in general, following on from the HMT/DTI publication, “The drivers and public policy consequences of increased gearing” (October 2004).

3. Issues for consideration

- 3.1. Chapter 2 presented a brief overview of the activities conducted during the DPCR, categorised by workstream. This Chapter lists a number of issues that need to be considered for assessing the processes used during the DPCR; these can be considered against the overall control, but also against the individual workstreams as appropriate.
- 3.2. The objectives of this Chapter are to highlight key issues against which the processes should be assessed and to elicit responses from interested parties with respect to these issues. In order to maximise the benefit for all parties, it would be best if respondents could be as specific as possible when quoting examples on any of these issues.

General principles and objectives

- 3.3. The project on developing network monopoly price controls noted that the Better Regulation Task Force had laid out principles for better regulation and its enforcement⁷, and endeavoured to follow these when establishing suitable objectives for the DPCR.
- 3.4. The project on monopoly price controls also set out objectives for the review. Ofgem would welcome views on whether:
- ◆ the objectives of the review (see paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2) were appropriate;
 - ◆ Ofgem's processes facilitated the effective delivery of these objectives (or if not, why not); and
 - ◆ the manner in which Ofgem attempted to achieve these objectives conformed to the principles of good regulation.
- 3.5. It is not the intention of this assessment to identify whether the policies in the Final Proposals were appropriate; this will only be possible to assess as the

⁷ Regulation and its enforcement should be proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted. More detail can be found at: www.brtf.gov.uk
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review period progresses. The focus of this assessment is on the processes followed in conducting the review.

General issues

- 3.6. There are a number of general process issues against which the review must be assessed; these are expanded on in the following sections. Ofgem welcomes views on any or all of these points.

Communication

- 3.7. How effective were the channels and methods of communication? Were the appropriate individuals with responsibility for work areas within Ofgem clearly identified to interested parties? Was Ofgem open and receptive to comment and criticism during the DPCR? Did stakeholders have access to the appropriate levels of seniority within Ofgem to resolve issues as they arose?

Workshops

- 3.8. Ofgem held a number of workshops during the process (2 x Network monopoly price controls, 2 x structure of charges, 2 x DPCR, 1 x distribution losses). Did participants find these useful? Were there too many/too few? Were they held at appropriate stages of the process?

DNO/Ofgem Working Groups

- 3.9. Did groups meet at an appropriate frequency? Did participants get the opportunity to put forward their views in an open and constructive manner, and did Ofgem give these views appropriate consideration? Was Ofgem represented at an appropriate level of seniority during these meetings? Did these groups produce meaningful outcomes, or were they generally unproductive?

Preparatory work

- 3.10. Was the planning work (conducted primarily by the Network monopoly price control project) useful? Did it target the areas of greatest importance for the DPCR? Did it give adequate consideration to the potential for radical change

from previous price controls? Was the focus on complexity, simplicity or pragmatism?

Use of consultants

- 3.11. Were consultants used in an appropriate manner by Ofgem throughout the DPCR? Was the output from Ofgem's consultants perceived to be fair and unbiased? Should Ofgem be doing more or less of the work in-house?

Consultation process

- 3.12. Was the overall consultation process too lengthy, about right or too short? Did Ofgem produce the right amount of material so that interested parties could understand the DPCR? Were there too many/too few consultation documents? Were the response periods for these documents sufficient? Was there evidence that respondents' views were considered? Did the Ofgem documents give a fair and balanced account when respondents had contrary or conflicting views?

Requests for, and use of, information

- 3.13. Were Ofgem's requests for information appropriate and proportionate? Was the consultation on draft information requests useful? Did Ofgem give appropriate explanation and justification for all information requests? Did regulatees have sufficient time to meet Ofgem's information requests?

Timeline

- 3.14. Was the publication of the timetable as early as March 2003 useful? Were the timelines for the various work streams appropriate? Was it appropriate to schedule the Final Proposals for November 2004? Was it appropriate to issue an update in September 2004, in between the Initial and Final Proposals? Which issues were addressed to soon/too late in the process?

Regulatory consistency

- 3.15. Was the content of Ofgem's Final Proposals consistent with the views it expressed throughout the DPCR? Were there inconsistencies between the

previous DPCR and the manner in which analysis was conducted during this DPCR?

Transparency

- 3.16. Were the processes and analyses conducted by Ofgem and its consultants sufficiently transparent? Was the underlying data provided by DNOs sufficiently transparent?

Access to Ofgem & the Authority

- 3.17. During the DPCR, both Ofgem and Authority members met with various interested parties (environmental groups, consumer and union representatives, financial analysts and DNOs). Did groups encounter reluctance on Ofgem's part to arranging meetings? Was Ofgem properly represented at such meetings? Were Authority members willing to engage at appropriate stages of the process? Were these meetings productive?

Further work

- 3.18. There are ongoing work streams that have arisen as a result of the DPCR, eg, cost reporting, resilience and financeability. Are the links between these work streams and the DPCR clearly defined? Are such work streams an appropriate means of dealing with the outstanding issues?

Overview of process

Process delivery

- 3.19. Did the process work? Did it effectively deliver a price control in a cost efficient manner? Did Ofgem deploy sufficient resource, too much or too little and at the right time in the process? Were Ofgem teams comprised of the correct range of competencies to deliver an effective price control?

Positive points

- 3.20. What parts of the process worked well? Which elements added the most value to the process? What aspects should be retained for future reviews?

Potential improvements

- 3.21. Were there any flaws in the process? How could the overall process be improved? What were the biggest problems? What change should be made to the process to avoid a repetition of these problems?

Other issues

- 3.22. What issues have been omitted from the above lists? Are there any other observations or comments that should be made regarding the DPCR? Are there other issues Ofgem should be addressing in 2005 and 2006 as early preparation for DPCR5?

Appendix 1 Minutes of DPCR workshop held on 10 March 2005

Summary of discussion points raised in Review of Distribution Price Control Review 4 (DPCR4) workshop, held at Ofgem (9 Millbank) on 10 March 2005

Following a brief introduction to the purpose of the workshop and a general overview of the process followed, Ofgem invited general comments on the process. The following points were raised by Distribution Network Operators (DNOs):

- There was general agreement that the DPCR4 processes had been more transparent than those of the previous DPCRs.
- The comparatively early start was good, but some DNOs considered that full advantage wasn't taken of this, perhaps partly due to staff changes within Ofgem. It was noted that while it was good that Ofgem kept to its publication timetable, some publications seemed to be issued solely for the sake of meeting timetable commitments, rather than bringing new developments to the debate.
- DNOs were happy with the level of access to Ofgem staff at all levels. The meetings with the Authority committee were a welcome development, but the 'rules for engagement' needed to be further developed; DNOs would have welcomed post-meeting feedback from the committee itself.
- The DNO/Ofgem working groups (WGs) were considered to be worthwhile, especially when they were used as a sounding board for Ofgem to develop policy. However, some early work on policy development seemed to be overlooked, and DNOs were not certain as to whether papers submitted by them were given the same consideration as formal responses. The degree of linkage between related WGs was not as good as it should have been, partly due to a lack of proper minutes for many of the meetings.
- Some felt that Ofgem started data collection too early in the process. DNOs believed that it would have been better to spend more time early on resolving methodology issues, so that the correct data could have been specified for collection. Others considered that the flexibility to firm up on a methodology in the light of the facts was beneficial, but the initial data collection exercise was too onerous on this occasion. Some participants questioned the proportion of data collected by Ofgem that had been used in the final determinations.
- There was general support for using more of Ofgem's internal resource for cost analysis work, rather than using consultants. There should have been a greater integration of the work of the various consultants (eg, Distributed generation and capex consultants), and Ofgem's technical directorate should have had a greater input on the capex work.
- Ofgem's approach to progressively removing the uncertainty of the final outcome, so that there were no big surprises, was welcomed. However, several major items were left until quite late in the process (RAV, cost of capital), and this had been a source of frustration for DNOs.
- There were mixed views as to the value of Impact Assessments (IAs). Those that considered them to be useful agreed that to maximise their benefits, IAs should be used from the start of the DPCR to demonstrate policy development, rather than being for ex-post justification.

The workshop then considered issues of particular relevance to each work stream.

Policy

- It was suggested that the emphasis on specific policy areas changed following the changes in Ofgem management, so that much of the early policy work (balancing incentives, uncertainty) was left aside until late in the overall process.
- DNOs felt that although Ofgem issued its policy paper on time in March 2004, many of the more complex and contentious issues were left open. They believed that the work could have been spread more evenly and the details of implementation for many policies could have been resolved sooner.
- The issue of insufficient linkages between WGs was raised again; it was suggested that there should be an overarching group, attended by DNO regulation managers and Ofgem management, to consolidate the work of the individual WGs in one forum. This could also be used by Ofgem as a sounding board for policy development.

Quality of service (QoS)

- Participants agreed that the QoS WG was important and productive, but it should have been better integrated with the costs and incentives WGs.
- Most DNOs considered that Ofgem could have been more transparent in how it used the customer survey work in deriving quality-related cost allowances. Most agreed that the survey could be developed to produce more robust data for the next DPCR.

Distributed generation, IFI & RPZs

- There was positive support for Ofgem's stance towards encouraging innovative solutions to the development of networks and the connection of distributed generation. However, some DNOs commented that in developing the detail of the IFI and RPZ, Ofgem had acted too cautiously.
- The DG incentive was also well supported, but it was commented that the final outcome had become unnecessarily complex.
- DNOs considered that the remit of the consultants engaged by Ofgem was unclear, and DNO technical staff were unable to engage Ofgem in the necessary debate on the long-term development of the network; this detracted from the process.

Cost assessment – Opex

- DNOs reiterated their view that it was preferable if Ofgem used in-house resource to conduct this work; however, if consultants were to be used, they should be engaged far earlier in the process, so that they have input in the data definition and collection exercises. Many of the early data submissions had to be reconsidered because the data requirements had been incorrectly specified by Ofgem.
- A number of participants considered that the assessment of risk will be the next major challenge to be considered in DPCRs, as this has an important relationship with cost and quality. The Ofgem Asset Management Survey could be used to inform this assessment.
- The methodology for future cost assessment needs to be considered before the next DPCR begins, so that it is consistent with the Regulatory Reporting Pack exercise. Opinion was divided as to whether the stance adopted by OFWAT (detailed cost modelling) would be appropriate or even possible in the electricity environment.

Cost assessment – Capex

- Once more, Ofgem was urged to consider developing its in-house expertise more, rather than use consultants. It was considered that this would lead to more transparency in the determination of capex allowances.

- DNOs would value a greater link between the opex and capex work, and a review of the modelling methods was proposed.

Financial issues

- There was support for the process whereby Ofgem's position regarding pensions and rates was clarified early, thereby leaving only a small value at risk prior to the Final proposals.
- The process for determining taxation was criticised for not resolving the issue until a very late stage, as was the process for determining the RAV.
- DNOs appreciated being involved in the development of the financial model, but would have benefited from the model being released concurrent with the Initial Proposals, as its delayed release hindered their understanding of the full effects of Ofgem's proposals.
- One attendee suggested that Ofgem should consult early on in the next process as to how DNOs with problematic financial ratios would be dealt with, as consultation on this issue for DPCR4 was deemed to be insufficient.

Metering

- This was an area where there had been many process difficulties: DNOs felt there had been a lack of senior management involvement within Ofgem, there had been a number of changes in key staff and the issue suffered from being separate from the main price control section. The outcome could have been seriously flawed but for the efforts of the Ofgem staff at working level and the close co-operation of the DNOs.
- Although it was acknowledged as a 'one-off' activity, Ofgem was urged to consider whether there would be any read-across to the forthcoming transmission price controls, so that similar process deficiencies could be prevented.

Licence modifications

- DNOs generally welcomed the early recognition of the workload that the licence modifications entailed and the amount of resource devoted by Ofgem. This should be replicated in the next review.
- DNOs raised the issue that they considered there were deficiencies in Ofgem's quality control processes with respect to the legal drafting of licence modifications.
- One attendee considered that the process was hampered by the amount of policy discussion that took place, which took a significant amount of time within the WG.

Other points of note

- The review of the DPCR processes was welcomed. It was hoped that it could inform the forthcoming transmission price control reviews, and that these in turn could further inform the processes for DPCR5.
- It is important for any DPCR to avoid having to solve the problems of the previous DPCR and retain the corporate knowledge gained from DPCR4. Processes, policies and their rationale should be documented before the DPCR4 teams break-up so that DPCR5 starts from an informed position.
- One DNO suggested that an annual determination of the RAV would be a major step forward in reducing the uncertainty in DPCR5
- Another DNO stated that Ofgem could consider having a rolling program of price control determinations with a few DNOs each year, rather than having to do a control for all fourteen DNOs concurrently.
- It is becoming increasingly more difficult for other stakeholders to become involved in the process, due to the increased complexity of the issues under consideration.

Appendix 2 Timeline of key DPCR activities

Date	Activity
28-May-02	Developing network monopoly price controls (DNMPC) workshop
Aug-02	DNMPC consultation
24-Oct-02	Structure of charges update paper
13-Jan-03	Distributed generation open letter
15-Jan-03	Distribution losses consultation
Feb-03	DNMPC workshop
Feb-03	Structure of charges workshop
12-Feb-03	DNMPC update paper
14-Mar-03	DNMPC open letter on timetable and Frontier Economics reports
25-Mar-03	Consultation on DG-BPQ
10-Apr-03	Open letter on customer survey methodology
14-Apr-03	Distribution losses workshop
12-Jun-03	Structure of charges consultation paper
12-Jun-03	Distribution losses consultation
16-Jun-03	Issue HBPO
24-Jun-03	DNMPC conclusions paper
27-Jun-03	Issue DG-BPQ
Jul-03	Structure of charges workshop (x2)
16-Jul-03	DPCR first consultation paper + initial metering consultation
30-Jul-03	Rebates consultation paper
Sep-03	DG-BPQ returned
Sep-03	HBPO returned
30-Sep-03	CEPA benchmarking and customer survey (part 1) reports
08-Oct-03	FBPQ issued
16-Oct-03	DPCR update paper
Nov-03	DNO cost visits
Nov-03	Storms interim arrangements announced
07-Nov-03	Draft financial model published
07-Nov-03	DPCR workshop
14-Nov-03	Structure of charges consultation paper
01-Dec-03	Rebates consultation paper
02-Dec-03	CEPA Total factor productivity report
18-Dec-03	DPCR second consultation paper
18-Dec-03	Mott report on DG costs
Jan-04	FBPQ returns
Feb-04	DNO visits with Duncan Whyte
Feb-04	DNO-Authority committee meetings
24-Mar-04	DPCR policy paper
Apr-04	E&Y visit DNOs
06-Apr-04	Structure of charges consultation paper
20-Apr-04	DPCR workshop
21-Apr-04	Letter issued to DNOs regarding cost assessment
May-04	DNO visits with Duncan Whyte
14-May-04	DPCR incentives letter
May-04	PB Power modelling meeting
May-04	E&Y wrap-up meetings
28-Jun-04	DPCR initial proposals
28-Jun-04	Customer survey (part 2) report
Jul-04	PB Power and E&Y draft reports to DNOs
Jul-04	DNO-Authority committee meetings
Jul-04	Financial model to DNOs
30-Jul-04	Structure of charges open letter
Aug-04	PB Power meetings with DNOs
27-Sep-04	DPCR update paper
Oct-04	Structure of charges consultation paper
Oct-04	DNO-Authority committee meetings
29-Nov-04	DPCR final proposals
21-Feb-05	Licence modification consultation

Appendix 3 Registration of interest in public workshop

Ofgem intends to hold a public workshop on key issues arising from the assessment of the distribution price control review. This workshop will take place in London, on Thursday 12 May 2005. If you would like register interest in participating in this workshop, please complete and return the form below (or email the requested details) by 15 April 2005 to:

Paul O'Donovan
Ofgem
9 Millbank
London, SW1P 3GE

After the closing date, further details will be sent to all those who have registered an interest in attending. If you have any queries, please contact Paul O'Donovan on 020 7901 7414 or at Paul.ODonovan@ofgem.gov.uk

Company/Organisation		
Company/Organisation		
Address		
Name of attendee(s)	Phone number(s)	
E-mail address(es)		