

The logo for British Gas, featuring the text "British Gas" in a bold, sans-serif font, followed by a stylized flame icon.

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Dear Gary,

## **Notice under Section 8A(3) Electricity Act 1989 – Global Utility Connections Limited**

### **Introduction and general comments**

British Gas Trading (British Gas) welcomes the opportunity to respond to Ofgem's consultation in respect of a notice under Section 8A(3) of the Electricity Act in relation to an application for a new electricity distribution licence from Global Utility Connections Limited. British Gas has an interest in the outcome of this issue because of our presence in the electricity market.

This non-confidential response can be placed in the Ofgem library.

### **Ofgem proposals**

#### Charging arrangements

British Gas agrees that it is appropriate, for an interim basis only, for domestic customers' charges on new distributors' networks to be set by reference to the charges of the ex-PES (the original privatised) Distribution Network Operator (DNO) within that service area. The appropriate enduring form of regulation for these charges should be price controls set on the basis of the efficient level of costs of serving those customers. British Gas would be concerned if these proposed interim arrangements were left in place for any significant period of time as this could perversely incentivise the ex-PES DNOs to restructure their charges on a non-cost reflective basis to foreclose the market to new entrants.

It is our understanding that the existing price controls for the ex-PES DNOs only apply to customers within their privatisation service areas. Consequently, no protection (beyond the application of competition law) is therefore available to domestic customers that are connected to these DNOs' networks outside their own service areas (i.e. in the service areas of other ex-PES DNOs). We hope that protection for these customers, at least analogous to that being proposed to customers of new electricity distributors, but ideally that relating to price controls is shortly forthcoming. It is likely that in the absence of the suggested additional protection, competition in this

connections market will at the very least be distorted to the detriment of customers. In practice though, it could allow opportunities for ex-PES DNOs to effectively foreclose access to the competitive supply market for their connected customers outside their own service areas in favour of the supply businesses of their own affiliated companies.

#### Financial ring fencing etc

The proposals in this area are generally welcome. However, the Authority will need to exercise extreme caution in relation to any discretion it chooses to exercise with regards to alternatives to the obligation to maintain an investment grade credit rating. Any alternatives need to afford no less financial protection of the licensee, hence customers, than the current default arrangements.

As these interim arrangements will eventually lead to price controls for all distributors it would appear appropriate to extend the provisions of regulatory accounts to new entrants at this time. This should also ensure that any consents given by the Authority to allow charges to be higher than the ex-PES DNO in that area can be verified on an ongoing basis via consistent cost allocation information.

#### ***Other existing Section C licence conditions***

##### Conditions 39, 40 and 41

Beyond distribution activities, customers should be protected via effective competition. The introduction of the Utilities Act formally separated the competitive supply activities from the monopoly distribution activities. These changes were brought about to remove any perverse incentives for the monopoly distributor to discriminate in favour of its own supply business. Similar arrangements were earlier brought about in gas following an Ofgas referral to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission<sup>1</sup>. Most commentators agree that this is the minimum form of regulation to facilitate effective supply competition.

These arrangements are effectively implemented for ex-PES DNOs via restrictions on the use of distributor information, the appointment of a compliance officer and the prohibition of cross-subsidies. The protections currently afforded to existing domestic customers connected to the networks of ex-PES DNOs via licence conditions 39,40 and 41 should therefore be extended to the domestic customers of new entrants. Failure to do so, could allow opportunities for new entrant DNOs to effectively foreclose access to the competitive supply market for their connected customers in favour of the supply businesses of their own affiliated companies.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me on the number given above.

Yours sincerely

Tahir Majid  
Regulatory Issues Manager, Strategy

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<sup>1</sup> The predecessor to the Competition Commission