Consultation

Renewal of Ban on Acquisition-only Tariffs (BAT) after March 2027

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Response deadline:	25 September 2026
Contact:	Daniel Newport, Deputy Director
Team:	Retail Market Policy
Email:	retailpolicyinterventions@ofgem.gov.uk

Standard Licence Condition (SLC) 22B, the Ban on Acquisition-only Tariffs ("BAT"), is currently scheduled to expire on 31 March 2027 unless Ofgem exercises its existing licence powers to extend it. Through this consultation, we are seeking views on a proposal to renew the BAT for a further 12 months, until 31 March 2028, unless stakeholders provide new and persuasive evidence supporting its removal. We are also inviting feedback on the proposed renewal of the associated market-wide derogation across the same period.

This consultation focuses solely on whether SLC 22B should be extended or removed in its current form as a temporary market intervention.

We welcome responses from all parties with an interest in the domestic retail energy market, particularly energy suppliers, third-party intermediaries and consumer groups, as well as other stakeholders and members of the public.

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Executive summary

We are consulting on whether to keep the Ban on Acquisition-only Tariffs, known as the BAT, in place for a further 12 months. The BAT means that, where suppliers offer tariffs to new customers, they must also make those tariffs available to their existing customers. We are minded to extend the BAT, and retain its associated market-wide derogation, until 31 March 2028.

The BAT was introduced in April 2022 as a temporary intervention in response to the last gas crisis. Since then, Ofgem has extended the measure annually. We consider that the rationale for the previous extension of the BAT until March 2027 remains relevant. In particular, we consider the BAT continues to have benefit to consumers.

The wider regulatory framework has changed significantly since the BAT was introduced. Our financial resilience measures, alongside ongoing monitoring and supervision of suppliers, have strengthened supplier resilience. However, recent supplier failures demonstrate that risks remain. Renewed disruption to global energy supplies due to the conflict in the Middle East has also contributed to higher wholesale prices and increased volatility.

The BAT is likely to have a mixed effect on competition. It is likely to reduce the range of cheaper deals available to active customers, because suppliers cannot reserve their best tariffs only for new customers. However it ensures the lowest priced tariffs are available to all, not just those willing and able to switch. The BAT may also encourage suppliers to find non-price means to attract and retain customers, such as improved service. The associated market-wide derogation may also encourage greater internal switching and engagement.

The BAT can provide protection to existing customers by helping to ensure that access to competitive tariffs does not depend on switching supplier. If the measure was removed, some existing customers, particularly fixed term tariff customers who are unable or unwilling to switch supplier, could end up paying more if suppliers subsidised acquisition-only tariffs through higher prices for their existing fixed term tariff customers.

This consultation only considers whether to extend the BAT and retain the market-wide derogation temporarily until 31 March 2028. It should not be read as a view on whether these measures should become enduring parts of the retail energy market. As we have previously made clear, our default position is to extend the BAT until substantive decisions are made on its permanent status. Such decisions about their longer-term role, and how they interact with future price protection and retail market arrangements, would be considered separately.

1. Introduction

We briefly introduce this consultation and provide information about how to respond.

Purpose of this consultation

1.1 This is a consultation on extending the Ban on Acquisition-only Tariffs ("BAT") and retaining its associated market-wide derogation, which are due to expire on 31 March 2027, for a further 12 months until 31 March 2028. The BAT ensures that any discounted deals available to a supplier's new customers are also available to existing ones. The market-wide derogation allows suppliers to offer 'retention only' tariffs exclusively to their existing customers which are cheaper than their tariffs available externally.

1.2 The existing renewal mechanism in SLC 22B allows for the BAT to be extended on an annual basis. The scope of this consultation reflects our proposal to extend an existing temporary measure. A review of the longer-term role of the BAT (and the market-wide derogation) would require a broader and more detailed assessment.

1.3 We have consulted on extending the BAT on an annual basis since its introduction and are grateful for stakeholders' previous submissions. In order to reduce the work required for stakeholders to respond, if stakeholder views have not changed since we last consulted on extending the BAT in August last year, we invite stakeholders to say so in their responses (specifying the date of their previous response we should take into account for this consultation), rather than repeat previous arguments. Responses which are concise and refer back to previous arguments in this way will be considered in the same way as other responses. Where stakeholders have different views or any new or additional evidence, we encourage stakeholders to reflect those views together with any supporting evidence in full in their responses.

1.4 Section 2 sets out our assessment and seeks views on whether the BAT should be extended in its current interim form until 31 March 2028.

1.5 Section 3 sets out our assessment and seeks views on whether the BAT's associated market-wide derogation should continue alongside the BAT until 31 March 2028.

Context and related publications

1.6 The BAT was introduced in April 2022 alongside the Market Stabilisation Charge (MSC) as a temporary measure to address extreme wholesale market volatility and high energy prices. Together, these interventions helped improve the resilience of the GB domestic retail energy market during a period of significant uncertainty for both suppliers and consumers. At the same time, a market-wide derogation was introduced. While the MSC expired on 31 March 2024, the BAT was retained because of its potential consumer benefits beyond supporting market stability.

1.7 We first examined the wider merits of the BAT through our October 2023 Call for Input and subsequently proposed removing it in the May 2024 Statutory Consultation. However, following stakeholder feedback and consideration of ongoing market conditions, we decided in July 2024 to retain the BAT. This decision reflected evidence of consumer benefits and the opportunity to assess the measure in more stable market conditions, as well as its potential impact on consumer trust in the market.

1.8 The October 2024 Consultation and November 2024 Decision extended the BAT until 31 March 2026. The August 2025 Consultation and November 2025 Decision subsequently extended it until 31 March 2027 due to the additional consumer benefits it delivers and to support market stability. On each occasion, we also retained the associated market-wide derogation.

1.9 In our two most recent decisions, we made clear that our default position is that the BAT would remain in place until substantive decisions are made on its permanent status. We also set a high bar for making any changes to our default position in the short to medium term – namely that there should be compelling evidence that it would be actively damaging to the retail market for the BAT to be retained.

Consultation stages

Stage 1 - Consultation open: 28 August 2026

Stage 2 - Deadline for responses and consultation closes (awaiting decision): 25 September 2026

Stage 4 - Consultation outcome (decision) and responses published: November 2026

How to respond

We want to hear from anyone interested in this consultation. Please send your response to the person or team named on the front page of this document.

We have asked for your feedback in each of the questions throughout. Please respond to each one as fully as you can.

We will publish non-confidential responses on our website.

Your response, data, and confidentiality

You can ask us to keep your response, or parts of your response, confidential. We will respect this, subject to obligations to disclose information. For example, under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, statutory directions, court orders, government regulations, or where you give us explicit permission to disclose. If you do want us to keep your response confidential, please clearly mark this on your response and explain why.

If you wish us to keep part of your response confidential, please clearly mark those parts of your response that you do wish to be kept confidential and those that you do not wish to be kept confidential. Please put the confidential material in a separate appendix to your response. If necessary, we will contact you to discuss which parts of the information in your response should be kept confidential and which can be published. We might ask for reasons why.

If the information you give in your response contains personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) as retained in domestic law following the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union ("UK GDPR"), the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority will be the data controller for the purposes of GDPR. Ofgem uses the information in responses in performing its statutory functions and in accordance with section 105 of the Utilities Act 2000. Please refer to our Privacy Notice on consultations, see Appendix 4.

If you wish to respond confidentially, we will keep your response confidential, but we will publish the number, but not the names, of confidential responses we receive. We will not link responses to respondents if we publish a summary of responses, and we will evaluate each response on its own merits without undermining your right to confidentiality.

How to track the progress of a consultation

1. Find the web page for the call for input you would like to receive updates on.
2. Click ‘Get emails about this page’, enter your email address and click ‘Submit’.
3. You will receive an email to notify you when it has changed status.

A consultation has three stages: ‘Open’, ‘Closed (awaiting decision)’, and ‘Closed (with decision)’.

2. Renewal of BAT until 31 March 2028

This section sets out the key reasons for our proposal to renew SLC 22B for a further 12 months, until 31 March 2028, on which we are seeking stakeholder views.

Questions

Q1. Should the temporary BAT (SLC 22B) be renewed until 31 March 2028?

Q2. If you consider that SLC 22B should not be renewed from 31 March 2027, please share specific evidence to support your arguments.

Rationale for extending the BAT previously

2.1 When we published our decision in November 2025 to extend the BAT for a further 12 months until 31 March 2027, we said doing so would deliver consumer benefits, especially to vulnerable and disengaged customers, while continuing to support market stability. We also discussed how extending the BAT could also help to increase consumer trust in the market, by enabling customers to access their own suppliers' cheapest tariffs.

2.2 We recognised that removing the BAT could benefit some consumers, particularly active customers able to access cheaper acquisition-only deals. However, in previous decisions to extend the BAT, we concluded that these potential gains were outweighed by the wider benefits of retaining it for consumers overall and for the stability of the sector.

2.3 In their responses to our August 2025 consultation, stakeholders – both consumer groups and suppliers - broadly agreed with our case for extending the BAT. Some price comparison websites had responded to previous consultations opposing the extension of the BAT saying it weakens competition and reduces incentives to switch, adding that vulnerable and disengaged customers are already protected by the price cap.

Rationale for extending the BAT again

Consumer trust

2.4 When supporting the extension of the BAT in response to previous consultations, some stakeholders have said that removing the measure could reduce consumer trust in the retail energy market. This is a reasonable concern given potential consumer perceptions of a market where, in the absence of the BAT, only active switchers can access the cheapest tariffs on the market. The sense of unfairness may be compounded by the fact that these active switchers face higher prices when their acquisition-only tariff expires if they stay with their supplier. The perception that the market is not fair and an erosion of consumer trust could have adverse effects on effective competition in the longer term.

2.5 While the specific impact of the BAT on consumer trust in the retail energy market is difficult to isolate, broader indicators suggest that trust in the retail energy market has been improving. According to Indicative findings from our forthcoming annual Consumer Impacts of Market Conditions (CIM) survey, based on research carried out in February-March 2026 and set to be published next month, 45% of consumers said that they trust energy suppliers to be fair in the way they deal with consumers and citizens, up from 41% in 2025 and the highest result recorded since March 2022 when the first CIM survey began collecting these figures. This compares with levels recorded in the mid 30% range between July 2022 and January 2024.

2.6 Our forthcoming CIM survey also included a question on the BAT for the first time which provides some evidence that consumers support the principle underpinning the measure. When asked about the types of customers who should have access to suppliers' best energy deals, 70% of consumers said that suppliers' best deals should be available to existing customers as well as new customers, even if this results in less heavily discounted tariffs overall. This compares with 22% of consumers who said that customers who shop around should receive the cheapest deals, even if existing customers pay more.

2.7 We note that customers were not asked about the potential longer term benefits such as improved customer service that may result from greater competitive pressure in the market exerted by acquisition-only tariffs.

2.8 It is worth noting that trust does not depend solely on regulatory interventions. Suppliers can take unilateral actions to bolster trust - eg in relation to their pricing, service and communications. However, in the absence of the BAT, competitive pressure could encourage suppliers to offer acquisition only tariffs even if they would otherwise prefer not to.

Consumer protection

2.9 The BAT can provide consumer protection to existing customers, particularly those on fixed term tariffs who are vulnerable or in debt. If the BAT was removed, suppliers could offer cheaper deals only to new customers and make up the lost revenue by charging higher prices for existing customers on fixed term tariffs. Fixed term tariff customers who are unable or unwilling to switch to a different supplier to access cheaper acquisition-only deals, but who are sufficiently engaged to switch to another fixed term tariff with their existing suppler, could therefore end up paying more. Ofgem data indicates that since the BAT was introduced, fixed term tariffs for existing customers have become better value than historically, when compared against tariffs available on the open market.

2.10 Suppliers' existing customers who are on default tariffs are already protected by the cap and therefore the BAT only provides limited additional protection to them. Since most default tariffs are already priced at or just below the level of the cap, suppliers could not charge most default tariff customers more to subsidise acquisition-only tariffs if the BAT were removed.

2.11 The consumer protection benefit of retaining the BAT is particularly relevant for fixed term tariff customers in debt. Credit customers with debt that has been outstanding for more than 28 days, and prepayment meter customers with debt above the Debt Assignment Protocol threshold (£500 per fuel), may face restrictions on switching supplier, as set out under Customer Transfer Blocking arrangements (SLC 14). This means that these customers can only access their existing supplier's tariffs.

2.12 Indicative findings from our forthcoming CIM survey demonstrate that a much higher proportion of vulnerable customers, who are more likely to be in debt, are more likely to switch with their existing supplier than to another supplier. In the last six months 24% of customers who said they were constantly struggling to pay their energy bills said they had switched tariff with the same supplier - higher than the average of 17% for all customers.

2.13 Rising debt levels and higher numbers of customers in debt means more customers will be restricted from switching to another supplier. Ofgem's latest figures show that in 2026 Q1 the total amount of debt and arrears owed by domestic customers for more than 91 days was a record £4.79 billion, compared to £4.15 billion for the same quarter last year. Moreover, the number of accounts repaying debt has increased by 3% for electricity – to 852,000 – and by 4% for gas – to 710,000.

2.14 Given the continued cost of living pressures on households, rising energy prices and the uncertain outlook for global energy markets, the risk remains that high debt levels could persist or increase further in the near term. This suggests that the BAT is likely to continue to provide important protection for these customers.

Competition

2.15 While acquisition-only tariffs can disadvantage existing customers, they benefit active customers. Under the BAT, suppliers have to offer the same deals to both new and existing customers, so are less likely to offer such cheap tariffs to all customers. By reducing the incentive for suppliers to offer deeper discounts to attract new customers, the BAT therefore likely reduces the range of cheaper prices for active customers. Cheaper prices could still be available to active customers however, as new entrants may still price aggressively under the BAT, because they have few existing customers to whom they would have to offer the same tariff.

2.16 Nevertheless it is likely that the BAT reduces the number of external switches by customers to other suppliers. At the same time, it is possible that this reduction in external switching is offset to some extent by higher internal switching levels as suppliers focus more on retaining existing customers rather than acquiring new ones, for example by offering better value tariffs or improved customer service. The market-wide derogation further supports internal switching by allowing suppliers to offer existing customers retention-only tariffs which are cheaper than those available to all customers (see next section).

2.17 While official switching data excludes internal switching, Ofgem's consumer research indicates that internal switching levels have been growing, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of overall switching activity. According to indicative findings from our forthcoming CIM survey, 17% of customers said they had switched with the same supplier in the last 6 months. This is the same proportion as recorded last year, representing the highest level since March 2022 when the first CIM survey began collecting these figures. Moreover, it represents a steady increase in relative terms over this period, with over 3 times as many customers reporting they had switched with their existing supplier compared to a new supplier in the last 6 months, up from twice as many recorded in November 2022- January 2024.

2.18 Regardless of the specific impact of the BAT on competition, there has been a recovery in the proportion of customers on fixed term tariffs compared to standard variable tariffs since the measure was introduced. According to our latest figures, in June this year 34% of customers were on fixed term tariffs, up from a low of around 9% in July 2023. The number of fixed term tariff customers has fallen in recent months, from 40% in April this year, but this is likely due to rising wholesale prices narrowing the gap between fixed term and price capped tariffs. Throughout 2025, quarterly external switching figures showed a strong increase compared to 2024. Available data for 2026 so far indicates that external switching levels have fallen slightly compared to the same period last year.

2.19 There are other metrics to assess competition beyond price and switching over which the BAT may have an influence. By constraining the ability of suppliers to use pricing to attract new customers, the BAT may also increase suppliers' focus on non-price features like customer service to gain market share, which would then benefit both new and existing customers. According to the Energy Consumer

Satisfaction Survey commissioned by Ofgem and Citizens Advice, there has been a gradual improvement in customer service satisfaction with suppliers since 2023 and levels remain at an all time high since 2018 when the survey began.

2.20 The number of new entrants is another indicator of competition. During 2025-2026, we continued to see an increasing number of companies wanting to enter the supply market since the last gas crisis. The BAT may contribute to making the supply market more attractive for entrants. This reflects the fact it removes the ability for suppliers to use revenue from existing fixed tariff customers to subsidise cheap acquisition only tariffs. Suppliers' pricing will be affected by their commercial incentives, but to the extent that such behaviour was a concern for potential entrants, the BAT may reduce uncertainty for them.

2.21 We acknowledge that the BAT has longer term impacts more broadly on competition and the market which are harder to quantify. These would require further assessment when deciding whether to make the BAT an enduring feature of the market.

Market stability

2.22 We consider that the BAT still supports sustainable competition. It reduces the risk of unsustainable competition by reducing suppliers' incentives to offer unsustainably cheap acquisition-only deals to win new customers. This reduces the financial risks associated with aggressive pricing strategies which can contribute to disorderly supplier exits and associated costs for consumers.

2.23 The BAT can further support market stability by reducing the risk that suppliers are left with stranded hedges for price cap customers who switch away in a falling market. This risk is greater when wholesale prices are high. In this scenario suppliers can price fixed-term tariffs using more recent, lower wholesale prices, while the cap reflects a lagged hedging strategy. This can make fixed-term tariffs relatively more attractive, increasing switching away from the cap and leaving suppliers with expensive hedges that may need to be sold back to the market at a loss. By limiting the price differential between acquisition-only tariffs and the cap (and therefore reducing the number of cap customers switching away), the BAT can reduce this risk.

2.24 The suite of financial resilience measures Ofgem has introduced since 2021-22, together with our ongoing monitoring and supervision of suppliers, has significantly strengthened supplier resilience to both internal and external shocks, helping to safeguard households, businesses and the wider economy. In particular, since March 2025, suppliers with domestic customers have been required to comply with minimum capital requirements to help ensure suppliers maintain sufficient capital to absorb losses. Our most recent supplier financial resilience annual report set out that over 2025-26, the overall resilience of the market improved, with aggregate capital remaining significantly above minimum requirements, although it decreased slightly compared to the previous year.

2.25 However, challenges remain, illustrated by two supplier failures in April and November 2025, the first suppliers to fail since 2022. Moreover, the global environment in which the GB energy market operates remains highly uncertain, with the conflict in the Middle East once again disrupting global energy supplies. Such developments can rapidly increase pressure on supplier finances and consumer affordability, highlighting the continued importance of a robust and resilient regulatory framework. In particular the sharp rise in energy prices we have witnessed as a result of the ongoing conflict increases potential supplier losses from stranded hedges when wholesale prices fall and price cap customers switch away, a risk that the BAT as noted above, can help to mitigate.

2.26 In response to the sharp rise in wholesale prices, following a consultation in May this year, we published our decision to reintroduce the Market Stabilisation Charge (MSC) licence condition, which enables us to implement the mechanism at pace based on market conditions to support market stability. While the MSC is a potentially more powerful mechanism, we consider that the BAT can also play a valuable role in supporting market stability and that it would be prudent to retain the BAT for a further 12 months given the uncertain and volatile outlook for wholesale prices.

2.27 More generally, we recognise that a more detailed review of the enduring case for the BAT in the wider context of price protection and the future retail market more generally is needed. However, until that point, we consider that maintaining the existing requirement supports the predictability of regulation.

Our minded to position

2.28 We consider the rationale that supported the previous extension of the BAT and its associated market-wide derogation (until March 2027) continues to apply to this proposed extension.

2.29 We acknowledge that extending the BAT is likely to reduce the range of cheaper tariffs available to active customers. We consider however that it would also support more sustainable competition and can provide consumer protection, especially to those on fixed term tariffs who are vulnerable and disengaged, as well as additional consumer benefits

2.30 We consider that the rationale is strengthened by recent events in the Middle East. We acknowledge that the geopolitical situation is uncertain and difficult to predict, particularly for the timeframe up to March 2028 when we are proposing to extend the BAT.

2.31 Neverthless, while we will continue to monitor the impact on the GB energy market before making a final decision on whether to extend the BAT in November, we consider it reasonable to expect that the global outlook for wholesale prices will remain volatile for the foreseeable future and we should plan accordingly. Given the BAT supports market stability, we therefore consider it would be prudent to retain the measure for a further 12 months.

2.32 We wish to make clear that the minded-to position expressed in this consultation relates to the temporary extension of the BAT by a further 12 months until 31 March 2028 and should not be interpreted as a judgement on whether to make the BAT enduring. Likewise, the arguments expressed in this consultation are not an exhaustive description of what we consider to be all the likely impacts of an enduring BAT. The longer term impact of the BAT as an enduring feature of the market need to be assessed in the context of price protection and the future retail market more generally.

3. Retention of market-wide derogation until 31 March 2028

The market-wide derogation from SLC 22B currently expires by default on 31 March 2027, the same time as the BAT is currently scheduled to expire. In this section we set out our proposals to retain the market-wide derogation, alongside the BAT, for another 12 months until 31 March 2028. We are seeking stakeholder views on our proposal.

Questions

Q3. Should the BAT's associated market-wide derogation be retained until 31 March 2028 alongside our proposal to extend the BAT for the same time period?

Q4. If you consider that the market-wide derogation should be removed after 31 March 2027, please share specific evidence to support your arguments.

Context

3.1 The market-wide derogation from SLC 22B allows suppliers to offer retention-only deals exclusively to existing customers without making them available to new customers. This derogation is set to expire on 31 March 2027—aligned with the BAT's current scheduled expiry— unless the BAT is extended through the existing renewal process. The direction we published in 2022 introducing the derogation stated that it would be in force for the duration of SLC22B unless we revoked the direction earlier or varied it in writing.

3.2 We consider that the rationale for retaining the market-wide derogation remains valid. We are therefore proposing to retain it alongside the BAT until 31 March 2028. Our key reasons are set out below:

a) Supporting the interests of consumers: Allowing retention-only tariffs can benefit the customers who select these tariffs. This benefit reflects that serving an existing customer can involve lower costs than acquiring a new customer. Suppliers will take different approaches to reflecting acquisition costs into their tariffs, but it may be possible to offer at least some benefit to existing customers..

b) Providing better deals for vulnerable or indebted customers: We consider that retaining the derogation is likely to benefit vulnerable and indebted consumers in particular, especially those who may be unable to switch supplier.

c) Regulatory certainty: Consistent with our rationale for extending the BAT, we consider that retaining the derogation for a further 12 months provides a degree of regulatory certainty that supports market stability and enables suppliers to undertake financial planning and tariff-setting with greater confidence.

3.3 In previous consultations, we noted that the slow return to competition and more robust levels of switching following the last gas crisis made it difficult to assess the impact of the derogation on the retail market. We are grateful for previous stakeholder responses about the derogation including proposals about how it could be amended.

3.4 An assessment on whether the BAT should become an enduring feature of the market should also be accompanied by a detailed review of whether the derogation should also become permanent and if so, in what form. This review will assess the derogation's impact on the retail market, drawing on data from the more significant level of fixed-term tariff uptake we have seen more recently.

Send us your feedback

We believe that consultation is at the heart of good policy development. We are keen to receive your comments about this consultation. We would also like to get your answers to these questions:

- Do you have any comments about the quality of this document?
- Do you have any comments about its tone and content?
- Was it easy to read and understand? Or could it have been better written?
- Are its conclusions balanced?
- Did it make reasoned recommendations?
- Do you have any further comments?

Please send your feedback to stakeholders@ofgem.gov.uk.

Appendix 1. Privacy policy

Personal data

The following explains your rights and gives you the information you are entitled to under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Note that this section only refers to your personal data (your name address and anything that could be used to identify you personally) not the content of your response to the consultation.

1. The identity of the controller and contact details of our Data Protection Officer

The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority is the controller, (for ease of reference, "Ofgem"). The Data Protection Officer can be contacted at dpo@ofgem.gov.uk

2. Why we are collecting your personal data

Your personal data is being collected as an essential part of the consultation process, so that we can contact you regarding your response and for statistical purposes. We may also use it to contact you about related matters.

3. Our legal basis for processing your personal data

As a public authority, the GDPR makes provision for Ofgem to process personal data as necessary for the effective performance of a task carried out in the public interest. i.e. a consultation.

4. With whom we will be sharing your personal data

Information: Include here all organisations outside Ofgem who will be given all or some of the data. There is no need to include organisations that will only receive anonymised data. If different organisations see different set of data, then make this clear. Be a specific as possible.

5. For how long we will keep your personal data, or criteria used to determine the retention period.

Your personal data will be held for (be as clear as possible but allow room for changes to programmes or policy. It is acceptable to give a relative time e.g. 'six months after the project is closed')

6. Your rights

The data we are collecting is your personal data, and you have considerable say over what happens to it. You have the right to:

- know how we use your personal data
- access your personal data

- have personal data corrected if it is inaccurate or incomplete
- ask us to delete personal data when we no longer need it
- ask us to restrict how we process your data
- get your data from us and re-use it across other services
- object to certain ways we use your data
- be safeguarded against risks where decisions based on your data are taken entirely automatically
- tell us if we can share your information with 3rd parties
- tell us your preferred frequency, content and format of our communications with you
    - to lodge a complaint with the independent Information Commissioner (ICO) if you think we are not handling your data fairly or in accordance with the law. You can contact the ICO at https://ico.org.uk/ or telephone 0303 123 1113.

7. Your personal data will not be sent overseas (Note that this cannot be claimed if using Survey Monkey for the consultation as their servers are in the US. In that case use "the Data you provide directly will be stored by Survey Monkey on their servers in the United States. We have taken all necessary precautions to ensure that your rights in term of data protection will not be compromised by this".

8. Your personal data will not be used for any automated decision making.

9. Your personal data will be stored in a secure government IT system. (If using a third-party system such as Survey Monkey to gather the data, you will need to state clearly at which point the data will be moved from there to our internal systems.)

10. More information For more information on how Ofgem processes your data, view our Ofgem privacy policy.