

# Call for input: Stakeholder evidence - DSO Performance Panel 2024/25

Dear Stakeholders,

This document outlines our call for evidence on Distribution System Operator (DSO) performance in 2024/25.

### Background

We set price controls for the companies that operate Great Britain's gas and electricity networks. The RIIO-ED2 price control is aimed at electricity distribution networks operators (DNOs) and will run between April 2023 and March 2028.<sup>1</sup> As part of RIIO-ED2 we introduced the new DSO financial operational delivery incentive (ODI-F). The DSO ODI-F aims to drive DNOs to more efficiently develop and use their network, taking into account flexible alternatives to network reinforcement, in turn resulting in lower bills for consumers.

A key part of the DSO incentive evaluation process is the DSO Performance Panel assessment. The Panel is a mix of independent experts and DSO stakeholder representatives who will have a role in challenging and evaluating DNOs' performance in RIIO-ED2. The Panel will provide DSO stakeholders and industry experts with a platform to hold the DNOs to account, adding greater transparency to the DSO incentive decision making process. Assessment will be made annually against a pre-agreed set of criteria, as set out in Appendices 1 and 2.

### Stakeholder input

We want to utilise the knowledge and experience of a wide array of industry parties and independent experts to gain a comprehensive picture of DSO performance. As such, we are publishing this call for evidence to request DSO stakeholders' feedback on any areas of distribution network company performance (with respect to the DSO Performance Panel assessment criteria) from April 2024 to March 2025. This may include areas where you believe the DSO has met or exceeded expectations and/or the areas where you may have concerns that expectations are not being met.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> <u>https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications/riio-ed2-final-determinations</u>

Stakeholder evidence provided through this call for evidence will be taken into consideration by the DSO Performance Panel when evaluating DSO Panel Submissions<sup>2</sup> and presentations<sup>3</sup>, acting to reduce the information asymmetry between them and distribution network companies.

We would prefer to receive feedback in written format, but are also open to more informal routes (eg, by phone etc). **Please send your feedback to <u>RIIOED2@ofgem.gov.uk</u> by 9 May 2025.** 

### **Next steps**

We will publish non-confidential responses on our website by mid-May and the DSO Performance Panel Secretariat will summarise the responses so that they are available to the DSO Performance Panel. The DSO Performance Panel may contact DSO Stakeholders or distribution network companies to seek clarifications on call for evidence submissions.

DSO Performance Panel Sessions will take place in the summer each year following DNO submissions by the end of the preceding April. By 30 September each year we will publish the DSO Incentive Report. This report will contain DSO Performance Panel scores, the breakdown by criteria, associated reward/penalty, and detailed feedback for each distribution network company explaining the decision-making process.

We look forward to hearing from you. If you have any questions on the contents of this letter, please contact us at the email address listed above.

Many thanks,

#### **David McCrone**

Head of Price Control Operations Policy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The DSO Performance Panel Submission is an opportunity for distribution network companies to explain how they met the DSO Performance Panel assessment criteria through their DSO activities within the previous Regulatory Year.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Each distribution network company will then have the opportunity to take part in a 60-minute DSO Performance Panel Session. DNOs will give a 20-minute presentation, followed by 40 minutes of Q&A, as part of their DSO Performance Panel Session.

## Appendix 1: DSO Performance Panel assessment criteria and weightings

| No. | DSO Performance Panel assessment criteria                   | Weighting |
|-----|---|-----------|
| 1   | Delivery of DSO benefits                                    | 30%       |
| 2   | Data and information benefits                               | 20%       |
| 3   | Flexibility market development                              | 20%       |
| 4   | Options assessment and conflicts of interest mitigation     | 20%       |
| 5   | Distributed energy resources (DER) dispatch decision-making | 10%       |

### Appendix 2: DSO Performance Panel assessment scoring guidance

### Scoring guidance: Delivery of DSO benefits

|                         | Poor (1-2)  | Weak (3-4)   | Average (5-6)  | Good (7-8)  | Excellent (9+)  |
|-------------------------|---|--|--|---|---|
| Level of<br>ambition    | Benefits are poorly<br>articulated and<br>supported by a limited<br>evidence base | what extent they are<br>driven by DSO<br>activities<br>Assumptions are<br>weakly articulated and<br>not consistent with<br>well-established<br>methods for economic<br>appraisal (eg, HM | activities (eg, flexibility)<br>are well evidenced and<br>correspond with ambition in<br>DSO strategy<br>Consideration of the impact   | wider system benefits<br>(eg, greater network<br>access for DER and better<br>coordinated dispatch<br>across the Transmission /<br>Distribution boundary)   | the distribution network<br>company is taking a<br>proactive role on regiona<br>cross vector investment |
| Benefits<br>realisation | No consideration of<br>benefits realisation<br>within the RIIO-ED2<br>period      | Limited evidence that<br>the delivery of benefits<br>has been tracked<br>within the RIIO-ED2<br>period   | Clear articulation of actual<br>benefits the distribution<br>network company has<br>realised within the RIIO-<br>ED2 period through the<br>delivery of its DSO<br>strategy<br>Robust processes / KPIs for<br>tracking benefits | As "Average", but in<br>addition evidence that the<br>distribution network<br>company has quickly and<br>proactively adapted<br>existing plans and course-<br>correcting where<br>opportunity to increase<br>benefits | the distribution network<br>company has delivered<br>additional outputs that                            |

| Scoring guidance: Data and information provision | ion |
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|  | Poor (1-2)   | Weak (3-4)   | Average (5-6)  | Good (7-8) | Excellent (9+)  |
|--|--|--|--|------------|---|
| Scope,<br>granularity<br>and accuracy<br>of data | data and information<br>collected and shared<br>No consideration of<br>third-party data with<br>little to no use of smart<br>meter data<br>No strategic approach to<br>delivering improvements<br>with very weak evidence<br>that the distribution<br>network company is<br>taking steps to improve<br>data quality<br>Little to no consideration<br>of how to ensure data | to deliver<br>improvements with<br>only limited evidence<br>that the distribution<br>network company is<br>taking steps to improve<br>data quality<br>Limited consideration<br>of how to ensure data | across planning,<br>operational and market<br>roles, including at a<br>minimum the data set out<br>in the DSO Baseline<br>Expectations <sup>5</sup><br>Use of third-party data<br>considered, including<br>harnessing smart meter<br>data<br>Clear evidence that the<br>distribution network<br>company is taking steps to<br>improve data quality, with<br>processes in place to<br>address gaps in datasets<br>and drive up standards<br>Consideration of how to | - ·        | <ul> <li>As "good", but in addition:</li> <li>The distribution network company is leading the sector in promoting planning, operations and market data availability</li> <li>The distribution network company is sharing underlying methodologies and other insights beyon output data</li> </ul> |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> By accurate and unbiased we mean correct at time of publication, as close as possible to the actual value and not skewed in any direction. <sup>5</sup> These include, but are not limited to, comprehensive and comparable heat maps, distribution flexibility tender results and curtailment as part of non-firm connection agreements.

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| Accessibility<br>of data | of how to tailor data and<br>information provision to<br>DSO Stakeholders'<br>needs<br>Data is only available in<br>differing, hard to use<br>formats | how to adapt data and<br>information provision<br>to distribution network<br>company Stakeholders'<br>needs |   | Tailored approach to<br>provision and clear<br>evidence of how DSO<br>Stakeholder engagement<br>is being used to influence<br>and improve provision<br>Data is available in an<br>accessible, common<br>format | <ul> <li>As "good" with in addition:</li> <li>Provision of network models</li> <li>Consistent and standardised use of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to</li> </ul> |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
|                          | available in a logical,<br>easy to access location<br>Lack of credible evidence<br>that industry standards<br>are being considered or<br>applied      | Data is largely<br>available in a logical,<br>easy to access location<br>Some evidence that                 | a logical, easy to access<br>location<br>Evidence that industry<br>standards are consistently<br>being considered or<br>applied | Data is readily available in<br>a logical, easy to access<br>location  | allow DSO<br>Stakeholders to<br>automate their data<br>collection   |

|   | Poor (1-2)  | Weak (3-4)   | Average (5-6)  | Good (7-8)   | Excellent (9+)  |
|---|---|--|--|--|---|
| Design of<br>distribution<br>flexibility<br>products,<br>contracts and<br>processes | Lack of standardisation<br>across the distribution<br>network company's<br>distribution flexibility<br>services products,<br>contracts, and<br>qualification criteria<br>The distribution network<br>company is not following<br>industry standard<br>practice<br>Limited DSO Stakeholder<br>engagement has been<br>undertaken to identify<br>and address key issues<br>hindering flexibility<br>market development<br>The licensee is using<br>proprietary systems | across the distribution<br>network company's<br>distribution flexibility<br>services products,<br>contracts, and<br>qualification criteria,<br>with limited<br>justification<br>The distribution<br>network company is<br>following industry<br>standard practice in<br>some areas, with<br>limited justification<br>where this is not the<br>case<br>Some DSO Stakeholder<br>engagement has been<br>undertaken to identify<br>and address key issues<br>hindering flexibility<br>market development,<br>but this largely relies<br>on centrally-led | company's distribution<br>flexibility services products,<br>contracts, and qualification<br>criteria are standardised.<br>Where not, credible<br>justification is provided<br>The distribution network<br>company is following<br>industry standard practice,<br>eg, implementing Open<br>Network Project<br>deliverables. Where this is<br>not the case a credible<br>justification is provided<br>Extensive DSO Stakeholder<br>engagement has been<br>undertaken to identify and<br>address key issues<br>hindering flexibility market | <ul> <li>The distribution<br/>network company has<br/>implemented in full<br/>the current set of<br/>Open Network Project<br/>deliverables, and<br/>made improvements<br/>in response to DSO<br/>Stakeholder feedback</li> <li>Clear evidence that<br/>the distribution<br/>network company is<br/>unlocking the value of<br/>flow and energy</li> </ul> | As "good", but in<br>addition:<br>• The distribution<br>network company is<br>setting an industry<br>leading benchmark<br>for distribution<br>flexibility products,<br>contracts and<br>processes |

### Scoring guidance: Flexibility market development

| Facilitation of<br>market<br>access | provide market support<br>services and platform<br>services<br>Little to no evidence that<br>the distribution network<br>company has taken | to provide market<br>support services and<br>platform services<br>t The distribution<br>network company has<br>taken modest steps to | Clear explanation of how<br>the distribution network<br>company is enabling third<br>parties to provide market<br>support services and<br>platform services<br>Clear evidence that the<br>distribution network<br>company has undertaken<br>initiatives to improve<br>market access and enabling<br>simple, cost-efficient<br>participation have been<br>effective<br>Limited exclusivity clauses<br>with credible justification<br>where used | ad<br>∙ | - · | As "good", but in<br>addition:<br>Clear evidence that<br>the distribution<br>network company's<br>ambition extends<br>beyond delivering<br>distribution flexibilit<br>(for network<br>minimisation,<br>management and<br>restoration) to<br>enabling and facilita<br>flexibility for system<br>optimisation |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|---------|-----|---|
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| Scoring guidance: Options assessment and conflicts of intere | est mitigation |
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|--|----------------|

|   | Poor (1-2)   | Weak (3-4)   | Average (5-6)  | Good (7-8)   | Excellent (9+)  |
|---|--|--|--|--|---|
| Assessment of<br>network<br>options       | methodology used to<br>assess options to<br>resolve network needs<br>is not clearly defined or<br>accessible to DSO<br>Stakeholders<br>Options assessment<br>involves limited cross-<br>sector engagement,<br>optioneering and<br>planning with other<br>sectors or vectors<br>Evaluation<br>methodology used to<br>assess options to<br>resolve network needs<br>fails to recognise value<br>of alternatives to<br>conventional network<br>reinforcement,<br>including flexibility and<br>energy efficiency | is not clearly defined or<br>accessible to DSO<br>Stakeholders<br>Options assessment<br>involves some cross-<br>sector engagement,<br>optioneering and<br>planning with other<br>sectors or vectors<br>Evaluation<br>methodology used to<br>assess options to<br>resolve network needs<br>inconsistently | Evaluation methodology<br>used to assess options to<br>resolve network needs is<br>clearly defined and<br>accessible to DSO<br>Stakeholders<br>Options assessment<br>involves demonstrable<br>cross-sector engagement,<br>optioneering and planning<br>with other sectors or<br>vectors<br>Evaluation methodology<br>used to assess options to<br>resolve network needs has<br>a consistent approach to<br>valuing alternatives to<br>conventional network<br>reinforcement, including<br>flexibility and energy<br>efficiency | <ul> <li>As "average", but in addition:</li> <li>Proactive engagement with other network companies and current / prospective network users to resolve network needs</li> </ul> | network company has   |
| Management<br>of conflicts of<br>interest | network company has<br>not introduced  | The distribution<br>network company has<br>not introduced<br>sufficient proportionate  | The distribution network<br>company has introduced<br>proportionate measures to<br>identify and address actual   | As "average", but in<br>addition:<br>• Outcomes of<br>investment decisions   | As "good", but in<br>addition:<br>• The distribution<br>network company's |

| measures to identify<br>and address actual and<br>perceived conflicts<br>between its DSO and<br>network ownership<br>roles | measures to identify<br>and address actual and<br>perceived conflicts<br>between its DSO and<br>network ownership<br>roles | <ul> <li>and perceived conflicts</li> <li>between its DSO and</li> <li>network ownership roles,</li> <li>including:</li> <li>Demonstrable executive</li> <li>level accountability and</li> <li>board-level visibility of</li> <li>DSO decisions</li> <li>Transparent, clear and</li> <li>separate decision-</li> <li>making frameworks</li> <li>supported by</li> <li>independent oversight</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>are available on the distribution network company's website in a clear, accessible format</li> <li>Demonstrable, wide-ranging stakeholder buy-in to the distribution network company's approach and measures, including from market participants</li> <li>A clear evidence base put forward to justify the distribution network company's approach</li> <li>Formalised distribution network company-DSO relationship (e.g. operational agreement, decision-making framework, distribution network company-DSO code)</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>approach has been<br/>developed and<br/>validated through<br/>extensive DSO<br/>Stakeholder<br/>engagement and is<br/>backed up by<br/>compelling evidence</li> <li>The distribution<br/>network company is<br/>applying best practice,<br/>learning from other<br/>network operators and<br/>updating its approach<br/>in line and wider<br/>industry<br/>developments</li> <li>The distribution<br/>network company is<br/>delivering<br/>opportunities to both<br/>seek and share<br/>insights from across<br/>the sector, driving<br/>improvements not<br/>only within their<br/>organisation but<br/>across the sector as a<br/>whole</li> </ul> |
|--|--|--|---|--|
|--|--|--|---|--|

|                                | Poor (1-2)   | Weak (3-4)   | Average (5-6)   | Good (7-8)   | Excellent (9+)  |
|--------------------------------|--|--|---|--|---|
| DER visibility<br>and dispatch | The distribution<br>network company has<br>little visibility of DER<br>characteristics and<br>data parameters<br>Poorly defined and<br>opaque decision-<br>making framework for<br>when DER are<br>instructed to dispatch<br>in real-time, with no<br>coordination of<br>dispatch instructions<br>Operating a dispatch<br>instruction<br>infrastructure, with no<br>clear definitions or<br>rules, that runs risk of<br>"hard coding"<br>capabilities in network<br>operations to the<br>distribution network<br>company | some visibility of DER<br>characteristics and<br>data parameters<br>Poorly defined and<br>opaque decision-<br>making framework for<br>when DER are<br>instructed to dispatch<br>in real-time, with<br>limited coordination of<br>dispatch instructions<br>Operating a dispatch<br>instruction<br>infrastructure, with<br>weak definitions and<br>opaque rules, that runs<br>risk of "hard coding"<br>capabilities in network<br>operations to the<br>distribution network<br>company | The distribution network<br>company has<br>comprehensive and robust<br>visibility of DER<br>characteristics and data<br>parameters to inform<br>effective and coordinated<br>dispatch instructions<br>Clear and transparent<br>decision-making framework<br>for when DER are<br>instructed to dispatch in<br>real-time, including<br>primacy rules and<br>comprehensive<br>optimisation processes for<br>coordinating dispatch<br>instructions for DSO and<br>GB System Operator<br>flexibility services and<br>curtailment<br>Operating an efficient,<br>scalable dispatch<br>instruction infrastructure,<br>with clear definitions and<br>transparent rules, that<br>avoids "hard coding"<br>capabilities in network<br>operations to the | As "average", but in<br>addition:<br>• Enhanced DSO-GB<br>System Operator<br>communication<br>channels, eg,<br>complete ICCP link<br>installations<br>• Increased DER<br>participation in GB<br>System Operator<br>markets | As "good", but in<br>addition:<br>• Optimised whole<br>system coordination<br>of DER to resolving<br>conflicts of services<br>across GB System<br>Operator and DSO<br>• Leading industry in<br>ensuring dispatch<br>logic is consistent and<br>adhered to |

### Scoring guidance: Distributed energy resources (DER) dispatch decision making framework

### Call for input: Stakeholder evidence - DSO Performance Panel 2024/25 Stakeholder evidence - DSO Performance Panel 2024/25

| distribution network |  |
|----------------------|--|
| company              |  |