

# **Exit Capacity Development**

## **Presentation to Ofgem Exit and Balancing Workstream**

28 Jan 2004

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# Background

- Weaknesses recognised in existing interruptible arrangements
- Amendment to Transco's GT licence introduced in April 2002 :
  - “The licensee shall use all reasonable endeavours to ensure universal firm registration of NTS exit capacity with effect from 1 April 2004”
  - “Universal firm registration means that all NTS exit capacity is registered free from exit capacity curtailment rights”
- Ofgem requested scope of reform widened to include LDZ interruptible arrangements
- Implementation date extended to “as soon as is reasonably practicable after 1 April 2004” ( referring to 1 April 2005 as an indicative implementation date)

# Ofgem Objectives for Exit Capacity

## - Described in Letter to the Industry 27 May 03

- Cost reflective pricing, non-discrimination and removal of cross subsidies
  - Firm customers pay too much
- Transco determined (quantity of) interruption
  - Free-loading to be avoided by NGT rationing of interruptible contracts
- Increased customer choice
  - Flexible arrangements, probability or duration of interruption?
- Investment signals
  - Trade-offs between interruption, LNG and investment
- Safe and secure pipeline system
  - HSE should be satisfied that new arrangements are at least as good as old
- LDZ separation or sale
  - Robust to potential future divestment


# LDZ Interruption - Regime Reform History

- 1998 – 99 Discussion Paper NCD1 published; Interruption Seminars; Interruption Questionnaire
- Consultation Paper PC39 – Transco Review of Interruptible Services (May 1999)
- Ofgem Decision on PC39 (July 1999) – veto of proposals
- Ofgem Review of Interruptible Services (2000)
- Discussion Paper PD15 (Nov 2001) – variable and/or flexible service
- Ofgem SO proposals (2001/2) – 15 day regime
- Transco GT Licence – Universal Firm NTS Exit (Jul 02)
- Workstream Development (Sep 02 – date)
- Ofgem review (May/June 03)


# Principles of reform

- Enable more flexible capacity management at exit
- Reveal 'value' of transportation interruption.
- Provide better investment signal
- More imaginative demand side solutions
- Licence compliance

# Elements For Reform



# Development Permutations



# DN Solution

- Retain administered charge approach.
  - Conditions for a market approach not favourable.
- Process operated ahead of gas year.
- Matrix approach requires Transco to choose the number of days exposure to interruption for each site.
- Application approach requires shipper to nominate preferred exposure and Transco accepts/amends or rejects the application.
- Both approaches require transition arrangements in the event that an interruptible site is no longer required.

# DN Arrangements

- Firm exit capacity booking arrangements to apply
- Interruptible to firm switching
  - existing arrangements to apply outside of annual application process
- Firm to interruptible switching only to occur in the annual application process
- Interruption prices based on option exercise scheme
  - Option fee is upfront cost
  - Exercise fee payable on each occurrence of interruption
  - Pricing methodology to be published in the Transportation Statement

# Option and Exercise Regime

Adjustment %

100

Exercise discount B

Option discount B

50

Exercise discount A

Option discount A

30


0

15

30

45

National Grid Transco



# Application Process

- (Shipper) choice of option fee can differentiate the probability that supply point will be called or interruption
- Applications for interruptible LDZ Capacity and management of interruption continues on a supply point basis
- Applications for interruptible LDZ capacity occur each year ahead of Gas Year e.g. June for an October Gas Year

# High Level Principles

- Shippers are able to apply for “n” days of interruption
  - [n could be 5, 15, 25, 35, 45 for instance]
- Transco can reject number of days requested where  $n < 45$  if in aggregate insufficient days of interruption have been applied for
  - Transco then consider each application in turn and adjust applicable days to a default (previous year accepted value) starting with highest price and progress through stack until volume has been attained
  - No other terms will be adjusted
- Transco can reject an application for interruptible capacity if it is not required to maintain its required transportation

# DN Default Conditions etc

- All DM sites (firm and interruptible) can apply for interruptible capacity
  - Mandatory for existing interruptible sites to be considered in the annual process
  - Shippers can nominate terms (option/exercise) or default conditions can apply
  - Default – terms in place for the present year form the application for the next year
  - Default application in first year
    - 0% discount factor
    - 45 days duration
    - 1 year contract period
- Shippers can register for multiple year [5] interruption terms
- The number of days for interruptible rights may be determined by Transco where this is greater than the duration requested by the Shipper

# DN – Acceptance criteria

- Transco can reject an application for interruptible capacity if it is not required to maintain its required transportation capability
  - By ranking applications in price order
  - Price = option discount \* exit capacity charge
  - Accept lowest priced application first
  - Progress through stack until required volume obtained
- Revised interruption arrangements described here do not supersede the established emergency arrangements in Section Q of the Network Code

# Application Acceptance – Broad Principles

Application sequence	% discount	Option Price	Exercise Price	Exercise sequence
Accept last	100%	$P_6$	$E_1$	Exercise first
	80%	$P_5$	$E_2$	
	60%	$P_4$	$E_3$	
	40%	$P_3$	$E_4$	
	20%	$P_2$	$E_5$	
Accept first	0%	$P_1$	$E_6$	Exercise last

The diagram illustrates the relationship between application sequence and exercise sequence. The application sequence starts with 'Accept last' at the top and ends with 'Accept first' at the bottom, indicated by an upward-pointing arrow on the left. The exercise sequence starts with 'Exercise first' at the top and ends with 'Exercise last' at the bottom, indicated by a downward-pointing arrow on the right. The table shows that as the application sequence progresses (from last to first), the discount percentage decreases from 100% to 0%, the option price increases from  $P_6$  to  $P_1$ , and the exercise price decreases from  $E_1$  to  $E_6$ .

# Contracting Across NTS/network Boundary

- Consider 3 different scenarios :

## Scenario A - limited change

ie. Transco books NTS (firm) & LDZ (firm & int.) Capacity on behalf of shippers, at a level equal to the aggregate of capacity requirement for supply points (ie E SOQ)

## Scenario B – DM diversity

ie. Transco informs shippers of their registered SOQ values, and shippers book level of NTS & LDZ capacities, taking into account diversity

## Scenario C – NGT contracts with DNO (downstream network operator)

# Contracting Across the Boundary

- DNO option has found most favour so far.
- DNO aggregates demand within its DN.
- Takes a view on how much NTS exit capacity is required.
- Books the capacity.
  
- Charging methodology required to pass costs through.
- Incentive to book efficient levels of capacity?
- Tension between shipper/operator role?

# Universal NTS Firm

- Need for universal firm is not widely accepted.
- NTS only.
- Interruption replaced with turn-down contracts.
- Administered prices continue.
- Specific rules introduced for NTS CSEPs, storage sites & shared supply meter points (SSMPs).

# NTS Direct Connects – Proposed Process

1. Shippers book.
2. Annual duration (12 monthly blocks) / monthly duration.
3. Booked capacity  $\neq$  phys.Max. (In NExA), but  $>$  BSSOQ.
4. No voucher scheme.
5. Overrun charges apply (for SSMPs on an aggregate basis).
6. Daily product available ?

# Turn-down Contracting

- NGT to contract with shippers/consumers, via tender process
- Level of NTS exit capacity unchanged
- 3 years out (not agreed by NC workstream)
- Ranked in price ascending order
- Governance contained in procurement guidelines
- Novel solutions may be considered.

# Contractual/regulatory Changes

- Gas act
- GT licence
- IECR (inc. Entry ...)
- Procurement guidelines
- Network code
- Transportation charging statement
- Safety case

# Debating Points

- Why change?
- Should the NTS be firm only?
- Should/ how can consumers be involved?
- Should administered price process apply in DN?
- Should market approach necessitate a 3-year lead time for contracting?
- Should the DNO have a role?